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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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VISITS FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICAN SINAI ROLE

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 p 19

[Article by Ignacio Klich]

[Text] As Egypt's deputy foreign minister, Boutros Ghali, left Latin America last month with a firm Colombian commitment to send troops for the US-led Sinai monitoring force, Saudi Arabia's Prince Saud al Faisal flew in for a four-country visit.

AS EGYPT'S deputy foreign minister, Boutros Ghali, left Latin America last month with a firm Colombian commitment to send troops for the US-led Sinai monitoring force, Saudi Arabia's Prince Saud al Faisal flew in for a four-country visit.

After Mexico and Venezuela, the Saudi foreign minister travelled to Argentina, where he signed a trade and technical cooperation agreement. Last year, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales started imports of 22,000 barrels a day of Saudi oil sold directly by the state-owned Petromin concern. In July 1980, the Saudi commerce minister, Abdul Aziz al Solaim, visited Buenos Aires to see which Argentinian goods could be used to promote Saudi efforts to diversify sources of imports.

Saud al Faisal also questioned Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion about Argentina's offer to send 'some help' to the Sinai force. Camp David was not the answer, said the Saudi minister. Instead, he briefed the cautious Argentinians on Crown Prince Fahd's peace proposals to set up a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, and recognise Israel. However, it is doubtful whether the Argentinians are prepared to make more than a token gesture towards the Sinai multinational force, and the Arab League is trying to persuade Colombia and Fiji not to send troops.

In Brasilia, Prince Saud signed a similar cooperation agreement and the Brazilian government presented the visitor with a plot of land in the capital where a mosque and Islamic centre will be built. Earlier this year, the Saudi-backed World Assembly of Islamic Youth held its first gathering of

young Latin American Muslims in Brazil which, together with Argentina, has become home for many Muslims who came originally from the Arab world. There are larger Muslim communities however, in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, where immigrants from Pakistan and Indonesia settled.

The Brazilian gesture towards Saudi Arabia — the country's main oil supplier since the Gulf war hit imports from Iraq — resembled an earlier show of pragmatic affection. In 1974, the visiting Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs, Omar Sakkaf, was decorated with the Souther Cross. The Brazilians praised the Saudis for having 'included us in the restricted list of friendly countries to which the petroleum supply was maintained' after the 1973 oil embargo.

Prince Saud's declared hopes for a prompt decision on the opening of a PLO information office were intended to remind President Joao Figueiredo that two years have lapsed since he first broached the matter with Iraq's vice president, Taha Mohamed Marouf. Meanwhile, the man in charge of the PLO desk at the Brasilia Arab League office remains accredited as the league's first secretary.

Saudi interest in Latin America is quite recent. Until the middle of the 1960s Saudi Arabia was represented only in Mexico. Then came the opening of an embassy in Venezuela followed, early in the 1970s, by resident missions in Argentina and Brazil. Direct investments in the region are limited to Saudi shareholdings in the Lima-based Arab Latin American Bank, and Rio-based Banco Bozano Simonsen de Investimento.

Last November, Saudi Arabia obtained observer status with the Organisation of American States. If this was meant to signal Saudi interest in widening the scope and nature of its ties with the region, Prince Saud's itinerary suggests that Riyadh's main concern is still to cultivate strong links with Latin America's heavyweights.

CSO: 4400/8

PETRODOLLARS BACK A RALLYING YEN

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 p 45

[Article by Koji Nakamura]

[Text] A resumed flow of petrodollars, notably from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has triggered a substantial recovery in Japan's bond and securities markets, which had been in the doldrums because of the yen's nose-drive [as printed]

The yen hit a 15-month low of 247 to the dollar in early August, but recovered to Y230 levels towards mid-month. While financial experts, including the Bank of Japan's, had talked worriedly about its being unjustifiably 'undervalued,' the yen had been forced by high US interest rates to levels that caused the Japanese central bank to release dollar reserves in equalisation operations.

The oil producers re-entry into the bond and securities markets played a leading role in halting the slide. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had clearly seen the yen bottoming out early in August and started their yen-buying operations through investments in the markets. The yen's recovery--it had depreciated by some 20 per cent in two years--and the resumed petrodollar investments are thus inter-related, and some financial institutions including the Bank of Japan, are now confident that Y210-200 levels will be reached by next spring at the latest.

Clearly the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) feels confident too, and has resumed purchases of national bonds amounting to an estimated Y60bn. The agency, which had been buying \$200m in national bonds from the Bank of Japan every month since April 1980, suspended purchasing operations in early August when the yen was dropping daily.

However, as the yen rallied SAMA bought ¥10bn in medium-term national bonds through securities firms — and then ¥50bn in long-term national bonds from the Bank of Japan. With the monthly \$200m buying, SAMA's national bond holdings alone are estimated at \$3.4bn, nearly 14 per cent of oil producers' total \$25bn investments in Japanese financial markets — more than half the Japanese assets held by non-residents.

As of March 1981, the investments held by oil-producing countries (mainly Middle Eastern) were as follows: \$5.36bn in the bond market, \$1.5bn in bank accounts, \$1.68bn in short-term bonds and \$3.57bn in the stock market.

Buying by oil producers, notably Kuwait, was also a factor behind the recent registration of an unprecedented ¥8,000 in the stock exchange's Dow average. Besides the yen's recovery, the 'high profitability' of Japanese securities is also quoted as one reason for the market activity: securities market sources say that the profitability of Japanese stock on 10 August stood at 123, compared with 113 in the US, 105 in the UK, 69 in West Germany and 59 in France (based end-1979).

The surplus balance of Japanese stock acquisition held by non-residents amounted to ¥845.5bn in 1980 and ¥878.4bn in the year since August 1980. While the total non-residents' stake is around only one per cent of the total ¥80,000bn current value of securities listed on the Tokyo stock exchange, the share is steadily rising in terms of individual firms.

Hitachi, for example, one of the world's largest electronic manufacturers, is now owned by foreign shareholders to the tune of 22.3 per cent of its ¥130bn capital (as of end-March 1981). It was 13.0 per cent the previous year: foreign investors now rank fourth and fifth among the firm's major

stock-holders.

● Three Swiss banks are to expand their involvement in Japan's stock market, according to European banking sources: Swiss Credit Bank, Swiss Union Bank and Capital International Investment Bank. The reports said Union Bank was about to establish a fund which will exclusively manage Japanese securities. While the fund's size has not been officially disclosed, Frankfurt sources were quoted as estimating it initially at 80m to 100m Swiss francs (\$38m-47m).

Swiss Credit Bank is planning to open a SFr 100m (\$47m) Japan fund. The bank is already involved in Japanese securities operations, representing Middle Eastern countries through an SFr 180m (\$85m) net-asset Japanese securities in the fund at end-July stood at 22 per cent, compared with 12 per cent in the same month last

year. Capital International Investment Bank, whose total management asset is estimated at SFr 5bn (\$2.3bn), is reported to have decided to increase the Japan share from end-June's 30 per cent to 40 per cent.

IRAQ-TURKEY TRADE AGREEMENT EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 pp 38, 39

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text]

LAST week's signing of the trade protocol between Iraq and Turkey marks a turning point in the relations between these traditionally suspicious neighbours.

The importance of the trade agreement can be ascertained by the calibre of the delegation despatched to Ankara by Baghdad. This included Iraq's first deputy prime minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan, the petroleum minister, Taweh Abdelkarim, and the trade minister, Hasan Ali.

After the outbreak of the Iran Iraq war, Turkey tried to remain neutral, but this became more and more impossible as Iranian army generals began to defect, and were welcomed by the military rulers of Turkey. During the past few weeks Iranian newspapers openly criticised Turkey's attitude, but Turkey is aware that the rift between the two countries must not be allowed to escalate, as Turkish land routes and air space are important for the transfer of goods between Europe and Iran.

Taking advantage of Iran's difficult position, Turkey decided to go ahead with its plan to strengthen ties with Iraq. The trade agreement has guaranteed half Turkey's annual oil requirement. Iraq has pledged to supply about 8.5m tonnes of crude oil next year, and also promised to purchase about \$400m worth of goods from Turkey this year.

On 15 August the Turkish prime minister, Bulent Ulusu, said about the Iraqi visit: 'Issues to which we attach special attention have been the increase and

diversification of exports from Turkey to Iraq, increased service activities of the Turkish contracting companies in Iraq and broadening of mutual cooperation in the fields of transportation, oil, natural resources, banking and tourism'.

On the transportation front, the Iraqis are hoping Turkey will give them the use of Mediterranean ports such as Mersin and Iskenderun. It was reported in Turkey that a tentative promise was made by Turkish authorities to improve and construct special facilities at these ports. If true, this would give Iraq access to the Mediterranean without the need to go via Syria.

Iraq hopes that this rapprochement between the two countries, and the large-scale gains Turkey will get out of the trade agreements, would divert Turkish interest from the Ataturk dam project on the Euphrates. As an Iraqi diplomat in London said: 'If Turkey gives up the idea of the dam, we might be able to help in other agricultural and irrigation projects'. The proposed dam was one of the main causes of the rift between the two countries.

Iraq already represents the second largest export market for Turkish goods (West Germany is the largest.) During the first five months of this year the value of exports to Iraq was \$201m, compared with \$64m in the same period last year.

Iraq also has a lot to gain from the protocol: Turkey could become a very important outlet for Iraqi oil and goods. The existing oil pipeline, which can carry up

to 35m tonnes annually from the Iraqi oilfields at Kirkuk to Turkey's Mediterranean terminal at Yumurtalik, has become more important to Iraq since the war closed loading terminals in the Gulf. The other major outlet of Iraqi oil is at Baniyas in Syria, and as political relations between the two Arab states fluctuate constantly, it is in Iraq's interest to guarantee the availability of Turkish pipelines at all times.

Turkish officials announced last week that the government wanted the present fee of \$0.38 per barrel for pipeline use increased to at least \$1. Turkey has been pressing for an increase for some time.

The Iraqis are also offering to set up an international transport organisation with Turkey at Mediterranean ports, along similar lines to the agreement between Iraq and Jordan for transferral of goods from the port of Aqaba. The Iraqis are also persuading the Turks to build a new link between Iskenderun/Mosul railway line.

In political terms, the trade agreement is being seen as a foothold for Turkey in the Arab world. One Turkish analyst said: 'Turkey is deeply suspicious of Nato — look what happened in 1974: Nato stopped delivery of arms when the country needed it most.' It is economically and politically advantageous for Turkey to have the Arab and Islamic world on its side.

CSO: 4400/5

BRIEFS

KUWAIT HAS 250,000 JORDANIANS--Kuwait, Sept. 12--About 25,000 citizens from the West Bank enter Jordan during the summer and between 75,000 to 100,000 persons leave for Arab Gulf countries during the year, according to a report received today. About 75,000 Jordanians are working in Kuwait, and if their families are included, the total will reach about 250,000. The report added there was no accurate census figure of the population in Jordan itself. The Jordanian Prime Minister recently said that the country is suffering from a shortage of inhabitants and rejected the idea of birth control. The subject of refusal of visas to Jordanian nationals by some neighbouring countries has been discussed by the Foreign Ministry. Reciprocation, the number of entrants from and to Jordan from a particular country, the security situation and economic factors were taken into consideration. Commenting on the rush at the foreign embassies, Jordan Foreign Ministry official said this was due to the huge number of applicants for visas and the limited staff at the embassies. The main problem was with Gulf, US, Canadian and West German embassies. The report added that officials at the Jordanian Foreign Ministry would discuss the situation with the ambassadors of these countries to make it easier for Jordanian citizens to obtain visas. Reciprocation will be the basis of the talks. Jordan hopes to have agreements with some countries to cancel the need for visas between them and Jordan, the report concluded. [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 3 Sep 81 p 6]

INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS--Qatar's Crown Prince Sheikh bin Khalifa al-Thani signed an agreement in Rabat last week under which Qatar and Morocco will exchange expertise in the field of information. The agreement also covers exchanges of news and television and radio programmes. Sheikh Hamad signed a similar agreement with Jordan during a visit the previous week to Amman. Sheikh Hamad conferred in Rabat with King Hassan II and discussed agricultural cooperation, including the possibility of exchanging expertise and manpower. Qatar and Morocco were also reported to be discussing the possibility of industrial cooperation, notably between private entrepreneurs in the two countries. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 6]

CSO: 4400/3

GCC TRADE PROTOCOL FINALIZED

Dubai KHALEEEJ TIMES in English 17 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

KUWAIT — The unified economic agreement between the six member states of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council will push forward joint venture projects in their private sectors, sources here said yesterday.

The agreement will also lead to the coordination of regional industrial policies and the improvement of energy situation.

A final draft of the agreement was endorsed by the Council's foreign ministers and will come into force when ratified by the AGCC summit meeting later this year.

The proposed agreement is viewed in economic circles as the most outstanding achievement in the Gulf region which will substitute bilateral trade protocols previously concluded by different Gulf states, a Press report said.

The 28-point protocol will provide for complete coordination of economic, financial and monetary policies.

It will also contain a set of commercial and industrial legislations as well as new customs regulations to govern joint activities.

According to the agreement, the respective states of the council will exchange commodities as originating from one and the same country and no customs dues will be imposed on the exchange.

When the agreement is ratified at the AGCC November summit, nationals of the six states will be allowed to engage in business in the entire region without discrimination

and no restrictions will be imposed on the movement of capital.

As part of the plan for economic integration, the agreement stipulates complete coordination of policies in the fields of oil industry, utilisation of gas resources and energy sources.

In accordance with the new protocol, the six states will be bound to adopt a unified stand in international platforms particularly at meetings of the UN specialised agencies.

The agreement will guard against duplicity in projects and rule on locations for new industries according to the economic viability and feasibility studies of each respective project.

In planning for joint venture projects, the agreement will put stress on industrial and agricultural schemes that will lead to the realisation of regional development on proper basis and the ideal use of government and private capital resources.

The unified agreement will encourage research in fields of science and will provide for plans related to the transfer of selected technology.

The agreement stipulates means of manpower mobility within the region, coordinates training policies and ends all types of unnecessary competition.

According to its contents, the agreement will facilitate coordination in fields of transport, infrastructural projects and international investment.

To achieve parts of those objectives, the council's member states will set up a Gulf international consortium with a suggested capital of 18 billion Saudi riyals.

AFGHANISTAN

KARMAL REGIME PLAGUED BY GROWING HOSTILITY

Attack on Governor

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 14 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] London, Sept. 13--The Governor of Logar province was injured in an attack launched by Afghan freedom fighters and his two bodyguards were killed.

Agency Afghan Press reported that the attack was made in the subdividisonal headquarters Mohammad Aagha on Aug 25 at a time when the Governor was on a visit in the heart of the town. He was near Mamoor Hotel in the town when suddenly the guerillas opened fire on him. Governor's two bodyguards were killed on the spot while he himself suffered injuries. The freedom fighters escaped after the attack.

The same night the Mujahideen damaged two tanks patrolling the town by firing rocket launchers. On the same day, the Mujahideen attacked a mobile Karmal force at a place Kulangar on Kabul-Gardez Road in Logar province and destroyed four armoured cars and two army trucks. A number of troops carried by the vehicles and armoured cars were eliminated. On Aug 27, the Mujahideen attacked a Soviet force at a village Kanjak in Logar province. This village is 40 kilometres off Kabul. Ten Soviet soldiers were killed in the attack while two tanks were destroyed. One Mujahid was killed.

Attempt Foiled

Mujahideen led by their commander Yamin Khan frustrated an attempt of setting up a new telephone exchange in Kalat Gilzai in Zabul province. They seized the equipment worth million of Afghanis. Earlier the guerillas on Aug 27 destroyed the Kalat exchange from where the security force fled away leaving behind nine dead bodies.

On Aug 31, some new machinery of telephone exchange was being carried to Kalat Gilzai in a truck when the Mujahideen seized it 10 kilometres away from the town. The Mujahideen carried the machinery to their liberated area.

Notes Cancelled

The Karmal administration has cancelled all currency notes of 50, 500 and 1000 Afghanis of the times of Tarakki and Hafizullah Amin which carried no water mark.

These currency notes which carried in bold letters the word 'Khalq' and the insignia of the government had been printed in Moscow when the Soviet Government had obtained the contract of printing the Afghan currency. It is reported that besides the agreed number of notes, the Soviets had printed extra currency notes which had been distributed among the communist workers without bringing the fact to the knowledge of the successive Kabul administrations. Presently in Afghanistan the currency notes of the times of King Zahir Shah, Sardar Daoud, Tarakki and Amin are also being used.

Student Agitation

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 14: Reports coming here from Kabul say that the student agitation which started in Kabul last week has now spread to all the educational institutions in the capital, BBC reported tonight.

The reports also said that two girl students were killed on Wednesday last and 30 wounded when troops opened fire on a group of girl students demonstrating in a school.

Immediately after the shooting incident, about 1,000 students came out on the streets and shouted anti-Government and anti-Soviet slogans.

Attendance in Government offices is said to have come down to 50 per cent.

There is also an unrest because of the protest over fresh conscription of soldiers under the age of 35.

Since the State Radio announced the new call-up, trucks have been touring the capital making appeals on loudspeakers to ex-servicemen to resume service.

Western diplomatic sources said street patrols have also been stepped up to check the identity papers of the people.

The conscription drive is aimed at bolstering the depleting armed forces.

The total strength of the armed forces when Marxist rule was established in Afghanistan in April 1978 was around 90,000 officers and men. Defections, casualties and purges have depleted the Afghan army to about 30,000.

To supplement military personnel, the Government has formed volunteer defence groups drawn from the ruling People's Democratic Party's youth organisation.

The Afghan media frequently publicise the departure of these armed young men called "soldiers of revolution" to the provinces to fight guerillas and spread the Marxist message.

In a statement on the controversial new enlistment order, Chief of General Staff Baba Jan said: "The Government and the party are resolved to increase the effectiveness of the armed forces and strengthen their war preparations.—PPI/Reuter.

Opposition to Forced Recruitment

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 15 Sep 81 pp 1, 5

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 14--A military call-up which was reported to have sparked protests in Kabul has highlighted the Afghan Government's problems in building up an army to quell insurgency.

The demonstrations last week in which several people were said by diplomats to have been injured, followed an official announcement last Monday ordering discharged soldiers below the age of 35 back to the service.

The protests were the most serious since about 100 conscripted policemen, incensed by the extension of their two-year period of duty, went on the rampage in Kabul last December.

Since the State radio announced the new call-up, trucks have toured the capital making loudspeaker appeals to ex-servicemen to enlist. Western diplomatic sources said. Street patrols have also been stepped up to check identity papers.

The conscription drive is the latest of several efforts over the past year to bolster the armed forces, facing a serious manpower shortage.

The total strength of the armed forces when Marxist rule was established in Afghanistan in April 1978 was around 90,000 officers and men. Since then defections, casualties and purges have depleted the Afghan army to about 30,000.

A major reason for the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan that brought President Babrak Karmal to power was the Afghan army's steady disintegration, which threatened to leave forces hostile to Moscow in control of the country.

One of the tasks of the Soviet forces has been to put the Afghan troops in shape to face the challenge from Mujahideen fighting against the Marxist Government in Kabul.

In a speech last month, President Karmal told the armed forces: "Stability has been established to some extent in the cadres of the army and police....and the process of depletion of officers loyal to the revolutionary duties in the armed forces is ending."

Diplomats said the main problem confronting the Government was desertion by Afghan soldiers, reluctant to fight anti-Government Mujahideen.

Kabul has repeatedly offered amnesty to the deserters and the State radio claimed recently that many soldiers who had joined "saboteurs and troublemakers" had returned and were now fighting against the "counterrevolutionaries."

Offer of improved salaries and service conditions have been made to the troops in an apparent attempt to rally military support, boost morale and prevent desertion.

President Karmal, who is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, said last month his Government was trying to improve the "material and moral status and living conditons" of the troops.

His Government's latest inducement to military officers is to allow them to retain land in excess of an official ceiling on land holdings on condition that their children serve in the army.

The toughest and most organised conscription drive was launched in September last year when the Government decreed compulsory military service for men aged between 21 and 46.

Severe penalties were laid down for evading conscription or for desertion. But thousands of young men were said by diplomats to have defied the law and fled the country.

To widen recruitment, the Government last January reduced the draft age by a year to 20 and offered financial inducements to soldiers who stayed on after their discharge.

Graduates at present serve in the army for 12 months and non-graduates for two years.

Kabul-based diplomats have reported eye-witnesses as saying security forces forcibly pick up young men even below the conscription age of 20 years to draft them into the army.

To supplement military personnel, the Government has formed volunteer defence groups drawn from the ruling People's Democratic Party's youth organisation.

The Afghan media frequently publicise the departure of these armed young men called "soldiers of revolution" to the provinces to fight Mujahideen and spread the Marxist message.

In a statement on the controversial new enlistment order, Chief of General Staff Baba Jan said: "The government and the party are resolved to increase the effectiveness of the armed forces and strengthen their war preparations."

"The mobilisation of lieutenants and soldiers will make it possible to increase the effectiveness still further," he said.--Reuter

Kabul Underground

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Sep 81 p 4

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 16, (Dispatches) — Many young people in Kabul have gone underground to avoid a new call-up order by the Afghan authorities, western diplomatic sources said here today.

Radio Kabul announced at the beginning of the month that people under 35 who had served in the army but who were discharged before October 1978 would be called up to serve an extra year.

Visitors to government ministries in Kabul reported many ex-servicemen were missing from their offices and at one Western Embassy in Kabul all Afghan employees and contract labourers who would be subject to the recall asked to be paid off and had disappeared, the sources said.

The call-up provoked demonstrations in Kabul in which two girl students were reported killed when police opened fire. Sporadic demonstrations continued throughout last week, the sources said.

The communist authorities hope to boost the strength of the Afghan army, which has dwindled through defections from 80,000 to 30,000. They later exempted teachers and other categories of workers from the call-up.

Mediating on behalf of Soviets captured in Angola, Afghanistan also the International Committee of the Red Cross is awaiting replies from the Soviet Union and Pakistan on its proposal to transfer two Soviet soldiers captured by Afghan resistance fighters to a neutral country for internment, a

spokesman said Wednesday.

The proposal by the all-Swiss Humanitarian body is part of the services offered by it under the Geneva Conventions. Spokesman Jean-Jacques Kurz said internment would have to be in a country "considered by everybody as neutral."

A Red Cross delegate meanwhile has visited Soviet Sgt. Maj. Mikolay Pestretsov who South African forces say was captured in Angola last month. A report on the visit and the conditions of his internment has been handed to the Soviet Embassy in Luanda, Kurz said. Such visits are also provided for under the convention so neutral observers can see whether prisoners are humanely treated.

Riots in Schools

Karachi DAWN in English 18 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, Sept 17--Reports of disturbances in the schools of Kabul have been coming in during the past whole week, according to BBC.

The disturbances were sparked by the recent directives for the re-enlistment of ex-servicemen below the age of 35.

Though Kabul has never been completely peaceful after the 1978 revolution, yet after the induction of the Soviet troops in the country and the assumption of power by Babrak Karmal in place of Mr Hafeezullah Amin in December 1979, the mopping up of each other by the workers of Parcham and Khalq factions intensified since the activities of the opponents of the present Kabul Government have increased and they appear to be getting support to an extent from official circles and from men in the army, BBC said.

But there have been mass disturbances during the past one and a half years and there have also been disturbances by the police and these are clear signs of disliking against the Government. In April and May last year, there was serious unrest among the students, and the girl students demonstrating against the Russians were fired at.

Death toll was 57. Many people were wounded and arrested, BBC reported.

Disturbances continued erupting in the Kabul University and colleges throughout the year. A general strike call was given in December, on the completion of one

year of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The call was, however, not much successful.

But on December 25, the policemen created disturbances because Kabul Government was not prepared to relieve those who had already rendered two-and-a-half year service.

There are now reports that the Government is taking measures to check those who are trying to escape conscription. Check-posts have been set up and identity cards and other papers of students who are coming back after vacations are being checked, BBC said.--APP

CSO: 4600/7

REGIME APPLYING SOLUTIONS TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Warning Against Forged Banknotes

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Sep 81 p 4

[Text]

KABUL, September 12 (Bakhtar).— Recently, a number of Afs 500 banknotes of the DRA have been photocopied and forged on normal paper and put in circulation, according to a notice by D'Afghanistan Bank.

The difference between the genuine and the forged notes is clearly noticeable. The specifications of the new DRA banknotes are so complicated and safe that they cannot be forged easily and put into circulation. Discovery of the forged banknotes is, therefore, very simple.

As soon as the banknotes were put into circulation, they drew the attention of the concerned authorities. The security forces are in search of the forgers.

To avoid being cheated, the public may note the following points:

1—The forged banknotes are being photocopied without the security chord, which is noticeable at the centre of the right half of the genuine banknotes.

2—In the forged banknotes, the watermark, prepared in a miniature circle in the genuine ones, is not seen. In the left part of the genuine notes, the word "D'Afghanistan Bank" is noticeable in embossed 'nastaaliq' calligraphy but it is not seen in the forged ones.

3—The special symbol of D'Afghanistan Bank which is clearly seen in the genuine banknotes is completely confused and even the numbers of the forged banknotes are generally from one banknote and is not seen in its proper position.

4—All of the colours on the forged notes, particularly, the writings and signatures are blurred.

The public is requested to pay due attention in money transfer of the DRA Afs 500 banknotes and try to count the notes one by one.

If, during the money transfer, any suspected or forged banknote is noticed, the owner of the note in the capital may be introduced to D'Afghanistan Bank or the nearest police station or the security forces.

Similarly, in the provinces, the owner of such a note may be introduced to the D'Afghanistan Bank branch offices or the security forces.

The specifications of the genuine Afs 500 banknotes, which are legally valid as the past, are being shown on the television in contrast with the forged ones.

Amendment to Land Reform

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Sep 81 p 3

[Text]

"Supplement no. 1 of RC decree no. 8, is for sure a step forward for the well-being of our needy people and indicative of true respect for the religious rites and profound observance of the national and tribal traditions that the party and Government have ensured for the various strata of the nation after the victory of the new phase of the glorious Saur Revolution".

Stating this in an interview with the Kabul New Times, a source of the Council of Ulema and Clergy of the Islamic affairs department said: "Appendix no. 1 of the RC decree aims at assuring the religious Muslim compatriots of the fulfilment of the commitments made in the Fundamental Principles and the party and the Government's policy after the victory of the new phase of the revolution and the profound respect for the national and tribal traditions of various strata. By its implementation, on the one hand, the sanctity of the holy places is observed and, on the other, the services of the patriots, soldiers and the honest servants of the homeland are highly valued which is a source of inspiration for serving the motherland".

The source added that, in pursuance of the enforcement of Article 3 of the appendix, the extra acreage of the lands belonging to the holy places and respected personalities such as nationalities and tribal elders, officers, soldiers and defenders of the revolution are not to be expropriated.

At present, while the majority of our compatriots suffer from lack of adequate vocational know-how, the only way to improve the living conditions of the people is engagement in agriculture and better utilisation of the land is directly related to improving the working conditions on the land and satisfaction of the deprived class of people who have for years suffered from poverty and consequently to augmentation of the national income.

The source pointed out that, since the mankind is the descendant of a single father, the Muslims by virtue of the holy Islam emphasize fraternity and equality. According to the holy Islam, 'if a Muslim's needy neighbour goes to bed hungry in the evening, sleeping is prohibited for the other one satisfied with his dinner'. Therefore, every attempt by the party and our govern-

nment for ensuring social justice in the country is useful, necessary and in accordance with the Islamic shariat. The holy Koran upholds justice.

In short, the appendix is indicative of further scrutiny, consideration and assessment by the party and government of the mistakes emanating from shortcomings during the first land reforms operation prior to the new phase of the glorious Saur Revolution.

In reply to another question, the source said that the first supplement of the RC decree pays ample attention to revering the sacred places and the defenders of the revolution.

The difference between the operations of the first land reforms before the new phase of the revolution from the viewpoint of people's interest is considerable. The previous operation was not all-sided. The content of the new supplement is fully in accord with people's will. "Those who ignore this crystal-clear fact are like bats do not notice the sunlight".

"We believe that it is up to the peasants that, by popularization of the supplement and enjoying its benefits, to further expand their activities in agriculture, fulfilling their mission in improving the working conditions

and promoting agricultural production, liberating themselves from the yoke of slavery of the big landlords and feudalists", the source added.

The source also noted that the ulema and intelligentsia of the country consider as useful and fruitful the measure adopted by the party and the Government.

"Our message to the ulema, intelligentsia, patriots and working people is to render every effort and sincere support for implementation of the supplement and enlighten the people", the source said.

Help for Trade Unions

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Sep 81 p 3

[Text]

At present, there are 614 primary organisations of the trade unions throughout Afghanistan. In the first congress of the Trade Unions held in Kabul on 7 March 1981, the President of the Central Council, of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan had reported that there were only 400 such organisations in the country. However, in the span of five months since then, an increase of more than 50 percent has been made in the number of TU primary organisations.

"This indicates that the trade unions of Afghanistan have become centres for the toiling people of the

country. It is also manifestation of the rallying of workers and toiling people of this country around the party and their revolutionary Government. They are now showing a great deal of interest in the defence of their material and moral interests and are getting organised into mass organisations", said Qadir Mahboob, chairman of the Education Department of the Central Council of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan in an interview with a reporter of the Kabul New Times.

He said, out of the 614 primary organisations, 274 are in the Kabul city itself.

19 in the neighbourhood of Kabul and the remaining are organised in the provinces. According to the latest reports obtained on July 12 this year from the Provincial Councils of the trade unions, the total number of the trade unions has reached 175,000 and the workers and toiling people are increasingly getting organised into trade unions.

Answering why the increase in the number of primary organisations is not proportional to the number of members he said: "In organising the unions, the production principle and area are taken into account. That is, in each production unit, there is one primary organisation. Thus, first, we organise unions in the industrial centres and organisations where the number of workers and employees reaches to thousands. However, in a number of factories and industrial plants the number of workers is between 20 to 30 only, which makes the growth in number of primary organisations and that of the members impropportionate."

In the course of past five months 214 primary organisations have been set up, showing a vertical rise. Since the holding of the first congress, provincial councils have been set up in Bamian, Ghazni, Samangan, Kapisa and Paktia provinces with elected members.

The syndicate movement in our country is very young and in its infancy. We do not even have the necessary experienced cadres with good knowledge of syndicate activities. This makes the trade unions of Afghanistan

unable to fully utilise the interest and willingness of the toiling people and get them mobilised around the party and the revolution."

All popular governments ought to have social bases in society. In this country, following the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, when the state power fell into the hands of the PDPA, that is the political organisation of the working class and all the toiling people of Afghanistan, obviously the working class, peasants, and all the toiling constitute the social base of this new type of state. Thus, the role of any union in any country where the working class party holds the political power, including Afghanistan, is to establish a contact line between the ruling party and all the workers and toiling people.

In such cases the party leads the unions through the union members. As the want of the party is actually the want of the workers and toiling people, the leadership acquires a systematic form with workers and toilers every day rallying around the party and the revolutionary government with more confidence.

Following the Jaddi 8 change, in pursuance with the popular policy of the PDPA, the vanguard of the working class, a more favourable political and social atmosphere was created in the country with the regaining of confidence of the workers and toilers by the party and the Government and they were mobilised and organised through the unions in defence of the revolution and its new phase.

Qadir Mahboob noted: "In the countries where the working party does not possess the political power, the unions are struggling for reaching their goals aimed at ensuring their political, and social rights as well as their material rights including providing better working and living conditions.

"However, in the countries where the worker's political organisation (the new-type working-class party) holds the political power, the duty and objective of the unions in the first step is to raise the level of productions and achieve the growth of national economy, guaranteeing the welfare of all workers and toilers. With this objective in mind, the unions are taking direct part in building the society and the country. This participation ranges from taking part in drawing up productive plans, control and supervision of the affairs and are being translated into action.

"Fortunately, the unions in our country, relying on the party and the Government which has given extensive authorities to the unions, are forging towards achieving this end, as they are aware of the nature and power of the working-class Government which guarantees their interests."

The internationalist solidarity, struggle for ensuring peace, democracy, national

independence and progress on world-scale constitute the principles of international struggles of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan. That is why the Trade Unions of Afghanistan has entered the membership of the world syndicate federation and stands firm in the international struggles for implementation of these principles, Mahboob said.

The Trade Unions of Afghanistan is taking part at many of the international regional and syndicate conference in support of the peoples of Asia, Africa and has defended its principles. It has close relations with syndicate of friendly countries as well as progressive, capitalist and developing countries.

The Central Council of the DRA Trade Unions has already held the first congress of the Trade Unions in the country. This is a great achievement as there are syndicates in the world who have been able to hold their first congress only after five years of their beginning.

The Central Council of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan, with the help of sister organisations, has been able to provide training to its cadres and so far 200 of its members have been trained with help of sister syndicates. "The DRA Trade Union is also taking active part in international struggles", he concluded.

RADIO FREE KABUL, FOREIGN AID BOOSTING MUJAHEDIN CAUSE

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Sep 81 p 7

[Article by Marek Halter]

[Text] Free Radio-Kabul exists. It broadcasts. Bernard-Henri Levy, Renzo Rossellini and myself have just returned from Afghanistan where we gave the first three transmitters to the Afghan resistance.

Two months ago, in this very place we launched an appeal to set up a free radio station in Afghanistan. This project is being achieved, thanks to the donations of some people, and to the determination of others.

The first broadcast and the station call-theme made the most hardened mountaineers weep. For what they suffer from most grievously in the field is solitude. Like the old senator from Migrahar Province, Mr Ghulam Nabi, they are convinced that "God will punish those who do not come to the aid of Afghans, God or their conscience," but for the moment they must admit that neither conscience nor interests have moved many people to help them.

Despite the promises of President Reagan (Declaration of 9 March 1981) the United States prefers to help Egypt make its Soviet-constructed munitions plants run, rather than aid the Afghans directly.

Until now, Egypt is the only country to have furnished a large quantity of war materiel to the Mujahedin. Egypt declares it is prepared to furnish more, provided the rebels unite. (Declaration by President Sadat to representatives of the Afghan rebels. Cairo, January 1981) But Egypt is experiencing transport problems. The first shipment was loaded at Oman and discharged on the Pasni coast in Pakistan. There it reached Peshawar, hidden in trucks filled with vegetables. There, the Pakistan Government is too much concerned about its powerful Soviet neighbor not to hamper this kind of exploit. Its president, General Zia, knows full well that the 85,000 Red Army soldiers stationed in Afghanistan can invade his country in 48 hours, or arm the Baluchis and Pathan autonomists to encourage them to revolt.

Thus, when in the beginning of May 1981, deserters from the Afghan army crossed over into Pakistan in the Quetta region with a tank of Soviet origin and an assault helicopter, the Islamabad Government immediately returned them to their owner. A little earlier it had turned over to the Soviet Embassy several Soviet prisoners found in the hands of the Mujahedin.

Iran, bogged down in its war with Iraq, considers the majority of Afghan parties too liberal for its tastes. It only helps the Hezb and Islami, the most fundamentalist group. At that, this aid remains timid and half-hearted, according to the chief of that group, Gulbudin Hekmaktiar. Imam Khomeyni does not wish to provoke the Kremlin under current circumstances.

There remains Saudi Arabia, which from time to time dispatches a cargo of light weaponry bought at Interarms in Manchester. As for the Palestinians, with which the Afghans most willingly identify themselves, and who could have helped them as they help other guerrilla movements, they prefer to support Babrak Karmal's regime and remain in the so-called "socialist" camp.

Thus, the Mujahedin's arms are limited to those they were able to take from the Red Army at the beginning of the invasion, to arms turned over by deserters from the Afghan Army--reduced from 75,000 men in 1979 to 20,000 today--and "shelhe" arms of local manufacture, from the Dara or Landi-Kotal shops in the tribal zone.

That is little compared to the Soviet war machine, which seems slowly to be adapting to local terrain. It does not seek contact with the Mujahedin and seeks to maintain its partial but durable installations.

Thus, the "chourawis" (the Soviets) have built two permanent bridges over the Loxus, the river separating Afghanistan from Soviet central Asia. They have widened the Salang road, over which most of the military road traffic passes, and expanded all the airports, even the most insignificant ones, to permit the reception of the most modern military planes. Most of the airports are therefore now under construction. This is true for the one at Baram, near Kabul; at Kandahar, built by the Americans under Daoud; at Mazir-i-Sharif; at Shindand, at Herat, at Jelalabad or at Kunduz where the first light division of emergency forces has been installed, like the American Green Berets, and which showed its mettle at the beginning of July in the Dangam valley, between Baricot and Asmar, to the north of the Kunar valley.

Resistance does not abate, despite this strategy of stringent control; despite an intense propaganda campaign conducted by radio Kabul and the Soviet radio in the Afghan language broadcasting from the closest USSR city, Duchambe; despite a policy of "cultural autonomy and modernization" strangely reminiscent of the sovietization of the Moslem republics in the 1930's; and, finally, despite the cleaning up of the frontier regions, cleared of their populations. On the contrary resistance is increasing.

They hold the mountains, which cover three-fourths of the Afghan territory, and which for the moment the Soviets have abandoned their plan to conquer. Yet the Mujahedin are realists and they know they cannot obtain a military victory.

"For us," they say, "it will be Outer Mongolia, or, better, Finland." But in order to escape becoming satellites they need the support of world opinion and international diplomacy.

How can one make the Afghans, who rightly or wrongly consider themselves as one of the last ramparts between the energy sources of the West and Soviet expansionism, understand that their appeal to Reagan's America renders them suspect in the view of American liberals, and that the fact of fighting against the USSR alienates a good part of the European left from them? That left has not yet learned to oppose Soviet imperialism as it opposes Western imperialism. Devoted to "progressive" ideas and to plans for new societies, it has difficulty encouraging a people who has no other model of society in mind than its own. A model which they themselves, moreover, consider democratic.

"What is more democratic," explains a leader of the Afghan resistance to us, "than a society where intelligence and courage (mostly courage) are valued more highly than riches, where the chiefs are elected by assemblies and ousted by them, where religion is considered as a relationship between God and the individual, in which no one can intervene, not even the mullah."

Even if this idea is far from the ideas to which we are accustomed, even if the Afghans' struggle does not correspond to the idea we have of national liberation struggles, the indisputable fact remains: a country is occupied by a foreign power, and a whole people seeks to liberate themselves from it.

Should we sacrifice them on the altar of our theories or should we revise our theories and try to save a people?

Afghans, like all peoples that are struggling, passionately follow current events, and are aware of the interest that the French Government has in the Third World and its liberation movements. "A solemn declaration in our favor from your president would be of immense help to us," an Afghan leader stated to us.

Free Radio Kabul is a sign of solidarity of a few thousand individuals. Afghans received it with appreciation. Mr Safi, commander of the Pech region, even said to us, "The radio that you brought us is worth more than a thousand kalachnikovs."

However, we only gave the Afghan resistance 3 transmitters and they need 36 of them to cover all the country. (Gifts can be sent to the Committee for the Rights of Man. Free Radio Kabul. 152 rue du Chateau, 75014 Paris.) What is more just and more uplifting than to be able to give persecuted men the means of expressing themselves, of informing themselves, and of communicating?

Free Radio Kabul is just that.

9772

CSO: 4619/42

SAHARAN DEVELOPMENT PLANS SLOWED BY WEATHER

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text]

ALGERIA'S efforts to develop its extensive southern provinces are being severely hampered by torrential rains this summer, which caused considerable damage to the town of Tamanrasset, the administrative centre of Algeria's deep south. Flood waters running off the nearby Hoggar mountain range caused massive destruction and several deaths in this Saharan oasis of 70,000 inhabitants, and the government has pledged to make funds available for an ambitious rebuilding and urban improvement programme.

But the task facing government relief operations is daunting. Thousands of tonnes of cement and other building materials have to be shipped by lorry some 1,500km, from the coast, and the rains have washed out large sections of the trans-Saharan highway north of Tamanrasset. Another handicap is the dearth of skilled technicians. Civil servants from the coastal areas are reluctant to go to Tamanrasset, considering it internal exile in an inhospitable zone. Higher salaries and other financial incentives have failed to sweeten the pill.

The scanty Saharan population — mainly Tuareg nomads or semi-nomads — has found it difficult to adapt to modern life. Almost all young Algerians in the northern part of the country currently attend school, but only about half the children in the Saharan area go to class regularly. President Chadli Benjedid's government aims to make Tamanrasset more attractive to northerners and improve living conditions by creating agricultural villages as part of the agrarian revolution.

Tamanrasset is to be considerably expanded during the current Five Year Development Plan (1980-1984). A large and modern primary school, a technical high school for 1,500 students and a high school of similar size for the arts are planned. The ministry of telecommunications is to build a new post office block, as well as a modern telephone complex to handle satellite communications. Efforts are being made to build up social services throughout the administrative unit. Six health centres, ten telecommunication sub-stations and 15 new post offices are to be set up in the province's principal oases.

Work on two agricultural villages with modern amenities is nearly finished. One is at Amsel, 30km northwest of Tamanrasset, and the other at Silet, 130km to the south-east. It is hoped that the Tuareg population will be able to earn a decent living through market gardening and the cultivation of dates.

Tamanrasset's future also depends on its role as the nub of regional lorry traffic on the trans-Saharan highway between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa. Algerian officials hope that the two spur roads from the town will reach the Niger and Malian frontiers by 1982-1983.

Algeria's Saharan provinces are not, however, limited to Tamanrasset and its hinterland. The administrative unit of Bechar, along the Moroccan frontier, has considerable potential.

But the Saharan climate is also playing cruel tricks on agricultural schemes in the

Bechar. The irrigated polder at Abadla has failed to live up to expectations. Designed to turn this water-scarce region into an 'Algerian California', the scheme was to bring 10,000 hectares under irrigation, but only 5,400 hectares were ever brought into production, with water being provided by the Djorf Torba dam on Wadi Guir. In 1979, unprecedentedly heavy rains swelled the lake behind the dam to dangerous levels, and government officials decided to drain away 920m cubic metres of water. Unfortunately, rainfall in 1980 and 1981 has been sparse, and the Djorf Torba lake is now practically dry.

The 1980-1981 crop was wiped out, and there are serious problems in getting the scheme back into operation, even if rainfall returns to normal.

CSO: 4500/5

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

PILOT TRAINING--Pakistani pilots are presently training the Algerian pilots. They are increasingly replacing the instructors from the Eastern countries. [Text]
[Paris LE POINT in French 28 Sep 81 p 107]

CSO: 4519/7

GOVERNMENT ORGAN CALLS FOR DECISIVE MEASURES AGAINST OPPONENTS

Cairo MAY in Arabic 22 Jun 81 p 7

/Editorial: "Confronting Dissension!"/

/Text/ There is almost complete agreement among the people of this nation that the repeated events which are threatening the health of the national Union and are working to spread poison and vindictiveness between the two components of the nation are not something that one can be silent about, whose significance one can take lightly, or on which one can take a position of ambiguity and indifference.

The official and unofficial statements and details which have come to light about the incidents of factional strife in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' reveal that most of the fire comes from sparks that were held to be of little significance, as they say, and that interventionist, insidious elements provoked feelings of fanaticism among innocent, devout groups, exploiting certain minor disputes here and there to that end and using means of provocation and incitement by spreading about false news and fabricated rumors. The course of the fire soon started to rage, inspiring ignorant elements and appealing to motives of dissension and sentiments of primitive souls who think that religion is just structures, shrines and erected buildings, that defense of a belief means eliminating the proponents of the other belief, or that the triumph of God's word can be realized by perpetrating crimes of arson, killing or sabotage.

We do not want, and cannot allow, the members of a single people, the people of Egypt, to turn Egypt into another Lebanon rent by factional disputes and destroyed by religious deviation, its destiny and its future the plaything of personal or factional caprices, hatreds and ambitions of people who traffic in religion or seek political or worldly influence by stirring up religious passions.

We, as children of a deep-rooted nation whose people have known the meaning of tolerance, fraternity and mercy, do not want, and cannot permit Egypt to turn down the same road that Ireland was drawn down some years ago because of factional religious disputes, as a result of which oceans of blood are still flowing and in whose name different forms of chaos, destruction and ruin are being spread about.

We do not want, and cannot bear, the luxury of attaching ourselves to feeble causes of dispute and dissension from which arise tempests such as those which we

hear about in India, in which massacres take place among suicidal religious factions, in which the nation forgets its real problems in a flood of factional disputes over insignificant matters which lead nowhere.

Confronting dissension of this sort, whose repetition we have become fatigued by from time to time, requires serious, aware vision, intelligent, wise planning in which the efforts of Moslems and Christians join ranks, efforts by religious, party and political groups, and efforts by government agencies, if such incidents are to be kept from erupting again. We wonder why there isn't a committee of wise or intelligent men from both parties in each such section, village or quarter, whose formation the National Party will call for, whose function will be to confront such petty disputes and quarrels and resolve them in a peaceful manner before they become aggravated and people who provoke discord and dissension intervene to expand them.

The role the popular and party bodies play can be of benefit first in resolving such problems and secondly in exposing and uprooting elements of discord and dissension.

More important than all that, however, is the need to strive to apply the law most decisively and severely against people whom judiciary investigations have proved are responsible for fanning the fire of dissension, against people whose unlicensed possession of weapons and destructive equipment is proved, and against people who are working by various means to stir up emotions, spread about lies and fabricate false stories.

In exchange, it is necessary to confront such events by publishing the facts in full, so that public opinion inside and outside Egypt can realize that the people who try to play with the country's security and unity cannot work in hiding or under cover.

Egypt, throughout its long history, has realized how its people have lived together in spite of their diverse ethnic groups and creeds under the banner of tolerance, unity and alienation from fanaticism, in times of prosperity and in times of hardship. The time has come to put everything back in its proper place and eliminate the roots of evil, wherever and whatever they are.

11887

CSO: 4505/71

GOVERNMENT PAPER CONTEMPLATES CRACKDOWN ON DISSIDENTS

Cairo MAY in Arabic 29 Jun 81 p 7

/Editorial: "Political Integrity"/

/Text/ In every country of the world, mistakes, acts of deviation and transgressions, individual or otherwise, intentional or unintentional, take place; they are discovered in the first moments after their occurrence, or time passes before they are discovered, but they take place, and one cannot claim that societies exist which do not experience them at any time or place.

Such wrongs, if committed by ordinary persons who do not occupy political or public positions or centers at any level of leadership and responsibility, become ordinary matters which the law deals with through indictments and punishment. However, they become out of the ordinary when they infringe on party or political personalities who bear public responsibility or undertake political activity.

In every democratic, open society, it becomes difficult, even impossible, for such mistakes and deviations to stay hidden or enveloped in secrecy, because democratic societies are founded on the dissemination of facts and on participation by the broad base of the people in responsibility, the responsibility of choosing and the responsibility of making decisions as well. They are also founded, consequently, on holding everyone accountable in accordance with the size of his responsibility and the extent of his ability to bear it and bear its trust. If an act of deviation or a mistake occurs--and here we are talking about people who are involved in public political activity, in political parties, in the popular and constitutional bodies, or in public positions--it is necessary for the responsible body, whatever it may be and wherever its location may be--in the party leadership, the organization or the government--to take the initiative to unearth this act of deviation, investigate it, determine the responsibility for it and enable the law to hold the person who committed it to account and deter him.

There is nothing shameful in having a mistake occur in the biggest parties or organizations; what is shameful, rather, is when some people imagine they must hide, conceal and cover up the mistake to protect themselves and maintain the respect and appreciation they must enjoy, lest their status be damaged in the eyes of the people and their weight be diminished before the masses.

This kind of backward thinking is valid only in closed societies and is adopted only by countries where people are broken down into two groups, one which is subject to the law and its powers and one which is above answering to the law and its authority. That is acceptable in the context of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes where blessed classes of members of a single party or the ruling elite enjoy rights others do not enjoy.

We in Egypt have chosen the system of party pluralism and have adopted the democratic system which makes the sovereignty of the law a principle that is respected by all and is applied to all members of the people, from the president to the lowest member. The law, like the constitution, sets forth the methods for holding people to account, making them answerable and punishing them; it does not make a single exception which can be personally exempted from responsibility and accountability.

These articles which the constitution stipulates and the law sets forth are not formal or superficial ones, and this process is not cosmetic or voluntary. Rather, it is an essential necessity for preserving the purity of political action and guaranteeing that it is permanently and constantly cleansed of the elements of corruption and deviation which enter unseen into the arena of political action, or try to benefit from their activity in the political field to cover up their acts of deviation and their transgressions.

In any event, the process of revealing and extirpating the elements of deviation, especially in the field of political action, is the best guarantee of the survival and success of democracy; at the same time it is the best proof of the vitality of political action and of those engaging in it because it entails the power of renewal, of renewing the blood in the body politic and cleansing it of the elements of corruption and contamination. Egypt, throughout its political history, has seen parties that were strong and dominant but abandoned themselves to elements of rot, dissipation and deviation, soon became corrupt, then were dissolved and fell into oblivion, because they were not aware of the lessons of history and the wisdom of political action.

11887

CSO: 4504/71

PRELUDE TO GOVERNMENT TIGHTENING REVIEWED

Cairo MAY in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p7

/Editorial: "Confronting Laxity"/

/Text/ The coming month will witness the beginning of a stage of intensified activity on all government levels aimed at controlling progress, realizing discipline, and putting a stop to all manifestations of laxness which affect the quality of political action and divert people from confronting real problems by turning them toward side struggles and dissension which are futile and of no benefit.

Preparatory to this stage, President al-Sadat has asked all ministers and officials in all fields of executive and political activity to end their summer vacations at the beginning of the coming month, September, so that every official may return to his position without delay and efforts may be consolidated to take rapid, firm measures that can be carried out decisively and seriously before laxity becomes an endemic phenomenon which will be difficult to deal with the more its causes grow. Perhaps one of the most important features of this stage is the appeal President al-Sadat is expected to direct to the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly to hold a joint session in which the people, through their representatives and the legislative power, will hear a comprehensive report on the results of the investigation the Office of the Public Prosecutor has made on the events of factional strife and the emerging facts and circumstances which will set out relevant details and will define in full the responsibilities of the elements which enflamed or tried to enflame the fires of factional strife and have tried from time to time to provoke episodes of dissension and cause chaos to erupt uncontrollably--benefiting from the climate of freedom and democracy which the law has guaranteed.

On his speech on the occasion of the July Revolution holidays, President al-Sadat promised to put the facts of the situation with respect to this grave problem in full before the people now that the prosecutor's office has finished investigating them and the judiciary has said its piece. It is not reasonable for us to turn away from such events, which affect the security of the internal front and threaten the pillars of national unity, without revealing their causes and without setting forth decisive rapid measures to remedy them.

Therefore, with the complete statement which President al-Sadat will deliver, we can expect the declaration of a series of decrees and measures which will guarantee that the events fed by feelings of religious fanaticism, such as the events of

al-Zawiyah al-Hamra', will not be repeated and that limits and rules will be placed on the activities of religious groups, whatever they might be, Moslem or Christian, so that they do not go beyond the limits of sound religious appeals for all that is the best, without provocation or violence, and are not turned from religious groups into political parties that are not subject to accountability and stock-taking.

Such decrees and measures must be passed under the aegis of the sovereignty of the law and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, not through exceptional or individual measures, so that the wrongdoer will know the error before he commits it and the deviant person will realize his deviant act before he succumbs to it.

Also connected to this problem is the need to stand up to the phenomenon of laxity in its broader context, to hold negligence to account wherever it may be, and to extirpate deviation by its roots whatever the motives for it might be: the problem of religious fanaticism and its ramifications arises in most cases from social conditions which provoke feelings of frustration and extremism and prompt young people to seek out measures which are marked by violence and confrontation, in the desire for change and reform. Nothing will be of use in resisting this current except greater determination and severity in holding the phenomena of deviation to account, hemming it in, prosecuting it and enabling the hand of justice and the law to catch up with it, so that it will become clear in every persons' conscience that the scale of justice is not balanced by two measurers and that no one is above the sovereignty of the law and above accountability to it.

Overcoming and dominating these problems become essential when we seek to concentrate our efforts and focus our powers on surging forward with all our capabilities toward greater work and production, toward the horizons of prosperity and economic and social growth. Therefore it is necessary that we take our affairs in this stage more seriously and pay greater attention to people who are absent and lose hours of work and production in our lives. It is necessary to review labor laws and wages in order to link wages to production in all fields and eliminate the phenomenon of laxness in government offices, companies and factories. It is necessary that producers and persons who exert efforts be rewarded and that the slothful and unproductive who are living high on the shoulders of others be punished.

In this stage, the deputies and representatives of the people would do well to prescribe a firm tradition for themselves: to return to their districts and popular bases in the vacation period in order to ascertain their constituents' problems in real conditions, study their issues and feel the pulse of their movements and trends. If they resume their activity in the coming parliamentary session, they will be more responsive to the masses' feelings, more aware of their problems and better able to take part in solving them.

11887

CSO: 4504/71

SUSPICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN OPPOSITION PROBED

Cairo MAY in Arabic 25 May 81 p 7

/Editorial: "An Unholy Alliance!"/

/Text/ The position of the Labor Party and its newspaper has in recent days raised a number of important questions.

The opposition, in the party's view, has turned to attempts to defame, attack and contrive positions by which it intends only to provoke and stir up trouble. The press, in the opinion of the party newspaper, has become merely provocative, totally removed from objectivity and the attempt to seek the truth.

Lest we forget, for a whole year the Labor Party newspaper has been harping on a theme which hardly a single issue has failed to mention, stating that it cannot find paper, that it is threatened with a shutdown and that it is not enjoying material support from the "government" or others. What has happened?

Paper is now available to the newspaper in unprecedented amounts. Proof is that it is now able to print any quantity it wants; indeed, it has doubled its price, increased its revenues and started realizing big profits from each issue.

The party newspaper therefore is not suffering from obstructions or difficulties, as it has been accustomed to stating on its pages for many months. The newspaper has been turned into a provocative paper seeking material gain; every week the paper publishes what its overall quest demands that it do, even when that is at the expense of objectivity and the truth.

This all raises a number of important questions:

Is the Labor Party using democracy as a cover for getting at something which in reality does not serve democracy?

Has it started begrudging the Egyptian people all the achievements realized by the head of the Egyptian family, Anwar al-Sadat, in the form of closing down concentration camps, supporting freedom and giving maximum free rein to a democracy from which there will never be any turning back?

Has an unholy alliance taken form among the Labor Party, the communists, vindictive persons and the remnants of the power centers, so that they have formed a front which is trying to bring Egypt back either to the period of the parties before the 23 July 1952 Revolution or to the era of the power centers in the sixties?

The unholy alliance we are asking the Labor Party about contains Soviet intelligence agents in the Arab nation and people who are working secretly and openly, and it contains communist parties of various designations, starting with all the democratic national liberation movements and ending with the latest up-to-date forms of communist bodies. It also contains groups of people from the Arab nation who bear grudges against some regimes in it, and some of their rulers, including some leaders of various Palestinian organizations and people who control papers published in Arabic in Kuwait, France, England, Damascus and some other Arab countries. All these papers, in addition to the Labor Party paper and the publication of the Grouping in Egypt, have started functioning in the media environment which Soviet agents have contrived to form a yellow press practicing political fraud in the region, especially in Egypt.

The unholy alliance also includes the remnants of the pre-1952 Egypt Party and some dreamers left over from the 23 July Revolution leadership who are on the verge of oblivion and who, when democracy arose in Egypt, thought they would be able to ride the wave and return to leadership in Egypt. The alliance also includes groups from the power centers who ruined people's honor, trampled freedom underfoot, imposed sequestration, established concentration camps and spied on people.

The strange thing is that all these parties have now come to rally around the chief of the Labor Party and have infiltrated into his midst in the well known communist fashion, currying favor with him and starting to deal with him as if he were the "leader" and savior; the head of the Labor Party has believed them and been won over by their plan to use him "provisionally"--an expression they use--to get what they want, after which it will be easy to get rid of him.

Has the whole Socialist Labor Party entered into this unholy alliance?

Can this be the lawful opposition which arises in every democratic regime and considers itself, that is, the opposition, to be part of the regime in whose shadow it lives?

Can the legitimate opposition be converted into a group of provocateurs, as occurs with the system of secret communist cells which try to overthrow the regime in order to crush it?

It is strange, also, that every Arab regime around us, except for the Sudan, Oman and Somalia, seizes news of the alliance and the coalition which calls itself the opposition and publishes word of it. Why?

The answer, sirs, is obvious:

To keep Egypt from remaining alone, in the heart of the Arab world and the Middle East, an island of security, safety, freedom, democracy, stability, and peace.

ACTS OF LAWYERS' UNION CONDEMNED

Cairo MAY in Arabic 27 Jul 81 p 7

/Editorial: "Trade Unions Are Not Parties"/

/Text/ The crisis which the Lawyers' Union council provoked, and the complications which led to the issuance of a People's Assembly decree demanding that it be dissolved and that a temporary council be formed, have raised an important, serious issue which deserves to be treated calmly and wisely, in the context of the social and political conditions whose democratic pillars we are all trying to implant and protect from the causes of chaos and manipulation which fragment the ranks of nations and keep them from achieving their goals.

This issue is the need to agree on the role of professional unions in the context of the democratic system we have adopted which is based on a government of institutions and sovereignty of the law, and regulates the boundaries separating legislative, executive, judiciary press powers. What are the limits of the role the professional unions, among them the Lawyers' Union, are performing? What are their rights and duties vis-a-vis the people representing these unions on the one hand and public issues and problems on the other?

Without going into many details, a professional union, any union, is a grouping or league which includes workers in the realm of a given profession and performs its duties on three levels:

The level of defending the rights of the people working in the realm of this profession in the moral and material senses and enabling them to enjoy them; preserving the traditions of the profession; advancing it; ensuring and guaranteeing the exercise of the profession; and preserving the dignity of the people working in it.

It should be a vessel of expertise in the area of its specialization, contributing carefully studied opinions and honest, conscious advice on the public problems raised which bear on the affairs and the constituencies of this profession. The Teachers' Union is the best able to give a cogent opinion on problems of education and educational reform. The Engineers' Union is the most fit to talk about problems of manufacturing, production, agriculture and housing. The Lawyers' Union is the most entitled to give an opinion on the presentation of laws and legislation and the guarantee of justice and freedom.

There then comes the third level, which is that of expressing special opinions by taking part in the formulation of public opinion vis-a-vis national and seminal issues and problems of domestic and foreign policy, so that the members of the union can feel the duty of national participation and defense of the interests of the nation, considering that a duty and a responsibility for every member of society.

We will note that the first level of professional union activity, which is to defend the rights and interests of employees, represents the first, most important duty and lies at the heart of the daily, practical pursuit of the union's task. It is that on which our efforts must concentrate and for which it must be held to account only by the groups of people belonging to it, to the exclusion of other groups and factions.

The second and third levels enter into the realm of public activity in which numerous groups and bodies take part. The groups have equal rights to express their views and exert influence through legitimate channels on the decision-making agencies, be these agencies at the level of parties, the government, or the elected legislative councils which represent the people. It is the right of the Teachers', Engineers' or Lawyers' Union, for example, to express its opinions on problems of education and housing, on grounds that it is a group, and not the only group, of the public that is affected by these problems. These unions also have the right to announce their opinion on national and seminal issues, on issues of war and peace, on the issue of the struggle with Israel or on relations with Arab countries.

However: There is a difference between expressing an opinion by legitimate means and dictating an opinion by illegitimate means; there is a difference between expressing an opinion at variance with what the popular consensus has settled on, on a national issue such as the Camp David agreement, and attempting to impose the opinion by entering into struggles against the elected national authorities and siding with foreign powers which adopt a position of hostility and enmity toward them.

This is the error to which the dissolved Lawyers' Union council succumbed. In the past 2 years, the activity of the Lawyers' Union council was focussed totally on entering into a confrontation with every decision and policy adopted by the government and endorsed by the People's Assembly. The Lawyers' Union council has been transformed into something resembling an opposition party, although it does not have the attributes, powers, elected representatives or political program of a party. It is well known that the council members of any professional union, when they nominate themselves and are elected, do not nominate themselves and are not elected by their colleagues in the profession as their political representatives but rather solely as union representatives. Thus the Lawyers' Union council exceeded the bounds of its powers and area of competence when it conferred upon itself the right to enter into political struggles in which it spoke for a few thousand members whose opinion on any given issue was not taken and who did not give a vote of acceptance or rejection on it.

Such mistakes and transgressions ought not to happen to us, but they are an opportunity for us to set forth clear, evident bases, traditions and limits between union practices and party practices so that everyone may be aware of his rights and obligations without violating any of them.

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PRO-GOVERNMENT PAPER CRITICIZES WAFDIST LEADER

Cairo MAY in Arabic 1 Jun 81 p 7

/Editorial by Ibrahim Sa'dah: "No, Pasha!"]

/Text/ We do not know exactly what Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din wants. We do not know what he could do to persuade people of the soundness of his course of action, since he had assumed many vital positions in the Wafdist cabinet before the 23 July 1952 Revolution burst forth!

He imagines that people forget, that memory with the passage of time betrays the people who hold it! Otherwise, what is the meaning of his current attempt to turn the truth upside down and speak about glories, acts of heroism and positions, whose falsity, waywardness and vileness no two people will disagree over?

The great error to which the 23 July 1952 Revolution succumbed was that it turned the page of the past and prohibited all talk about the Wafd party experiment of the final years preceding the revolution. It imagined that people knew the secrets and the corrupt nature of this experiment. It also imagined that the people would never forget what they had suffered at the hands of the people who had deceived them, who became rich at their expense, left Cairo to burn, and went off to register the purchases of new buildings to add to their properties and possessions!

The expectations of the leaders of the revolution were erroneous:

The new generation which has arisen since the revolution knows nothing of these facts. It does not know what the political merchants did to their country and what they did to themselves. More serious than that, the 15 May 1971 Revolution allowed the merchants of politics to come out of their graves and crypts. It thought that it would have been possible for them to have benefited from their mistakes, to have rid themselves of them, and to have turned a new page. The democracy of May allowed them to return again to the political stage. It agreed to the re-establishment of their party. It expected that the leaders of this party would engage in politics in a manner different from the old method, which the July 1952 Revolution had arisen only to crush and to save the country from its miseries!

None of any of that took place!

We were taken by surprise to see that the man who had sullied the experiment of the old parties was the same person who is leading the new party! We were further taken by surprise to see that the people whom the people who had unanimously agreed were loathsome, disreputable and corrupt were returning today and ascribing to themselves fraudulent acts of heroism, different positions and nonexistent sacrifices!

Most unfortunately, they found people to listen to them, people to believe their lies, people to think well of them! It would be unjust for us to hold simple-minded people to task for having been deceived by the merchants and corruptors of politics. The fault was not theirs; it was the fault, rather, of people who did not reveal the truth to them and did not write the true history of things on their behalf, the secret things, the oversights which cannot be changed and must not be forgotten!

Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din grabbed his pen and wrote a letter which he submitted to 'Abidin Palace, requesting that it be presented to the president. What is baffling is that he signed it in his capacity as secretary of the old Wafd Party and chairman of the New Wafd Party. That is, he did not hesitate to assume an identity which was not his! He spoke of two parties which do not exist: the first was dissolved by the people after the 23 July 1952 Revolution and the second dissolved itself by itself and became irrelevant! How can he come today, without embarrassment, sign what he signed, and move history back to the time when he started his career in parliament, in 1936, by forging his birth certificate and adding 4 years to his age so that his application for candidacy would be accepted!

At that time people commented on that by saying that the former pasha had started his public career by forging official documents; shall we find fault with him today for ending his days, after a long life, by assuming an identity which is not his?

What has most angered the former pasha is that he was said to have been a plaything in the hands of the king and the hands of the British. We do not know how we can deny facts that have been proved and ignore official documents in which every letter speaks of this fact, which the Pasha is now trying to ignore and deny.

We have decided to publish Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's letter in full and not comment on it. We have selected what others besides us have said in replying to the many lies which were contained in the letter. We have chosen what colleagues of his in the dissolved Wafd Party said about him, we have chosen what was stated in the legal defense memorandum presented by Mr Fathi Radwan against Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, and we have chosen what the secretary of the British Embassy said about him in an official cable retained in the records of the British Foreign Office. We leave it to the reader to comment on that himself!

Once again, we wonder:

What exactly does Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din want? Or, more precisely, what can the former pasha do to forge history and destroy the facts?

It's a question which no one can answer but Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din himself!

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GOVERNMENT PARTY PAPER DENOUNCES DOMESTIC CRITICS

Cairo MAY in Arabic 18 May 81 p 7

/Editorial by Ibrahim Sa'dah: "Opposition!"/

/Text/ For a long time there has been nothing from the press and the mouthpieces of the Syrian government except insults against the Government of Egypt, attempts to disparage its achievements and an insistence on casting doubt about its intentions, principles and Arabhood!

The papers of Damascus have no concern except to slander President Anwar al-Sadat for no purpose! The statements by Syrian officials, from President Hafiz al-Asad down to the lowest Ba'thist Alawite official, are full of violent phrases and dangerous charges, all directed against the Egyptian government in general and President Anwar al-Sadat in particular!

What the mouthpieces of Syrian propaganda are doing against the legitimate government of Egypt is also being done by the mouthpieces of Libyan propaganda, the mouthpieces of Palestinian propaganda and the mouthpieces of Iraqi propaganda!

These Arab countries--fraternal Arab countries--have the right to write, talk, and be concerned as they please, just as they have the right to be hostile to foreign governments which do not agree with them or are not in accord with what they deem fit and call for.

These countries have the right to do all this, as long as their rulers plan media policy and define who their countries' friends are and who their enemies are!

It will not harm Egypt in any way if some people slander it or cast doubts on the positions of its legitimate government. It may perhaps sadden Egyptian citizens when they read a paper issued in a fraternal Arab country, for example Syria, and find many things in it that neither the mind nor the heart, nor taste can accept! Egyptians may be pained when they hear Radio Tripoli, Radio Baghdad or the Voice of Palestine from Damascus and find that they are trying to stir them up against their government, their leader or all the national, domestic and Egyptian issues they believe in and feel strongly about!

Grief alone constitutes the reaction of Egyptian citizens when they read Arabic papers cursing their country and listen to Arab broadcasts slandering their government and leaders.

We are not proponents of replying to curses with greater ones. We are not people who demand that our papers and broadcasts organize constant attacks against the ruling regimes in Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli and elsewhere in response to their attacks against Egypt and its regime.

However:

There is a big difference between ignoring the base charges these regimes are levelling against us and extending our hand and shaking those of the leaders of regimes that have planned the hate campaigns with which they fill the columns of their newspapers and with which they pack their speeches and radio talks!

There is a big difference, a very big one, between my trying to end Arab-Egyptian disputes and between my ignoring some people's curses, going to these people, embracing them, holding discussions with them and declaring my support for their positions and policies!

There is a very big difference between my opposing the policies of the Egyptian government in Cairo, protected by the democratic atmosphere we enjoy, and flying to Damascus, for example, in response to an invitation from the Syrian government, meeting with Hafiz al-Asad, getting information from him, quoting from him, then returning to my country triumphant and victorious!

There is a big difference--a very big one--between my writing against the Egyptian president in an opposition newspaper issued in Cairo and my meeting with Yasir 'Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in a rejection /state/ capital, and carrying out lengthy discussions with him in which our views coincide and at the conclusion of which we issue a joint communique declaring our solidarity, alliance and cooperation!

If it happens that one of them attacks my country, my people, my legitimate government, and my head of state, and then I try to meet with this person, embrace him, talk with him, and declare my support for him, my position has no meaning except that I am practicing wrongful opposition and exploiting the atmosphere of democracy in order to defy the feeling of all Egyptians!

If I ignore everything that is said about my country in loathesome terms that go against courtesy, and then agree to accept the hospitality of the people who use these terms, listen to them and eat their food, I do not believe that the most severe domestic critics would permit that or agree to it!

I cannot imagine that there are people who see no embarrassment in leaving Cairo, accepting an invitation from Hafiz al-Asad--who reviles my country, attacks the head of my government, tortures the Syrian people, prosecutes the Moslem Brothers, blows up the homes of Lebanese, and threatens the faithful--meeting with him, listening to him and sharing his positions!

What I cannot imagine has actually happened! What we cannot accept some people have proceeded to do!

It is a real tragedy, a tragedy which calls for a pause, merits study. In reality it represents a current which does not express the real Egypt, and underlines a tendency which is rejected by every Egyptian who supports or opposes his country's policies.

Strong, and true, opposition is the opposition that opposes the ruler for a political position and does not go to shake hands dirtied with blood and talk with people who have cursed Egypt, attacked its legitimate leadership, and sent their agents to try to stir up discord and spread about terror within the country!

Opposition, as I view it, means saying "no" to Anwar al-Sadat if you have an opinion different from him. It is not opposition when you go to al-Asad or 'Arafat, agree with him and shake his hand as he competes and vies with others to curse Egypt and curse its legitimate president, Anwar al-Sadat!

I really am at a loss as to how to choose a proper way to describe this opposition!

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CSO: 4504/71

PRO-GOVERNMENT CLERICS, OFFICIALS DISCUSS WAVE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI in Arabic 20, 27 Jul, 3, 10 Aug

/Article: "AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's Symposium: Religious Extremism"/

/20 Jul 81 pp 4, 5/

/Text/ All of us without exception are deeply concerned about Islam. All of us without exception are proud of our tolerant religion.

All of us without exception wish the banner of Islam to stand high.

All of us without exception are striving earnestly to advance God's words.

Who among us is not happy about the devout young people who know their lord and seek shelter in his contentment?

Who among us is not happy about the young men who are devoted to God in their conduct, openly and inside themselves?

Who among us does not hope that all of our young people will turn into men of God?

What does concern us, however, is that some of our young people are inclining toward extremism, with, on some occasions, the violence that leads to, which Islam dismisses and rejects.

What does concern us is that our young Moslems in their understanding of their religion are turning away from the proper course!

Therefore AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI has convened this symposium, to ascertain the reasons lying behind the phenomenon of religious extremism so that a way may consequently be found to remedy it.

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: Any call for reform must be constantly focused on establishing morality, supporting its structure, and surrounding it with an impregnable wall which will preserve it from the vicissitudes of time. The divine religions have arisen on this basis; if they are observed to the letter in full, they will put people on the sound path and will lead them by the hand to success and prosperity.

There is no doubt that our experiences in life, and the events of time that history has recorded, have taught us to have an unquestionable faith that nations can properly emerge and live a happy life only in the context of noble morals and manners and that if they deviate from God's law their star will fall. This matter is to be taken for granted, according to experience as well as the notice that almighty glorious God has given us in his beloved book.

On this basis, we can say that the foundation of the resurgence that can be our lot and that our lives can settle on in Egypt are Islamic principles and establishment of these principles in people's spirits. This notion, I believe, is what we have come here for today.

We are now faced with an issue which is one of intellectual extremism and religious extremism. There is no doubt that extremism in anything is a matter to be censured. The Islamic religion is distinguished only by being a mediating religion. It is mediation which has made ours the best religion that has been revealed to people.

Therefore we would like to deal with this problem, that is, the problem of religious extremism, and, with guidance and perspicacity, ascertain the causes which have led to the appearance of such extremism in Egypt, the country in which the noble al-Azhar is situated, the country in which Islam is studied extensively.

How does this extremism exist in our midst, or how could it exist when we have al-Azhar with its faculties, institutes and scholars?

There must be reasons. It is these reasons which we must look into now. If we put our hands on these reasons it will be easy to set forth a wholesome solution to this phenomenon.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: I am pleased to talk at this blessed symposium on a subject which I truly believe to be the issue of the hour.

Religious extremism has two sides, a theoretical side and a practical one.

I might let myself be guided by my trade as a professor of history and offer a summary historic introduction to the subject, as Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar has been so gracious as to speak about the problem from the point of departure of our pure religion.

I have practical experience, since I am connected to the most important sector in the government, which is that of the students.

I have found that the phenomenon of violence manifests itself clearly among students, especially students in universities.

When I say "violence," I mean violence in speech, which may spread and become aggravated, turning into physical combat.

I have observed through experience that the phenomenon of violence is a phenomenon that does not arise from within us but one that has been brought to us!

I can assert, through experience, observation and testimony, that "violence" is an imported phenomenon and has not been fashioned by our environment. The sources of "violence," as a phenomenon that has now manifested itself in our midst, are not Islamic. They are communistic or atheistic.

Islam does not inspire violence. Its grandeur, nobility and perseverance lies in the fact that it does not call for violence, indeed that it calls us to renounce it as much as possible.

There are many factors which feed the phenomenon of violence in our midst, most importantly our student children's travel abroad.

All our children who travel to Europe and America return bearing the phenomenon of violence.

However, in spite of that, I consider that the phenomenon of violence must not cause us fear or disturb us, because our tolerant religion commands us to renounce it and because freedom of opinion is the way to deepen our understanding.

Shayk Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq: Extremism in thought, as Prof al-'Adawi has pointed out, is relevant for the most part; it is a matter on which there is no conflict.

My statement will be confined to the phenomena of extremism in religion that I see.

Religious extremism is a matter which is not new to Moslems; indeed, it has existed since the era of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and blessings.

Perhaps we might recall the subject of these people who were companions of the prophet, some of whom were young men, and went to his home in his absence, questioning his devotion and work. When they gave notice of it, as if they thought little of it, in the words of the narrative, and when the prophet heard their questions and what they had understood to be his scant devotion and their plea that he be forgiven, he told them, "Haven't you said this, this and this?" They said, "Yes, prophet of God." He said, "I fast, I break the fast, I get up and I go to bed, I marry women and anyone who loathes my sayings and doings is not on my side."

I believe that this notion, which brought these people to the prophet's house, wondering about his devotion is a kind of extremism; extremism which must devote itself to being devoutly religious and performing God's due we can in any event also call extremism.

Moslems were not created just for worship. They have other obligations, which are those of the succession which God brought to man when he distinguished him from the angels: "Your lord told the angel, I am making a successor on earth, and this succession has its significance."

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: Do you mean that this kind of extremism might lead to violations against religion?

Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq: That is what I am getting at. We have now been witnessing an absence of religion among students, indeed in Egyptian society, for a long time, whether in school or the university, or even in the home--an absence of religion in the sense of religious training and religious supervision and guidance.

In the context of this absence, imported ideas have come, have taken root in the minds and spirits of young people, and have possessed them.

History tells us that during the wave of translation, especially the translation of philosophy, during the era of Harun al-Rashid and al-Ma'mun, in that era, in the wake of the broad extensive translation movement, signs of extremism emerged. Where did it come from? It came from imported cultures that had been brought in.

We also have opened up to the world before us, and the world has become like a single nation. In the context of this intellectual or cultural opening, many ideas, creeds and ideologies have come to us which we have unfortunately not been able to stand up to thoughtfully or fortify our young people against. There has been nothing in our radio broadcasting, our schools or our programs which could make our young people understand the true nature of these ideas and how they were brought in, what their centers were, or what their scope was in the context of the provisions of Islam. This is what we have missed and what has been lacking in our midst.

There also are groups of young people who have formed what are called religious societies. In this I am certain there is nothing wrong, or the least danger.

The danger, rather, comes when these groups deviate from the proper religious course.

Some of these religious groups might become extreme and take religion out of its context. They might imagine that Islam is exclusive devotion to worship; they might imagine that Islam is a particular kind of clothing.

Where did these unsound notions come from?

They all arose in the absence of the presentation of the proper Islamic religion in student milieux at the level of the grades of instruction, indeed on most occasions in the family environment.

Dr al-Husayni Hashim: The essence of the Islamic religion was truly summarized by almighty blessed God in the mission of his prophet when he said, "We have sent you only kindness for both worlds."

The Islamic religion is kindness for both worlds, for Moslems and non-Moslems alike, for man and the rest of creation.

The prophet is the guiding kindness, all the laws of Islam are nourished by the holy Koran, and the sayings and doings of the prophet explain the holy Koran.

We see that all the laws in the holy Koran are motivated by a style of kindness, in the name of God the all merciful and most compassionate. The chapters of the Koran

begin with the name of God the all merciful and most compassionate. This is proof that Islam is endowed with kindness in all its matters and that Islamic creation is the great creation.

There is a difference between education and upbringing; I consider that upbringing truly is more important than education, though the attention education receives now is very great. In the mosques, many givers of sermons and proselytizers give people proper information: they instruct people and support their role as fully as possible. Thus the imams state knowledge and convey it to people.

Many people possess knowledge but do not act in accordance with it. The reason for that is a lack of upbringing: "Our growing youths grow up in accordance with what their fathers have accustomed them to." How many crimes are committed by people who are the best informed about them, and how many traits people display when they know they are blameworthy and not approved by religious law! The cause of that is upbringing. To that end, I recommend upbringing; upbringing, as psychologists say, is of greatest importance in the first stages of life.

The phenomenon of deviation in the universities is just a collection of roots which children clutched at when they were in the prime of their life, were still in the nursery, then were in primary, preparatory and secondary school, and they bore them with them as poisonous roots into the university. The phenomenon of deviation has arisen as a reaction to intellectual deviation.

In every aspect, deviation is an evil and there is no doubt about it.

Religious deviation is a reaction to communist intellectual deviation, or, in similar words, deviant communist thinking is what has given birth to deviant religious thinking.

As his eminence Dr al-Najjar has shown, Islam is the mediating religion; the meaning of "you have been a mediating nation" is "just," because mediation is justice. As the philosophers Plato and Aristotle say, virtue is mediating between two evils: boldness is a virtue and recklessness is an evil; cowardice is also an evil and dignity a virtue, and so on.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: It occurs to me that we ought to have carefully defined the notion of "extremism" at the beginning of the discussion. What is it and what does one mean by it? It is true that it has appeared on the tongues of our gentlemen and colleagues who have spoken about part of this notion, but it is possible that it would be better for us to pause to define it.

In my view there is the extremism which exists in thought. Extremism in religious thought is extremism on the rulings of religion themselves and on interpreting the import of certain Koranic verses, as we have seen--the interpretation of certain Islamic groups of certain Koranic verses, for example. People act with excess in interpreting certain Koranic verses, setting definitions out for them which are not their true definitions, for example their interpretation of God's almighty statement "Those who are not governed by what God has revealed," and so forth.

Some people also interpret the methods for dealing with Christians and Jews which have appeared in our religion in a Western manner which the intelligence cannot accept.

Acting in excess and extremism in understanding--and here, by understanding, I mean the understanding of religious stipulations--is the first point before which we might pause and which we might call extremism.

The second form of extremism is embodied in the application of this notion. People might understand religion in a specific way, then subsequently try to apply it as they understand it.

Some people might understand, for instance, that the best thing in worship is exclusive devotion to it, and leave their work and worship day and night. This notion might come to certain people's minds; practical application to prayer day and night, abandoning work and the quest for a livelihood, is to be considered a definition of extremism, in the sense of applying these notions which I have mentioned as the first form of extremism.

We can then move on to the third form of extremism as I envision it, which is concentrated in the effects derived from understanding religious precepts and applying them in a certain way. There are effects which are derived from application, these derived effects are what I might call "violence."

Violence is the effect which results from an erroneous conception of religion or an erroneous application of religion!

I place the phenomenon of "violence" in third place; I can call it "extremism," and characterize it by a special designation, which is "violence" as a result of extremism.

This clearly helps us penetrate deeply into the reasons for each one of these three forms, and therefore we can wonder:

Why do we see that some people are extremists and others are not? Why? Upbringing might be the same in their cases, on many occasions.

Thus it is necessary for us to seek out adequate reasons for this extremism. This is not the easy matter that some people might think it is.

We might wonder: does this extremism, which we have seen and witnessed and whose manifestations we have witnessed, arise from wrongful religious information or a misconception of religious precepts?

Is it the result of psychological reasons of upbringing, in the sense that upbringing has not been properly guided from childhood and has not proceeded in its proper course, for one reason or another, leading to deviation? Dr Abu-al-'Azayim might point to some of these aspects.

Some of the educational and psychological aspects which have manifested themselves in childhood might prepare a person to become in the future a vicious extremist dealing harshly with everyone! When this kind of person turns to religion, the extreme features of his personality are reflected in his religious conduct and he becomes an extremist in religious matters as he is extremist in his personal and private affairs.

That might in my opinion be a reason for religious extremism.

Might extremism be attributed to religious enthusiasm itself, such as faith and extreme zeal for religion, which become transformed into extremism or violence?

Is extremism attributable to the blind imitation of foreign trends?

Is extremism an imported quality?

Is extremism political in essence, adopting a religious exterior? These are all in reality just conjectures whose validity, or lack of validity, we cannot judge.

The matter requires that we devote serious scholarly study in which psychologists, sociologists, theologians, and political scientists will participate, and which will take up an investigation into the phenomenon of religious extremism in order that one might arrive at its causes and that it might as a consequence be feasible to remedy it.

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: The fact is that the issues which have sprung forth, which Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan has discussed, are more individual than general. We cannot say that they are general ones subject to general criteria; rather, they are forms of perversion which occur at times.

I believe there are general bases which must dominate, and these are religious upbringing. If some people deviate, there are other reasons prompting them to deviation, and this is a deviation which cannot be measured.

Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr: In reality, the subject of extremism and the means for remedying are a big issue, a subject which needs copious study, and there may exist, in some libraries or other places, special research into this subject, albeit in generalized form, or simple references.

I am speaking to the very elite of thinking and opinion:

I say: extremism may seem to us to be an excess of thought and intellectual consciousness. If the thinking of a person, or his understanding of a given issue, is bad, then his love of this thought will acquire that quality.

Deviation might lie in belief and opinion and it might lie in conduct. One phenomenon of such deviation in belief is the fact that some people believed that the prophet was not human.

The almighty glorious lord of honor ordered his prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, to show the people in more than one place and on more than one occasion that he was human like them, lest they go to excess in their love, as some people in the past went to excess and raised him to heaven and to the status we have seen.

The prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, told the people "Do not lavish praise on me the way the Christians lavished praise on Christ the son of Mary."

The phenomena of extremism are old and have not been introduced into Islamic society recently. The phenomena of extremism existed at the death of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace. We know the defiant ideas which raised these people to levels which might be above those of man, and we know the violent nature contained in these ideas and the violence which occurred because of them; as a result of wrongful belief and a result of the love of extremism in religion, certain wrongful notions and conceptions revolved about them.

As a consequence, a strange laxity manifested itself which led to the renunciation of the major companions of the prophet; this is the peak of extremism and the peak of intellectual deviation.

Thus we find that one of the manifestations of extremism are the extremist beliefs some people hold.

There also is the Wahhabi creed, which basically arose to eliminate heresy and superstition.

It was a good idea when it first arose, but soon, in the course of time, deviated; it was the darwishes who belonged to it and smashed everything and everyone who opposed them that caused it to deviate. In fact, they threw out everyone who did not embrace their views of the Islamic religion and considered him an infidel.

We know the statement of almighty God: "T. H. /introductory letters/: we did not reveal the Koran to you to make you miserable."

We know the statement of almighty God: "God wishes you comfort and does not wish you hardship."

The Islamic religion is the religion of mediation--indeed, it is the religion of comfort.

On the Symposium

An enlightened elite of scholars of religion and thought, university professors and specialists have raised many important points in AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium, with respect to:

Religious extremism, its roots, its causes, its remedy, among them: The phenomenon of religious extremism and the violence that accompanies it do not arise from our midst--the phenomenon is imported and brought in from abroad.

Religious extremism is not something new or newly created in the ranks of Moslems--it is an old phenomenon which has existed since the era of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace.

In the absence of religious upbringing and guidance in the school, the university, and the home, and in the context of the intellectual opening to the world, wayward, misleading notions have done to us which we have not stood up to in an objective manner and protected our young people from.

There is no danger in the emergence of religious societies. The danger lies merely in these groups' deviation from the proper religious course.

Extremism is the effect which results from a wrongful conception and wrongful application of religion. The wrongful conception of religion is the inevitable product of the absence of a proper introduction to the Islamic religion.

There is unanimity, or near-unanimity, that the matter needs serious scientific study in which psychologists, sociologists, theologians and political scientists will participate, taking up an investigation into the phenomenon of religious extremism, so that it can arrive in a scientific, objective manner at its causes and thus its remedy.

Egyptian schools are proficient in scholarship but they do not give young people a proper religious upbringing.

There is a religious void which people who have infiltrated the call to Islam have exploited, occupying the field, spreading about their wayward call and disseminating extremism among young people.

Our young people are now exposed to corrupt, destructive intellectual currents which they must be protected from!

Participants in the Symposium

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar, President of al-Azhar University; Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haww, the mufti of the Republic of Egypt; Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, Vice President of Cairo University; Dr al-Hussayni Hashim, Secretary General of the Academy of Islamic Research; Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan, former head of the Teachers' Union; Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman, religious consultant to the National Party; Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr, scientific consultant to the Ministry of Religious Endowments; Dr Jamal Madi Abu-al-'Azayim, professor of psychiatry; Prof Jabir Hamzah Farraj, general director of information at al-Azhar; and, for AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI, Mahmud Mahdi and Sami Diyab.

/27 Jul 81 pp 4, 5/

/Text/ AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium is still in session.

The phenomenon of "religious extremism" is still the subject of a debate with many ramifications.

Our intellectuals, religious scholars and university professors are still carrying on a dialogue on the phenomenon, presenting reasons and seeking a remedy.

Many new causes of the phenomenon of religious extremism have been introduced in this instalment. In this instalment, also, the serious discussion of the remedy began.

Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman: Our young people would be the best there are, if they followed an upright program and the straight path.

Modern young people, at this time specifically, consist of young people who sincerely believe in God and his message; young people who are irresponsible about their religion and morals and are fugitives from their lord; or religious, extremist, intense young people who are zealous about their religion and, through their extremism and zealotry, have gone beyond the limits which Islam has brought forth through God!

In my opinion many reasons lie behind the phenomenon of religious extremism; these are stated by the questions I present and raise:

Are schools now providing a proper upbringing? I do not believe so!

Schools teach lessons but they do not nurture spirits and consciousnesses.

Have we managed to stand up to the cultural onslaught with all the means it entails for destroying the spirits of our young people? We absolutely have not.

I do not accept the phrase "religious deviation," because it means religious rebellion; it would be better for us to say "deviation in the name of religion."

Young people are exposed to numerous cultures. Islam is self-evident and does not need explanation, because men of bedouin backgrounds went to the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, and asked him about Islam, "Tell me something about Islam so that I need not ask anyone about it after you." Then the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, brought together two words and said "Say 'I believe in God,' then be devout."

Spread the message and do not run away, for the Koran is self-evident, the sayings and doings of the prophet are self-evident, and the history of the devout is filled with heroic acts of Islam which established the nation of Islam on a basis of piety and good will toward God.

I do not want to go on at length, but I can say that the tremendous piercing power of the call to Islam remains strong, calling for God wisely and with good exhortation and calling for God perspicaciously. The call for moderation and a commitment to the sound Islamic program, Islamic morality, and the straight path are the duties of every person making the call. The prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, has made the goal of his mission the nobility of morality: "I have been sent down to fulfill the nobility of morality."

I do not harbor ill will toward young people. Our young people are devout and religious but it is waywardness in understanding that is doing them harm.

There also is an important matter to which I would like to draw attention: there is a religious void which people who pretend to give the call are exploiting, taking over the field and harming Islam and Moslems; they have been a major cause, through their improper appeals, of the spread of the phenomenon of extremism among our young people.

Islam is not internally contradictory and its verses do not differ over any matter, unless some people want to bend them to something other than God's religion for special purposes alien to God's religion.

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: I can say that a home is a Moslem home only if the proselytizers perform their duty. The proselytizers must perform their duty for the public, among men and women.

A Moslem home will grow if both parents are virtuous; in their virtue there lies virtue for their children, on grounds that they are the exemplar and model. If a Moslem home grows, Moslem children and Moslem young people will be raised in turn.

Dr James Abu-al-'Azayim: In reality, if we look at extremism we will find that it is the product of an introverted personality.

There are two personality manifestations: there is introversion and there is extroversion. Both of them are pathological. The Koran tries to create people of moderate disposition who do not fall on their faces or go about ecstatically on earth.

As time passes, a personality which has been introverted since childhood does not reach the degrees of maturity which it ought to.

Therefore we must devote great attention to remedying the phenomenon of introversion, lest the person who possesses or is afflicted by it deviate from the natural course, in spite of himself.

Human growth passes through stages; there is physical growth, psychological growth, and social growth, and there is also religious growth.

The more people in their lives are in the intermediary position the Koran calls for, the more they progress with this growth and reach it at the suitable time, not stopping at any period.

You might ask me what hazard there is in such a stoppage of growth, if it occurs.

The hazard in the stoppage of growth lies in the fact that people whose growth has stopped at a specific period and who have not completed their natural course are easy to tempt and are easy to lead into zealotry.

This ease of being tempted and being led exposes them to being influenced by other personalities.

These other influential personalities might in turn be pathological and lead immature personalities, fill them with thoughts and form many different groups out of them and others!

Yes, Islam has left everything clear to us, but we must be anxious to investigate every mystery, because our current social life is growing complicated in a very amazing manner.

Jabir Hamzah: There is an introduction which must be made before one starts to talk.

Ibn 'Abbas, may almighty God be pleased with him, says: "We made nine-tenths permissible, out of fear of succumbing to what is forbidden." Therefore it is not

permissible to term adherence to religion and the preservation of the appearance of religion extremism.

It would have been more appropriate for us to direct attention, criticism and reform to the phenomena of deviation and waywardness which exists among young people of both sexes in society, and we must properly understand the statement of almighty God: "Call for your lord's path with wisdom and good exhortation."

This blessed verse is being repeated on the tongues of many scholars and ordinary people. In my opinion, stating it and interpreting it in the obvious sense is alien to the essence of this verse and the noble goals and honorable ends it is aimed at.

"Call for your lord's path with wisdom"--here wisdom does not mean permissiveness; rather, wisdom means putting things in their right place. The situation might require a good word; here wisdom requires that we use a good word. Wisdom might require severity, violence and war; here, wisdom is for us to do so, and if we do not we will deviate from wisdom.

I have some observations on what we in particular call religious extremism:

First, what cannot be doubted is that religion is a blessing, and what cannot be doubted as well is that there is no blessing in excess, and no excess in blessings.

Consequently, we do not accept this expression known as religious extremism.

Second, perhaps the reason for this expression, that is, "religious extremism," may be attributed to disrespect for the status of religion, as a result of which ordinary adherence to religion has become strange to society because society has become deviant. If people adhere to their religion, but in a sound manner, they will become perverted in the eyes of this society and strange in people's views and understanding.

Third, attributing extremism and violence to religious people specifically is not permissible, since confining different types of violence and perversion to religious persons alone or as a consequence of intensity in religion or adherence to religion is not to be accepted.

Fourth, there is an abundance of deviation that has been transmitted to us from abroad and did not previously exist in our midst.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: Most of what the people who have been invited to the symposium have said revolves about the fact that religious extremism has many manifestations and numerous causes; it is desirable to enumerate these manifestations and define these causes be through thorough studies in which men of religion, psychology, sociology and education take part so that it will be possible to set forth a suitable remedy for each manifestation.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: I would like to stress to the gentlemen here that religious extremism is a problem which has been imported from abroad. Our children are good and have never in their lives deviated. I wish to say this, not as flattery: as long as the edifice of al-Azhar is standing, God willing, nothing will happen.

Our base is sound. I consider that the symposium must concentrate on a specific point, which is that our children today are exposed to imported tendencies. We must look after the students and young people who come from abroad and spread destructive ideas among our young people.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: Dr 'Adawi, you are concentrating on the point that extremism has been imported. That is one cause, but are the currents coming in from abroad all the causes of extremism? Of course not. There are many other causes which lead to religious extremism, besides those that are brought in.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: I am like a baker standing in front of the oven; because of my pursuit of my job, my affiliation with university students and my complete understanding of problems and events going on around them, I still assert that the phenomenon of religious extremism or religious deviation is an imported one.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: That is, your opinion is that you give the reason that the phenomenon of religious extremism is an imported one preponderance over the other reasons. We say that imported trends are one of many reasons that lead to or create what we call religious extremism.

Yes, we agree with you that the currents that have come from abroad are among the reasons for the religious extremism that is becoming widespread among our young people now, but there are many other reasons besides that, which have been mentioned by our colleagues. Dr Abu-al-'Azayim, for example, spoke about psychological disturbances since childhood; there also is the erroneous conception of religion and its stipulations and there are other reasons.

We are not belittling the weight of the problem you talked about, and we are not belittling the weight of this. To the contrary, I am participating in hopes that we can remedy it. The problem which has been raised now is the young people's aversion to meeting with men of religion. It is necessary that we think of a solution to this.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: In support of what Dr Radwan said, we ask Dr al-'Adawi: if we prevent our young people from traveling abroad, will we have stopped our young people from being affected by foreign trends? Will we have put an end to religious extremism as an imported phenomenon? Will religious extremism in our lives and society thereby be ended?

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: I don't argue with you. All I am saying is that we have come to this symposium to deal with the problem of religious extremism and we must consequently concentrate on that, find a remedy for it and get rid of it for good without getting into mazes that keep us away from the heart of the problem.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: Now we have discussed the problem of religious extremism from two angles and have become acquainted with its roots that are deeply grounded in history.

We have also become acquainted with the reasons that lead to it, among them the absence of religious training in schools, universities and the home, wayward ideas

that lead people astray and came to us from outside the borders, and the religious void that has been exploited by interloper proselytizers who have spread extremism about among our young people.

We say that it would now be worthwhile for us, now that we have become acquainted with the causes of the problem, to devote ourselves entirely to discussing successful, decisive remedies. It is not impossible for you, who are elite intellectuals and religious scholars, to come up with a remedy now that you have set forth the causes.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: The phenomenon of religious extremism and the violence that accompanies it are, as I mentioned previously, imported and our children are therefore in urgent need to being shielded and protected.

We must look after the students, follow up on them and supervise them.

This does not mean that I am demanding that censorship be imposed on them or their behavior spied on. What I mean, rather, is supervising their behavior in a paternal way, as fathers supervise the behavior and conduct of their children. If they are late coming home at night, one should ask them "why are you late," so that this behavior will not be repeated.

We must also ascertain the problems of students and young people in general in order to remedy them, and we should find solutions for them and protect them from error.

This is a point of the utmost importance. The second point, as far as our environment is concerned, is that I lay responsibility on religious education instructors in the schools. They are primarily responsible for the unnatural or improper religious phenomena that are dominating the stage now.

I would like to see the day when religion instructors become the young people's primary guides and leaders. I would like to see the day when the main emphasis is given to religion instructors in the schools. At that point we will eliminate the phenomenon of religious extremism and its equivalents, and will pull it out by its roots.

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: We thank Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi for these views, which we can summarize in the point that the basis for the existence of these extreme ideas may lie in the fact that religious education in the schools is not as it should be in our Islamic environment and that we must, to remedy the phenomenon of extremism, be active in performing our duty in this field. We share this view and thank him for it.

Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq: When the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, was faced by a clan of his followers who were worshipping to excess, he tried to cure them, because worshipping to excess is a form of extremism.

How did the prophet cure them? How did he remedy this phenomenon?

The prophet remedied this phenomenon in a manner which was devoid of violence, severity or censure: he remedied it in a manner full of mercy, wisdom and upright guidance.

He told them, "I fast, I break the fast, I get up and I go to bed, I marry women, and anyone who loathes my sayings and doings is not on my side." This is because some of them had said "We fast but do not break the fast," others said "We get up but do not go to bed," and a third faction said "We do not marry women."

These are serious matters as far as the identity of the Moslem, his spirit and his self are concerned; he was not created just for worship, but has other duties, the duties of divine succession which God brought to man when he made a distinction between him and the angel--"When your lord told the angel, 'I am placing a successor on earth.'" This divine succession is of importance in settling terrestrial life, and therefore the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, confronted people who called for religious extremism, demanded that they commit themselves to his sayings and doings and his path, and explained them to them.

We must think of the remedy, starting now, as leaders, fathers, mothers, professors and instructors.

There must be a decisive, rapid remedy.

Perhaps one idea going about in my mind is that guardians should intervene in the schools or even universities lest the people taking charge of the remedy be isolated from young people's gatherings. Indeed, it is necessary that there be people in their midst who are closely attached to them and know their sufferings and the ideas going about in their minds; it is also necessary that their remedy be drawn from the true nature of Islam, to which our young people must turn in all of their gatherings.

On the Symposium

In this instalment of AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium, which is being held on religious extremism, its roots, its causes and its treatment, scholars of religion, university professors and specialists have raised many points, most importantly:

Extremism is engendered in introverted personalities and therefore we must devote great attention to remedying the phenomenon of introversion, lest the people who possess it or are afflicted with it involuntarily deviate from the natural path.

Human growth passes through stages. There is physical growth, psychological growth, social growth and religious growth. The more a person is in the intermediate position which the Koran calls for, the more he will progress in this growth and reach it at the proper time.

We must avoid succumbing to the error which is embodied in labelling adherence to religion and maintenance of the appearance of religion extremism!

Our children are in serious need of a form of shielding and protection. We must look after the young, follow them and supervise their behavior in a paternal fashion.

We must become acquainted with the problems of young people and try as far as possible to set forth solutions to them.

We must deal with the phenomenon of extremism the way the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and blessings, did, in a manner full of mercy, wisdom and upright guidance; it must be a remedy devoid of violence, severity or censure.

The person conducting the remedy must be closely connected to the young people being remedied and know their sufferings and problems and the ideas going about in their minds.

The treatment of the phenomenon of religious extremism which prevails among our young people must be dealt with from the standpoint of the true nature of Islam.

We must respond to every aspect in the ideas that come into the country and conflict with our religion in an objective, convincing manner, so that our young people's minds may be implanted with protection and shielded from being influenced by every destructive idea that appears!

Participants in the Symposium

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar, president of al-Azhar University; Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, vice president of Cairo University; Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan, former head of the Teachers' Union; Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr, scientific consultant to the Ministry of Religious Endowments; Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq, the mufti of the Republic of Egypt; Dr al-Husayni Hashim, secretary general of the Academy of Islamic Research; Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman, religious consultant to the National Party; Dr Jamal Madi Abu-al-'Azayim, professor of psychiatry; Prof Jabir Hamzah Farraj, general director of information at al-Azhar; and, for AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI, Mahmud Mahdi and Sami Diyab.

/3 Aug 81, pp 4, 5/

/Text/ In the third instalment of AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium, the conversation focussed on remedying the phenomenon of religious extremism.

The participants said that the remedy lies in correcting understanding and in supervising conduct.

They said that the treatment lies in opening the dialogue with young extremists.

They said that it lies in proper religious upbringing, which is embraced by the school as well as the home.

They said that it lies in the elimination of contradictions in the society which bring extremism to the fore.

They said that it lies in providing a climate of trust between religious men and young extremists.

They said that it lies in providing remedies to the social problems which sow anxiety and a feeling of alienation among the spirits of our young people.

Many notions were presented by our intellectuals at AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium in considering where the decisive remedy to extremism lay.

Dr al-Husayni Hashim: Remedying the phenomenon of religious extremism, or similar wrongful religious phenomena, must start with infancy.

Children, as Imam al-Ghazzali says, are born with a clean slate on which the good may be inscribed. Children must be brought up, as they are still pliable and can be molded, in an Islamic manner, or you will face problems later on.

A second point: it is necessary to review religious books and materials in the nursery school and the primary, secondary and university stages so that the student will be reared on the Islamic religion and on teachings that will protect him from imported principles.

A third point: we must seek the assistance of professors who specialize in religious education and we must reply to imported ideas and strange scientific theories which conflict with the bases of our religion. We must reply to every detail in them in an objective, persuasive fashion, with religious teachings and proof, so that we can implant in our young people's minds the material that will protect and shield them from being influenced by all destructive ideas that come in.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: In order for the remedy of the phenomenon of religious extremism to be decisive and successful, we must have a scientific study in which psychologists, sociologists, theologians and political scientists take part, and this study must look empirically into the phenomenon of religious extremism so that we will be able to come up with a remedy to this phenomenon.

The reasons for extremism differ from one environment to another, and consequently the means of treatment differ as the causes differ.

In general, the educational process, starting with childhood, is of utmost importance.

As regards small children, it is necessary that the educational process, from the beginning, take place in a manner which will guarantee us that such extremism will not afflict his conduct, starting with childhood.

The mother has major responsibility in this regard in her home, then, subsequently, in the school.

We must implant stories of religious tolerance in young people's consciousnesses. We must implant love in their spirits in the home and the school, as a value and a means for dealing with people, engage in a debate over what is the best, and call for good exhortation.

These are all values which must be disseminated from childhood in the spirits and consciousness of the young in order that they may grow up with them, so we can guarantee that when children reach adulthood the phenomenon of extremism will not dominate them.

If a student reaches the secondary or university stage, we must be concerned to let religious notions take their sound course and not act with excess in understanding or interpretation.

Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr: In reality, remedying any problem must take place first by correcting understanding; after correcting understanding comes the role of supervising conduct.

A young man went to the prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, and told him, "Permit me to commit debauchery." The companions of the prophet rose up against him, but the prophet started a calm, logical, persuasive dialogue with him, and, through the dialogue, managed to persuade the young man of the harm and unreasonableness of what he was asking permission to do, and the young person's spirit was soothed by the conversation and became calm.

We must emulate this art of dialogue which the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and blessings, has embraced and set forth with these people of religious extremism.

We must engage in calm, objective, persuasive dialogue with them, must most calmly understand their ideas and demands, and reply to them logically so that we can instill in them a sound understanding of their religion.

We must not abandon them to be easy prey to satans or people whom they consider to be models and exemplars:

We must meet with them, listen to them and offer them advice.

Every official must play his part in order to eliminate the phenomenon of extremism.

Schools must play their part in this.

Homes must play their part.

All the media must play their part to remedy this phenomenon.

Once consciousness is spread, there must be oversight. Who will perform the oversight?

First, both parents.

Second, the people supervising the education.

Third, people with high responsibilities in the government.

They must all spread awareness and at the same time perform oversight.

Every reform must be preceded by corrections, as for conduct, that must be subjected to oversight, and the task of spreading awareness or surveillance does not lie on a specific person or body but lies on everyone, without exception!

Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman: I consider that the pillars of righteousness are founded on the home, the school and the media; consequently the remedy must be performed by the home, the school and the media.

Home is the basis. Responsibility in the home is very great, because fathers in the home raise, discipline, teach, hold accountable and punish, as do the mothers;

mothers are schools, and if they are prepared they will prepare a people with solid roots.

Are homes now providing a proper Islamic upbringing?

Here homes differ, because the family is the basic brick in the structure of the society. If the father is religious, devout and sincere in his belief, he will raise his children sincerely, faithfully and in obedience to God, as will the mother.

Are the schools now providing a proper religious upbringing?

I do not believe so!

Is Islam now being applied as a mode of conduct in every home?

Islam asks Moslems to comport themselves as Moslems through conduct in their homes, their schools, their media, their institutes, their universities, their factories and in all their dealings!

We are experiencing contradictions. We are living in a society of contradictions. In order for us to base our structure on piety, we will first have to eliminate this contradiction!

I am building and others are destroying!

We need to have the home, the school and the media cooperate in bringing up young people.

I support the view that we must meet with the young extremists in order that a clear, open, broad dialogue may take place between us through which we can correct the young people's programs.

We want to have a bold meeting with the young people!

Dr Jamal Abu-al-'Azayim: As regards the phenomenon of violence, we assembled 100 court cases which involved violent behavior and assigned them ordinary employees who showed no form of rash judgment. We took the results, went to specialists in sociology, religion and medicine, and went to prisons and sat down with these people who acted rashly and learned about the characteristics of their personalities.

We found that some of them were addicted to narcotics, we found that some of them had just finished military service and were good at using weapons, and we found some people who had weak personalities and had turned to violence and the use of weapons.

We must shed light on all these matters so that religious persons may be fully aware of them.

Making religious men aware of this kind of unstable personality pattern and ways of remedying it will make them, when they talk or deliver exhortations, do so on solid ground, from the real conditions they have experienced.

Therefore it is necessary to continue the religious scientific research. By religious scientific research I mean research in which religious men take part in order to benefit and absorb many of the highly complex psychological and social phenomena of life.

There is a serious matter I would like to raise. In Cairo we have addiction treatment clinics.

When we sat down with and examined addicts in order to treat them, they told us, among other things, "The Koran does not prohibit marijuana or opium--it just prohibits intoxicants!" I believe this is a firm belief on their part!

Seventy percent of them believe that there is no stipulation in the Koran prohibiting narcotics!

When we say that a group has taken over young people's minds, the responsibility lies directly on religious men!

We are not being at all far-fetched, but how can we reach young people? How can we make young people trust us?

How can we reach these extremists? How can we make them see the total picture of Islam within us?

Then how can we bring religious men up to a level where they can attract young people to themselves?

In order for it to be possible to provide all this, it is incumbent on men of religion to be models for the young people in everything, and it is incumbent on them to be enlightened and civilized. Extremism, in my view, is a disease and we must thus diagnose this disease and view it scientifically and objectively.

We must study the phenomenon of extremism that exists in Cairo and we must also study the phenomenon of religious withdrawal.

Extremism is a psychological disease on which we must shed light so that we can diagnose it, since we will lose a great deal without diagnosis.

When I as a psychiatrist tried to treat an isolated case of extremism directly, I found that the person was suffering from an obvious disturbance. When I gave him a treatment for the disturbance, his personality began to be stabilized, he started to abandon his introversion, and consequently he started to abandon extremism and enter into an intermediate, stable life along with us.

On many occasions, society is afflicted with waves of what we call "psychological disturbance." There are groups which can take young people over in the context of such dominant psychological disturbances.

A second point I would like to raise, if you would permit me to, is how can we release the great powers that exist within men of religion so they can attract young people? How can we establish mutual trust among young people and men of religion?

There is excessive anxiety in society, there is alienation from society, and there are many problems, such as the housing problem and others. These problems affect families and consequently young people's personalities. This effect on the family, with the narrow benefits they possess prompts young people to go elsewhere!

How can we try to influence young people's free time so that they can frequent the warm places where their families are situated and where religion and constructive powers exist?

How can we set out a summer program for young people in order to organize their time without abandoning them to be victims of an idleness which will lead them into what we are fighting against now?

The dominant reaction to depression and social problems in society is extremism or deviation. We must eliminate this depression and anxiety in the spirits of young people lest this lead them to extremism.

It is a great mission which the family, school, factory, mosque and club must perform.

If they all rise up and perform the mission in full, and religious men are behind them, we will eliminate extremism and arrive at an Islamic middle ground.

Jabir Hamzah: The treatment of religious extremism, I am certain, may be summarized as follows:

1. The rule of life is that it is a mixture of good things and bad, that a struggle has existed, from the outset of succession to the end of life, and that as long as deviation exists on the part of some groups, there will be an intense adherence to truth.

2. If we want to specify these forms of deviation and the reasons why they have arisen, we will find that they are linked with the emergence of television, since there is no balance between programs which are full of folly and caprice and programs of culture, spiritual reform and religion. These come into people's homes and invade our beliefs and traditions.

3. There is a need for religious supervision by men of religion who specialize in television programs, so that they may not drop to a level which sows deviation in the spirits of our young people.

4. One must refuse to permit people who are well known for their fanaticism and provocative nature to exercise various activities in government mosques, especially since there are some mosques which are considered clubs for tendentious societies within sight and earshot of the Ministry of Religious Endowments.

5. One must refuse to settle for the curricula in educational institutions. Indeed, it is necessary to resort to public lectures, in view of the interest people have in them.
6. The government has a role in preserving general religious appearances, in the sense of not allowing liquor and materials prohibited by religious law to be sold and being careful to shut down shops and departments during the Friday prayer.
7. One must refuse to permit foreign tourists to comport themselves and appear in a manner violating the customs and traditions of the country.
8. One must refuse to permit our young people to travel abroad on summer vacations, in view of the bad traits we have seen them bring back.
9. It is observed that the different media give opportunities to people who are not specialized in passing judgment on matters of Islamic law, and improper judgments are made, causing confusion in thinking.
10. The soundest type of upbringing has been furnished by Islam, and we must observe that. Islam is concerned with upbringing from birth, and in this is far superior to all modern types and theories of upbringing. This is clear from the fact that the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, gave the call to prayer in the ear of newborn children and give the prayer in their left ear. The prophet's motive in this was to teach the nation so that God's would be the first word closely to touch the infant's inner spirit and conscience when he emerged and first embraced life.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: From this it is apparent that religious upbringing and study curricula play a big part in remedying the phenomenon of religious extremism. Therefore, it is necessary to give attention to the programs and ingredients of religious upbringing and choose them on sound bases.

The school must not support the religious upbringing here alone; rather, the home must support it along with the school.

In addition, men of religion and proselytizers have a great burden in explaining the essence of religion so that the errors of their beliefs and behavior will be apparent to the extremist groups. Thus what is needed is to provide enlightened men of religion so that young people may be won over by them and may respond to their guidance.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: I support Dr Jamal Abu-al-'Azayim's statement on the need to have a climate of trust between religious scholars on the one hand and young people on the other, because it is a climate of trust which will pave the way for the first step toward the establishment of a dialogue with young extremists.

The dialogue with young extremists must be preceded by the establishment of trust between religious scholars and young people.

In order for this trust to exist among young people, it is necessary that we be good examples for them. Every official in the government must be a good example, so that we can provide the atmosphere of trust that must exist in order to establish an open dialogue with young religious extremists and in order to get them to listen to us and our ideas and views.

Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq: We must proceed along the road toward young extremists by the best means, as God has taught us. We must not go to them and tell them "You are deviants or extremists." Rather, we must make our children understand their issues, issues which we ourselves might call deviation or extremism. We are always hearing that these young people are corrupt and spread corruption, must be resisted with violence, and so forth. This is wrong. First we want to bring out what is in our own spirits, and this is a matter we must approach. We must go to them and tell them, "What are you up to?" They must present us with their questions, and their questions must be aired, just as the answers to these questions must also be aired.

We must refrain from always saying that religious groups are deviant, because we want these religious groups to attract young people, we want to have more of these religious groups which can attract young people. This is better than having our young people afflicted with purposelessness, as is the case in Europe. This is better than having our young people attracted to licentiousness!

All we must do is describe the correct conceptions of Islam to these young people and these religious groups so that they will not lose their way, deviate from the path and succumb to error!

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: We all believe that this is the proper point of departure, and this is what people will surely consider to be the prelude.

When we start by condemning deviant persons or extremists, that is not a logical method or a logical, desirable or feasible appeal.

It is natural that when we call for God we are calling for wisdom and good exhortation. This is a point that no one doubts.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: One recommendation we would like to raise before you gentlemen is to strive by every possible means to provide a climate of trust between religious scholars, intellectuals with respected views, university professors and superintendents of clubs and societies on the one hand, and extremist youths on the other.

We consider that a climate of trust is the first step toward establishing an open, constructive dialogue with them which will correct religious notions. Perhaps one way of providing a climate of trust is to provide young people with good examples in the form of religious and intellectual leaders, to understand their problems and to conduct a debate with them over what is the best.

Dr Jamal Abu-al-'Azayim: I would like to add something else: religious scholars must enlarge their participation with psychiatrists and social experts in treatment groups in order to examine and remedy many psychological problems, such as problems of extremism, deviation and the like.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: We can summarize some of the remedies that have been raised in this symposium for the phenomenon of extremism by saying that Dr Jamal Abu-al-'Azayim has concentrated on the point that psychiatrists play an important role in treating the problem of extremism, since introversion is the basic cause of extremism and consequently must be treated psychologically from the beginning, and the point that states of anxiety, depression or disturbances and the problems of modern life in the form of housing and the like are to be considered some causes which lead to deviation and extremism.

Prof Jabir Hamzah has emphasized the need for moderation and balance in media programs, especially television, on grounds that that is the most widespread, lest trivial programs corrupt the material the serious religious programs offer.

Participants in the Symposium

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar, president of al-Azhar University; Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, vice president of Cairo University; Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan, former head of the Teachers' Union; Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr, scientific consultant to the Ministry of Religious Endowments; Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq, the mufti of the Republic of Egypt; Dr al-Husayni Hashim, secretary general of the Academy of Islamic Research; Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman, religious consultant to the National Party; Dr Jamal Madi Abu-al-'Azayim, professor of psychiatry; Prof Jabir Hamzah Farraj, general director of information at al-Azhar; and, for AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI, Mahmud Mahdi and Sami Diyab.

/10 Aug 81 pp 4, 5/

/Text/ This article is a contribution by Dr Jamal-al-Din Mahmud, secretary general of the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs, on the subject of AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium on religious extremism. The writer of the article was away from Cairo when the symposium was held.

Religious extremism is to be considered a phenomenon alien to the course of life in this age, at first glance. Its existence in Islamic countries specifically should be considered especially alien, because such extremism, relative to Islamic thought, arose more than 1,000 years ago and sound Islamic thinking has risen above it for many centuries. Extremism is a violation against moderation and an adherence to sides that lack moderation. There is no scope for extremism except when dialogue, discussion and differences of opinion are accepted; extremism is inconceivable in fixed scientific study. The danger of extremism emerges when all the affairs of life do not depend just on the stipulations of life alone, where matters are either right or wrong; rather the various forms of religious, political, social and economic reform in every society depend on the discussion of ideas and the study of and constructive dialogue on ideas, so that right can be distinguished from wrong first of all, then, subsequently, and this is a matter of importance, so that what is best or will best achieve the public interest may be determined. Judgment is rendered on ideas by discovering what is most beneficial or what will best achieve the public interest, not just by taking one side or another, because that is unimportant. 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, realized this when he said "The wise man is not the man who can tell good from evil; rather

the wise man is the one who can tell the greater of two evils." This is a statement which reveals the infeasibility of extremism, which sees only good and evil, black and white, acceptance and rejection, and subsequently cannot tell how one can correct evil, how one can appraise matters neutrally and chastely, and how one can see the various aspects of things so that the judgment on them will be sound.

We cannot ignore the stipulations of the general rules of Islamic law, whose application requires that we conduct research and dialogue and listen to various opinions so that our application will be sound. The rule "harm is not eliminated through harm", the rule "one must bear the lesser evil in order to ward off the greater one," and the rule "one must bear private harm in order to ward off public harm"--all these rules and their like are tantamount to rules for choosing between conflicting interests and rules for righting wrongs which balance the scale of harm and interests. When one adopts a specific verdict in Islamic law, all these rules and their like without a doubt depend on the awareness of all aspects of the idea, the discussion and examination of it, and the discussion of all opinions regarding it, so that one may arrive at a sound verdict in religious law. No doubt siding with one of the two parties in basically accepting or totally rejecting an idea and adhering to a specific position, while neglecting all other views, cannot lead to the sound application of these rules and their like in religious law.

It is strange that extremism in interpreting religious stipulations or the general rules of Islamic law arose in the era of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace. Genuine books on the sayings and doings of the prophet relate that a group of companions wished to isolate themselves from the world and repudiate the things of the world that God deemed lawful, thinking that that meant closeness to almighty glorious God. The prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, refuted them by saying "I am protecting you and making you fear God, but I fast and break the fast, I get up and I go to bed, I marry women, and anyone who loathes my sayings and doings is not on my side." This glorious prophetic lesson calls upon Moslems to be moderate. Almighty God is worshipped for what he has stipulated and it is not for us to be severe on ourselves and bind ourselves to what Islamic law does not hold us to, since commitments by extremist parties entail excesses which lead to monasticism, which Islam forbids, while commitments to disdainful attitudes are a form of negligence which releases us from the religious duties of Islamic law. Both are to be rejected in Islam, which does not accept extremism, even when intentions are proper and goals are honorable.

The fact is that extremism in religious interpretation /itself/ represents no danger to society. The persons who espouse it will be held to account or punished as long as extremism is restricted to the persons espousing it, for that falls under the category of wrongful interpretation, whose exponents may learn and retreat from it, as happened with the companions whom the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, taught. However, an extremism which is wrongful will become dangerous if the intent is to spread it about and gather people around it in order to realize other goals, because wrongful opinions always are relevant in matters of religion and the terrestrial world, and the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, set forth his rule, which is replete with mercy and justice, saying "If a ruler makes an independent judgment and is right, he should receive two recompenses, and if he makes an independent judgment and is wrong, he should

receive one recompense." This means that error in individual judgment on the part of anyone who is able to exercise it is not insubordination in itself, if the situation does not go beyond a mere error in understanding resulting from a deficiency in knowledge or incompetence in viewing matters, and the person involved will not be held to account or punished. Rather, society's duty will lie in talking to the person who has erred and explaining what is right to him, and it is not proper for us to isolate him from society, because such isolation will make him introverted in his views and increase his adherence to them. The Moslem scholars were the people who most severely adhered to that, especially in the era of independent judgment in which the Islamic creeds arose. Indeed these sublime religious jurists, who were the best of persons at understanding Islam in its general overall stipulations and rules, all called for freedom of views and thought and for various opinions and refused to be copied and to have what they said followed and fanatically adhered to. One of these statements was one by Imam Abu Hanifah: "We taught this opinion but when people brought us something better we accepted it." Another was the statement by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal: "Do not mimic me and do not mimic a Malekite, Shafi'ite or a revolutionary; learn as we have learned." Herein lies a prohibition of fanaticism, which is more loathsome than extremism.

However, society has the right to protect itself from the danger of perverse opinions and extremist thoughts, if a desire to spread them about exists, since that bears on society's right to protect all its members, including the weak, who do not have the power to review or contend with arguments and determine which is the stronger, and people who are fascinated by new ideas even if they are wrong, such as young people whose protection is a duty of society so that they can acquire the cultural and intellectual wherewithal in religion to enable them to cope with the errors of fascination to which they are exposed. Therein lies the duty and responsibility of the ruler: to rally Moslems together around statements of truth and resist anything that will fragment them and turn them into sects and parties.

There is no doubt that the first extremist group to appear in Islam was the group of Moslems with whom the great dissension began. By that I do not just mean the Kharijite group which rose up in opposition against Ali, may God be pleased with him; I also mean a group which appeared before them, and prepared the way for them, the people who rose up in opposition to 'Uthman, may God be pleased with him, because they were not content to declare their opinion, in which they considered that error had been committed by the caliph, and were not won over by the arguments and views the caliph presented to them, providing security and stability for Moslems, but rather went to excess in their extremism, besieging the caliph and committing the crime of killing him. Here the matter is not just one of error of opinions or extremism in ideas; it is a crime which is punishable by Islamic law and cannot be justified by anything. This extremism continued until its purpose became to use religion and not to serve it or defend it. Therefore, Imam 'Ali ibn Abu Talib at the outset took, against this extremist thinking, the position of an imam who teaches an erroneous ignorant person, arguing at length with the people who had risen up in opposition to him and rebuking them with strong arguments, so that many of them who had at the outset been deceived in the name of religion were won over by his views. Ibn Qutaybah, in "The Imamate and Politics," relates that they, that is the Kharijites, demanded that the imam repent for what they called his apostasy by accepting arbitration between himself and Mu'awiyah ibn Abu Sufyan.

He most intensely refused, and told them "By God I have not been an apostate toward God since I became acquainted with him." After he fought with Mu'awiyah's army they made a strange demand of him, which was that he entitle them to the children and women of the people who had opposed them as booty--a corrupt, wrongful view that was not proper in terms of Islamic law. A lengthy debate ensued between them and he finally rebuked them with an argument to which they complied, when he told them, "If I entitle you to their children and women, to which of you will fall 'A'ishah, the mother of the devout, who was in Mu'awiyah's army, and whom Imam 'Ali had shown hospitality though her opinions were opposed to him?" When he presented them with this question, they became embarrassed and departed.

However, the situation had turned from argument and the contention of arguments to something else which Islam does not hold legitimate, which is the commission of crimes. Some Kharijites killed 'Abdallah ibn Khibab ibn al-Art and his wife, who was pregnant and about to give birth, after they asked the man his opinion about 'Ali ibn Abu Talib, he answered them with the truth he believed, and they led him and his wife to the bank of the river and killed them with injustice, hostility, and terror for the devout. The strange thing is that one of them found his companion chewing on a date which he had picked up beneath a date tree owned by a non-Moslem; the companion ordered him to spit out the pit and pay the price for it to the owner of the tree. See how extremism, when it grows and becomes intense, leads to disruption of the balance of the mind, until it becomes permissible to kill someone unjustly and hostilely but not to take a fruit without paying for it?

When Imam 'Ali ibn Abu Talib fought them and killed some of them, because the matter had become one of aggression against people and violation of their honor, blood, bodies and money, and not just an error of opinion met by arguments and persuasion, or even neglect, and because the situation had revealed a desire to use religion, not to serve it, and to lead people astray, not teach them, the ruler's right to guard religion and prevent corruption on earth arose.

Therefore, Moslem society must protect itself from dissension and fragmentation, and, if Moslems are a single nation, as the Koran stipulates, it is not permissible for us to turn the nation into groups and parties. If mosques belong to God, then it is not proper for us to divide them among people; Moslems are the worthiest of people to come together and not be fragmented, because all religion comes from God and God has preserved his book and guided us to the proper sayings and doings, which in themselves are a shield against disputes to which there is no limit and extremism which will accept no mediation or moderation. If caprice enters the theories and philosophies which people set forth, prompting dissension and disputes, it would be better for us to glorify Islam than to descend to the arena of struggle over ideas, theories and philosophies, even if some people try to draw us into this arena, which is not worthy of the honor of Islam and the thinking of Moslems.

/Signed/ Dr Jamal-al-Din Muhammad Mahmud.

Recommendations of the Symposium

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium recommended the following as a remedy to the phenomenon of religious extremism prevalent among our young people:

Opening a dialogue with young people in general and religious groupings in particular and trying to understand their ideas and demands and respond to them with a logic which will impart to them a sound understanding of their religion.

The problem of extremism must be remedied by correcting understanding, first, then by observing conduct and imparting enlightenment. The responsibility for observation here must not be laid on a particular person or specific body; rather, it must be assumed by everyone without exception.

Extremism is the offshoot of a contradiction which dominates society; therefore, we must eliminate this contradiction, first of all, if we wish to eliminate the phenomenon of extremism and establish our structure on piety.

In order for us to be able to reach young people and cause them to trust us, we must show them that the full picture of Islam exists inside us.

Men of religion must be a model for young people in everything, and they must be civilized and enlightened.

Extremism is a psychological illness. Therefore we must shed light on it, identify it as a disease, and look upon it in an objective, scientific way.

We must release the great forces within men of religion in order to enable them to attract young people.

We must create a balance and equilibrium within the media, especially television, as that is the most widespread of the media, so that trivia programs will not corrupt the material offered by serious religious programs.

We must not allow people who are known for fanaticism and destructiveness to engage in their activities inside the schools.

Islamic upbringing must be provided in the home and the school from childhood. Religious upbringing plays a big role in remedying the phenomenon of religious extremism; therefore one must pay attention to its curricula and provisions and choose them on sound bases.

Men of religion must explain the essence of the Islamic religion so that extremist groups will see the errors of their beliefs and behavior.

Dialogue between young extremists and scholars of religion must be preceded by mutual trust between them.

Therefore it is necessary to furnish an atmosphere of trust between scholars of religion and extremist youths as a first step toward a dialogue that will bring them together.

In order for it to be possible to provide this atmosphere, every official in the government, including religious scholars, must offer a good example to young people.

We must make the way toward extreme youths through good deeds, as God has taught us. They must raise their questions, we must respond to them objectively, and the questions and answers must be aired together.

It is necessary to expand the introduction of religious scholars in the treatment teams, along with psychiatrists and social specialists, in order to examine and treat many psychological problems, foremost among them extremism.

Psychiatrists play an important role in treating the problem of religious extremism, since introversion is the main reason for extremism and consequently must be treated psychologically from the beginning.

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PRONOUNCEMENTS HAIL FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF GULF WAR

Ba'athists Called Menace to Gulf

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial by S. Moadab]

[Excerpts]

A year has passed since an unwanted war was imposed on the Islamic Revolution (IR).

It is true that hundreds of our Islamic fighters have been martyred and it is equally true that parts of our Islamic homeland remain under the occupation of the Ba'athist forces of Saddam. But it is also true that, surely, none of the objectives the Iraqi dictator had in view when he invaded Iran, have been reached. Beguiled by the Americans, encouraged by the reactionary regional states, ill-advised by the remnants of the ousted regime and lured by the malicious dream of becoming the gendarme of the Persian Gulf, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq committed the gravest of crimes by sending his over-equipped forces to "topple the regime of Khomeini."

A promise which should have been realized in three days but after a year has proved to be a chimera. What lies before the frustrated eyes of Saddam today are unbelievably heavy casualties in men and military equipment. Over Khark island alone more than forty Iraqi planes have been shot down. Iraqi oil exportation has been brought down to almost zero. Nearly all vital installations in Iraq have been hit at least once by our airplanes. More than four thousand men of the "victorious army of Ghadessieh" are now in numerous POW camps in Iran. In this war the IR showed its fidelity towards its original slogans of independence and liberty. It also manifested the human and Islamic values to which it is bound before taking any retaliatory measures.

From the first days of war more than eighty of our war planes have flown en masse over Iraq to show that we are indeed militarily quite potent, yet, not even a single civilian target was hit. History will record with glory that our artillery range goes beyond the military targets but not a single bullet has been

aimed at the cities and villages. The future generations in Kerbala, Najaf and Baghdad will read that at time of full-scale war, the skillful pilots of the Islamic Air Force of Iran flew with bombs and rockets over these cities but what the people saw falling from these war planes over the cities were the leaflets titled "Why We Defend Ourselves."

The present day Iraqi POW's will tell their children, when they return to Iraq, how the Islamic morality has nurtured men who do not permit themselves to treat the POW's in an un-Islamic manner. And on the other part, history will report to the next Iranian generation how hospitals, houses, villages and cities were bombarded by Saddam's mercenaries. Our children will read that, because the Iraqi pilots did not dare to fly over military targets, they bombarded the civilian targets. Dezful, Ahwaz, Khuminsahr, Abadan, Kermanshah and... will remain as symbols of heroism for our fighters and the scene of innumerable crimes committed by the enemies of the IR.

For years, since the Ba'athist regime was installed, the Iraqi leaders have hidden themselves under the slogans of progressive claims. Although the non-participation of the Ba'athist forces in the war of 1967 and 1973 has proved the falsehood of Ba'athist claims, although the plots against PLO and the assassination of its representatives in Paris and elsewhere has revealed the animosity of the Ba'athist regime to the Palestinian movement, and the neutrality of the Iraqi forces in Jordan during the Black September felonies has shown the complicity of the Baghdad regime, another big test was necessary to unveil the colonized mentality of Saddam and his regime. The invasion of his forces gave this opportunity to the whole of the Muslim masses and progressive people to see that in Baghdad power is usurped by men who have no sympathy with the liberation of the region from the imperialist domination.

Today, one year after his grave mistake, Saddam knows that in the near future he will have to stand before the Iraqi people to answer why he has stabbed the IR in Iran. Saddam is fully aware of his imminent fate. This is why, in order to escape it, he has decided to sell out not only the riches of Iraq but also all the commitments the Iraqi people had. The "anti-imperialist," Saddam now is a will-less puppet of the Washington-Paris-London triumvirate. Since very recently, after the contrived Tamuz bombardment by the Zionist planes, he leads a regime leaning towards Tel Aviv. Saddam has no logical answer to give to the Iraqi people as to why he is getting closer and closer to the reactionary regimes of the Persian Gulf states.

The people of Kuwait, who are cognizant of the expansionist dreams of Saddam, see him hankering after Kuwaiti lands. Hundreds of trucks and vehicles now take all manner of goods from Jordan to Baghdad daily. Is not the Jordanian monarch the same man whom Saddam called for his overthrow? Saudi cargo planes take thousands of tons of material aid to Iraq everyday. Are not the present leaders in Riyadh the men whom Saddam has been insulting in his mass media for years? Today Saddam knows how downgraded he has become and how isolated he is in the Islamic world.

In order to cherish the memory of all our brothers and sisters and to show the crimes of Saddam to the world and show our people how effective their cooperation has been, a week, commemorating the war anniversary has been declared with the Friday prayers and will end with the prayer of next Friday. The program chosen this week is a comprehensive affair to show different aspects of the mutual influence the imposed war and the continuity of the revolution have had.

Before bringing the editorial to an end, it is noteworthy to take a look at the U.S.'s desperate plots in order to distract popular attention from the imposed war. As we have shown in detail in our previous editorials, the world-devouring America helped indirectly and encouraged Saddam to attack Iran in order to consolidate its position in the Persian Gulf region. In order to prepare the ground for Saddam for a fast victory, America has played all possible tricks and laid all sorts of traps for the IR.

Liberal Stooges, Mojahedin, Tudeh Denounced

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial by Zainab]

[Text]

After serving the temporal interests of the Western powers for some time, liberalism proved impotent in realizing its ideals any further, due to the superior level of consciousness among the Muslim masses; a consciousness which enabled them to reject this deviation decisively. Disillusioned from its consecutive defeats in the face of Islam, America quickly dislodged its liberal stooges and adopted a new offensive against the movement. This offensive, engineered by bankrupt politicians of world arrogance, can be defined, in simple words, as "Terrorism" aimed at the elimination of key figures. Its more complicated mechanism, involved the employment of all forces opposing the Islamic Republic; making use of those which have a larger following and influence within the country.

The Mujahedeen Khalq (Munafiqeen) meet these requirements most precisely. The Islamic outer core and religious taste this group carries has been a major factor in its partial success in gaining some foothold among, particularly, the youth. It has been evident for a long time, to those who watch the internal developments of Iran, that political groupings with secular and atheist lines have absolutely no chance of attracting the attention of the masses. Hence, Western imperialism has resorted to groups, which because of their eclectic character carry a Islamic color but capitalist or Marxist content. Even

Eastern imperialism has been compelled to give in to this reality and its internal base in Iran, the Tudeh Party, has for long claimed to have merely political orientations. It (Tudeh Party) uselessly attempts to deny its atheist and Marxist foundations, by acclaiming pro-Islamic "tendencies" and "Muslim members" and so forth.

However, in all cases their success in obtaining a mass following was minimal. The Muslim nation of Iran under the enlightened leadership of Imam Khomeini had reached a level of consciousness where it could distinguish all deviatory and hypocritical lines from the pure Islamic line of the Imam. As a result, the Munafiqeen who were very ambitious about grasping the reigns of power and who believed that Imam could not establish a government after overthrowing the shah, had to refer to an organization like the *Mujahedeen Khalq*. They were totally

disillusioned upon seeing that the Islamic nation did not fall an open prey to ambitious power struggles and eclectic ideologies. Consequently, at that point the Munafiqeen's hostility against the Islamic Republic became fused with America's unrealized dream of undermining this revolution, and a de-facto alliance was formed. Hence, the armed auxillary of the Munafiqeen began to launch an assassination campaign against the key figures of the Islamic Republic under the programming and support of America. This alliance is a strange one, in that it aligns an apparently radical force alongside a strongly conservative one; but in reality, its main focal point is none other

than opposition against Islam. Thus, the Munafiqeen have taken up arms against the nation, motivated by their feeling of revenge against those who did not follow or vote for them and America joyously watches as "some one else" does the filthy job, it always longed to see done.

What will cause the defeat of this imperialist strategy, like others, is the ignorance of both the Munafiqeen and America of the Islamic nature of this establishment.

The fact that they have resorted to terrorize in their state of desperation basically indicates that they consider certain figures and personalities to play a vital and irreplaceable role in the Republic. This stems from the liberal and westernized outlook that they carry.

Unlike the West, in an Islamic society the motivating factor is the ideology and faith prevalent among the masses. True, the most committed and faithful are appointed to leadership roles, but the Islamic society

always has potential capacity of developing and training committed and faithful individuals. Thus, we see that the courageous Muslim nation invests its ultimate hope in the ideology, in Allah and in Imam Mahdi.

When their most beloved officials are martyred they chant "Iran is full of Behesties, Raja'ls and Bakhshars."

Again, incomprehensible to the West, is the fact that the committed Muslim expects martyrdom as a natural

evolution in his struggle towards God. Hence Imam calls the events of the IRP bombing a tragic yet "expected" event. Martyrdom is innate in the school of Towheed, the red line of martyrdom is the line of Mohammad (S.A.) and Ali (A.S.).

As a result, the Muslims are ready to confront and endure such hardships with no sign of weariness or despair.

The ominous alliance of America and the Munafiqeen must realize that if it aims to uproot Islam, Islam is not summarized in personalities it is projected in Allah; in an absolute eternal school of thought. If it aims to create despair and fear among the nation, it must have witnessed how these acts have consolidated the nation's unity and faith. If America aims to prevent the Republic from true progress and to disrupt development progress for the Mustasafin, it must know that if the nation has to elect 20 presidents during a year it will do so and will maintain its stability.

Finally, let the enemies know, that we have a sun, which is in occultation. By eliminating the stars which shine in this night of occultation, the enemies of Islam hasten the emergence of that sun. For the disappearance of the stars gives good tidings of the dawn of the great sun of Islam — Mahdi (A.S.).

Virtues of Islamic War Extolled

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial by Zainab]

[Text]

In Islamic culture, war does not necessarily imply a negative meaning. Wars are controlled and directed by men and they obtain their value in context of the direction for which they are employed. In a world where oppression and evil prevail on one side and the downtrodden suffer under the boots of tyranny on the other, war can have three forms. Most common are the wars that world arrogance wages against the mustaz'afin, particularly when they have

risen to obtain their rights. Then there are the wars that the downtrodden wage against the usurper powers. Thirdly, there are the wars when no side is just, but both are armies of falsehood entangled in battle.

Islam has a clear and decisive position vis-a-vis all these types of war. As long as injustice and oppression prevail, the Muslims fight and wage wars against oppression in all its social, cultural and economical forms. Hence contrary to the incorrect Western impression that war is always "bad" and peace always "good", Islam welcomes a war which is directed towards abolishing of falsehood, and denies that form of peace which ignores the rights of the oppressed.

If we endeavor to view matters in this context and in spite of the poisonous smog imperialist propaganda has left before our eyes, we can study, impartially, the value which the war imposed upon the Islamic Republic by Iraq has had for the Muslim Iranian nation.

First we must keep in mind that the accepted values and criteria that the west implies in its evaluations are not applicable to the assessments which Islam presents. Western conceptions are based upon fallible and biased human experience whereas Islam relies on none other than absolute divine revelation.

One year ago the arrogant Iraqi regime committed a mistake which will ultimately undermine its rule over the deprived nation of Iraq. Deceived by the tempting but hollow promises of American imperialism and stimulated by its own expansionist line and internal crisis, Iraq dug its own grave.

Through imposing a prolonged borderline war, which was only one aspect of the multi-faceted war imperialism has waged against the Islamic Republic, the Iraqi infidel engaged the Muslim nation of Iran in a struggle which enhanced their unity and solidarity against world arrogance. Generally the development and purification of man's character and soul is best achieved in an atmosphere of pressure and hardship. It is at these intervals that man realizes his weakness-

ses and shortcomings and endeavors to improve himself. This prolonged war served as a catalyst for the growth of the Islamic nation. Scenes of youth joyously embracing martyrdom, mothers encouraging their sons to fight, women striving behind the fronts to serve the warriors, old men crying for acceptance as volunteers and a thirteen year old tying a grenade to his waist and jumping under an Iraqi tank all are signs of a noble and unprecedented morality among a nation.

Imam rightfully described the nation as resembling the followers of Islam at the time of the Prophet. He stressed they fulfilled their duties 100 percent.

The increased need for spare parts and artillery, particularly after the war broke out, compelled the Iranian industries to step up and increase their independence seeking programs, hence this past year the nation witnessed strides taken in various technological fields towards the goal independence. Imam had said correctly that we must be isolated and attacked to achieve independence.

A comparison between the conditions (morally and logistically) of the armed forces before the war and today, after a year of struggle, will clarify the fact that if the Iranian army had any points of moral or material weakness, or if any incompetent elements had infiltrated among its ranks, today it can certainly be said that more than ever before the armed forces are in line with the Islamic Revolution, they are soldiers of Imam-Zaman (Mahdi A.S.), as Imam says.

Additionally, on the internal scene, this war, which again can be considered as an enhancing development and growth, led to the nation's ever increasing awareness of the deviant lines and tendencies within the country which were taking advantage of the social situation for their own interests. The ultimate result was the overthrow of Banisadr (chief representative of the pro-western eclectic line of thoughts) and the continuing purge of the internal ranks.

The virtues of war on the external side remain to be discussed.

IRAN

PROFESSOR REVIEWS TUDEH'S PRO-SOVIET RECORD

Paris LE MATIN in French 1 Sep 81 p 11

Report by Historian Khosrow Shakeri: "From the Specter of the Islamic Republic to the Gulag Apocalypse"

Text With the death of Iranian President Radjai and Prime Minister Bahonar, the dismal series of attempts-repression continues in Iran. It is more impossible than ever to give an opinion on the future of Imam Khomeini's regime. In this situation, as confused as it is tragic, Khosrow Shakeri examines the role played by the Tudeh party, which is considered as the "official" heir of the PCI [Iranian Communist Party]. He especially wonders why one "overestimates" the importance of the Tudeh party, which "since its foundation" has had a "policy of protecting Soviet interests" in Iran.

During a recent statement, the pro-Soviet Tudeh party opposed the appeal for the creation of an international committee against repression in Iran. The attention given to this statement made by the Tudeh shows an overestimate--even propaganda--which is made about this pro-Soviet party, as if it was on the same footing as the Italian and French communist parties. Now the following question arises: why this overestimate? Why is this attention given to a party which has shown unfailing loyalty toward the Soviet Union, whether it is led by Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev. In the eyes of some, this loyalty is sufficient as a necessary justification for them to exaggerate the importance of this party, by giving it a disproportionate place on the Iranian political scene. At best, the latter do not understand that they are rendering a free service to the expansionist policy of the Soviet state; at the worst, they are unaware of it.

Let us see then why. It is a question there of a complete misinterpretation of the not very distinguished past of this party, a party which has all the defects of a communist party, without, however, having any of its merits. What is the history of this party?

Created in 1941, the Tudeh is considered the official "heir" of the Iranian Communist Party, the PCI, which was founded in 1916 by Iranian workers who emigrated to Baku. These workers had been active before in the PSDI [Iranian Social Democratic Party], which had played a major role in Iran's constitutional revolution between 1906 and 1911.

At the end of the First World War, the PCI set itself up in Iran and reactivated the PSDI's left wing organizations. It participated with Guilan's Jangalist revolutionaries in the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran in 1920. This republic was liquidated a year later by the new strong man of the Iranian royalist government, Reza Khan Pahlavi, but also with the complicity of British imperialism and the new so-called socialist government in Russia, seeking international recognition.

Going underground, the PCI had to conduct from that time on a desperate struggle against Asiatic despotism in Iran. Despite a bloody terror, the PCI managed to maintain itself on the Iranian political scene. Only the Stalinist purge, which struck it very early, already in 1932, was able to seal the fate of this revolutionary party with an independent spirit; its most experienced cadres and leaders were pitilessly liquidated for having had the courage to follow a line independent of Moscow and oppose the USSR policy of support for the Pahlavi's dictatorship. In the middle of the 1930's, a few intellectuals close to the PCI leaders tried to organize an independent Marxist group which would avoid Stalinist influence. Penetrated by a man loyal to Moscow, this Marxist study group headed by Doctor Arani was betrayed and reported to the Pahlavi police, curiously at the same time as the Moscow trials. Arrested and given prison sentences, this group which was yet another attempt to develop an independent socialism in Iran, was dismantled by the political police. Arani, the group leader, was killed in prison at the age of 37 years.

On leaving prison, after the occupation of Iran by the allied forces in 1941, a few old friends of Doctor Arani founded, with other intellectuals, the Tudeh party which, in view of the bitter lessons of the 1930's, started from the beginning to show its loyalty to the USSR. Consequently we must reject the Tudeh party's claim that it is the "intellectual heir" of the PCI, for the Tudeh party has never had a revolutionary and even less a communist program. At a time when the most vital forces in Iranian society were conducting with weapons in their hands a bitter struggle against the Shah's despotic and pro-imperialist regime, this party, comforted by the good neighbor relations between the Shah and Moscow, spent its time in applauding "royal" reforms and attacking the armed revolutionary movement, the Mojahedin and the Fedayin of the people. This attitude of the Tudeh party was not anything new during the 1970's. Already, during the 1940's, its collaborationism had not escaped the attention of the British ambassador, during the period of imperialism dominating

in Iran. In a note sent to British consulates in Iran during the Iranian election campaign of 1943, the ambassador emphasized that "it is not in our interest that such candidates [of the Tudeh] be prevented from running in elections (...). On the contrary, staunch candidates pledged to progressive and liberal ideas, who probably will promote reforms, should be encouraged..." In a report sent to London, the ambassador asserted that "there is no communist party in Iran. There are communist individuals, but they have not formed a communist party. The Tudeh party, which is frequently considered communist, repudiates this name and its program is reformist." Even a superficial survey of the Tudeh party's publications would confirm this assertion, without a shadow of doubt.

Moreover, this same party conducted a bitter struggle against the patriotic and anti-imperialist movement led by Mossadeq, calling the latter "a crafty old man in the pay of American imperialism" and "a traitor." (Note the continuity of this way of thinking, when Kianouri speaks of the revolutionaries of today such as the Mojahedin.) At that time, it was strangely the present party secretary general N. Kianouri who led the party organization which a few years before was in a governmental coalition with Qavam, a big landowner and leader of reactionary petty politicians. The leadership of this same party, after the coup d'etat of 1953 against the government of the anti-imperialist leader Mossadeq, in which Ayatollah Khomeini and his mentor Ayatollah Kashani--it is now certain--were involved, left its cadres and its members at the mercy of the repressive apparatus of the Pahlavi regime; as a result of the flight of party leaders to eastern Europe, including Kianouri, hundreds of party cadres, especially of its military organization, were victims of repression and perished.

In short, the policy of the Tudeh party has been, since its foundation, the protection of Soviet interests. The Tudeh party made coalitions with Iranian reaction and against the anti-imperialist forces. (Even with General Bakhtiar, the organizer and first chief of SAVAK who fell into disfavor.) The spread of socialist ideas was the least of this party's concerns. The collection of translations of Marxist works accomplished by the party is very slight. During its existence, it has taken a position both for and against the Islamic movement. Since the renewal of this movement, it has condemned the "reactionary" mullahs, this is to say Khomeini and his followers (June 1963): This position was recently transformed into support for Khomeini's anti-imperialist line. One of the Tudeh candidates in the entire country on the occasion of the election to the "Assembly of experts" (summer 1979) was the famous Ayatollah Khalkhali known for his iron hand.

The present secretary general of the party, Kianouri, in an interview granted to the American weekly NEWSWEEK (see LE MATIN 24

January 1979) claimed that "the oil field workers only obey instructions given by the Tudeh party; we enjoy broad support among the intellectuals, the middle-class, the 'national bourgeoisie' and the bazaar merchants (...). I have learned of the existence in the National Front of a movement favoring collaboration with us and we do not see any objections to collaborating with a bourgeois party." Is this a change of policy or mere bluff? No doubt, it is both of them! Those with whom formerly it had no objection to collaborating with, the National Front, the Mojahedin, the Fedayin, (so-called minorities), the Democratic Front, etc are today "the united front of counterrevolutionaries," they are murderers and "they deserve the death penalty" and their supporters "should be reeducated in work camps," in the gulag!

But what is the real importance of this organization so sure of itself? The Tudeh party has always maintained the point of view that its strength, while it was underground, was about 100,000 members and it mobilized more than 200,000 people during the street demonstrations when it opposed the nationalization of the British petroleum company. Now the Iranian population has more than doubled since then (15 million to 35 million). It is not without interest to point out that, in the light of what we have seen of this party's existence, candidate Kianouri and the party's "celebrated philosopher," Ehsan Tabari, have not received respectively more than 50,000 and 55,000 votes during the legislative elections of the summer of 1980 in Teheran (a city of 7 million people without outlying areas) at a time when the party, allied with the fundamentalists, was leading a legal life. "The increasing political influence of this party is made more obvious when we observe that the candidate of the Peykar group (Marxist-Leninist, a deserter from the Mojahedin and considered responsible for the murder of several Mojahedin leaders during the Shah's reign) received during the same elections a larger vote than the pro-Soviet party's candidates. It is thus natural for Kianouri to declare to the representative of the AFP that he did not know the number of members of the party which some claim have come from all the communist parties in the Middle East and which is "the best organized, experienced and the most disciplined of all the Iranian political parties and organizations."

Having said that, we do not have the least intention of lessening the importance of the Tudeh party as an organization at the orders of a great power which, at the right time, is going to use the latter to take over Iran and dominate the area. The interest of democracy demands that all the democratic and progressive forces be vigilant and come to the assistance of the pluralist and democratic left and all the forces of democracy in Iran to aid them at the moment when they are being subject to the heaviest blows in their existence. At the same time it is necessary to keep an eye on the stranded petty politicians in the pay of the enemies of democracy in Iran and the Middle East who are trying to use every enterprise for their personal ends.

It is necessary to act here and now with vigilance. Reacting to the fait accompli as in the case of Afghanistan, will be as futile as it is hopeless! To describe the forces of democracy as "counterrevolution" and those who are the horsemen of the apocalypse of gulag in Iran as "revolution" is undoubtedly only a service rendered to the cause of expansion of totalitarianism in the world.

8490

CS0: 4619/35

FEMALE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT DISCUSSES VARIOUS ISSUES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Sep 81 pp 3, 13

[Interview with Majles representative Maryam Behruzi]

[Text] In an interview with ETTELA'AT, Maryam Behruzi, representative of the people of Tehran in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, presented her viewpoints and opinions concerning various questions, especially questions related to women and the society of women.

What you will read is the text of her interview with ETTELA'AT.

Mrs Behruzi, in order that the people of Tehran may come to know you better as their elected candidate, please give us some details about your past struggles and also your occupation, the level of your studies and your life.

Behruzi: I was born into a religious family in the year 1945. My father was a man of faith and a follower of the religious authorities and used to attend sermons and perform his religious duties.

To the extent he was able, he influenced my character traits, spirit and soul from the point of view of training and religious teachings.

At 15 years of age I entered into a contract of marriage with a pious man trained in the religious sciences for a dowry according to the custom of the Prophet, which is basically religious instruction. From the very first week of my marriage I began studying the religious sciences (jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, Koranic commentary, philosophy and law). At the age of 22 I began teaching and propagating the faith. Although I was a supporter of the movement and a follower of the line of the Imam from the year 1963, my political struggles began in the year 1973. Without any ties with any organization or group I undertook politico-religious propaganda and the explanation of Islamic government. At that time when young people used to ask my advice about cooperating with the organization of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, I would tell them that in my view the work of that organization was not Islamic. I used to try to encourage and incite them to follow the way of the Imam and the religious authorities.

In the year 1975 we set up two secret classes in the library of the Musa ebn Ja'far Mosque under the titles investigation of Koranic verses as related to problems of the day and commentary on philosophy. In addition to instruction, the participants underwent training in karate and weapons.

Of course only a short period of the activities of these classes passed before they were ended by the regime and I was forbidden to teach. But under assumed names I continued speaking in short courses. In the year 1978 when the Imam issued an emphatic order for the activity of the propagandists, I spoke under the name Behruzi for one week during the month of Ramazan at the invitation of the martyr Dr Mofatteh in the Qaba Mosque. On the seventh day, in spite of the efforts of Dr Mofatteh to deliver me from the claws of SAVAK, I was taken into custody in front of the Hoseyniye-ye Ershad and transferred to the Komiteh Prison for interrogation.

After a week of solitary confinement and repeated interrogation, I was transferred to military court and then to Evin prison. After Sharif-Emami came to power and a group of political prisoners were freed, I was released.

Deviation from the Line of the Imam

Concerning recent events, the discovery of safe houses and the capture of young girls who have lived in these houses is a special situation, what is your view and analysis?

Behruzi: At the beginning I must say that when any band of group deviates from the line of the Imam, it has no destination other than collapse and misfortune. The only life-giving road is the straight path of God in its relation with the religious authorities and Velayat-o Faqih [Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent]

But since in the first days of the revolution a number of unaware and excited young people were inclined to become active in a revolutionary political organ, they were attracted unawares and involuntarily to those safe houses because of the existence of dangerous traps set by the enemies of the revolution. As a consequence, they found no way but to continue their bat-like movements.

Moreover, since the organization separated adolescents and youths from their fathers and mothers and from religious authorities and experts, and since they trained them to be impudent and self-opinionated, once the families became informed of how their children had been entrapped, they saw no way for them to return. In other words, the organization displayed only a single road to naive young people: this is that same evil plan of imperialism, which blocks all ways and leaves open only that way which leads to itself.

At the same time one must say that these problems are not new. For during the past regime also, because of the influence of western and imperialist culture, a number of our young people, especially uninhibited and alienated girls rejected by their families, sought refuge in dancing, gambling and sometimes corruption, prostitution and addiction.

But after the revolution, when these roads were closed, a number of unaware and emotional young people who had been raised on the false culture of earlier times were caught in the trap of this organization. These people are usually uninformed about the verities of Islam and were raised by families which were outwardly religious but which lacked a sound ideological and political view.

Of course I am hopeful that with the quick movement of the ideological revolutionaries, the course of the revolution will continue without any contamination.

Decisiveness in the Face of the Counterrevolution

What is your view toward the difficulties of the people in your electoral district?

These difficulties are not the same for everyone. Some people have legal difficulties, especially in relation to family law, and these certainly must be investigated in the family courts.

Another group is faced with the problem of preparing basic articles, especially foodstuffs.

Of course this problem results from not having an Islamic culture. For in the past, people have been made to become accustomed to squandering, that is, the consumer culture, so they are not able to tolerate the present situation. But if the consumer culture were to be changed to Islamic culture, which is production and frugality, then the dimensions of this difficulty would be reduced.

But an important problem with which everyone is afflicted is the lack of security, which exists in a palpable way from the road to the home and the hospital. It is for this very reason that with one voice everyone has asked the ministry of state to establish security as soon as possible throughout the country. The people want the counterrevolution to be dealt with decisively and they want greater attention to be given to confronting them, especially by the law enforcement agents and the police.

Exporting the Revolution

You who have entered the Islamic Consultative Assembly as an ideal example of a Muslim and dedicated woman of present-day society, what problem do you see as more acute for presentation in the Assembly?

Although our revolution was not an economic revolution and basically we rose up in order that genuine Islam might be actualized and Islamic culture be brought into existence, we are still forced to deal with economic problems, for the counterrevolution is taking advantage of this very problem. As for me, although I consider the problems of war, the refugees and foreign policy important, nevertheless, in order to put the domestic situation in order, I consider foreign policy in connection with the goal of exporting the revolution the most important problem.

Women in the Bill on Retaliation

Please tell us, after the revolution, what has been your principle activity, and how have you divided your time among social and political activities and family affairs?

After the revolution, my activities have consisted of organizing meetings for discussion and criticism, teaching (commentary of philosophy, the "Nahj al-balaghah," in Arabic, the "Osul-e kafi" and jurisprudence), analyzing the political problems of the day, speaking in the cities and the villages, research and preparation of legal and political reports, propagating the line of the Imam and explaining the role of the Velayat-e Faqih.

Concerning the division of my time, I must say that, although I do not consider myself very successful in all areas and I only have hope in God's kindness, still I believe that "to desire is to be able." So in spite of my heavy responsibilities, which include the care of my family because of the death of my father, leading and guiding my friends and acquaintances who come to me for advice and raising and caring for four children, through God's kindness I am able to accomplish what I can.

In any case I myself perform most of my household tasks, and I am satisfied, since God has promised, "Those who struggle in Our cause, surely We shall guide them in Our ways" [Koran].

How do you view the situation of women in the bill on retaliation?

The bill on retaliation, which was written with the blood of the martyr Ayatollah Beheshti and his efforts, and against which certain protests are being made by those who are ignorant of Islamic rights and laws and sometimes by those who are opposed to the revolution, is completely in accordance with the book of Islamic retribution. Its opponents are in reality objecting to Islamic laws. As far as I have heard, most of the objections are directed at two of the articles of the bill.

First, if a man should murder a woman, he is not to be killed, unless he should murder two women. The rumor had been spread that, for example, if a man should enter a women's public bathhouse and kill a number of women, he would not be punished or retaliated against.

But in fact, this is not so. In other words, if intentional murder is proven, three ways exist for recompense in the holy law: blood-money, retaliation and pardon. The blood-money for a woman is one-half that for a man, i.e., 500 miskals of gold. This is the statute of God, who says in the chapter on women, "To the male the like of the portion of two females" [Koran]. In the Sura He says, "The female to the female," that is, the statute concerning a murdered woman is related to the statutes which are enacted concerning women. These statutes say that if a man should murder a woman, the family of the woman has two choices: Either they can take the amount of 500 miskals of gold from the murderer; or, in exchange for paying one-half of the blood-money to the murderer's family, the man can be retaliated against. The philosophy behind paying the blood-money to the survivors of the murderer is only for the sake of protecting the family. For even if the man is corrupt and a murderer, his wife, dependents and children are innocent. Of course in the second case, if the family of the victim does not have the financial ability according to the finding of the judge of the divine law, then this amount will be paid from the treasury of the Muslims.

The other instance which has been seized as a pretext by the rumormongers and deviationists concerns the article which says that if a man should see his wife committing adultery with another man, he has the right to kill both of them. But if a wife should see her husband committing adultery, she does not have such a right. In the first part of the article, which exists for defending honor, protecting the family and removing any kind of contamination for the society's culture, there is no debate. The protests are directed at the second part of the article and grow out of not paying attention to the religious statutes. For a man can choose more than one wife, and it is possible that they not know about each other, i.e., in reality the man may not have committed any sin.

Of course my purpose is only to explain the statutes of the divine law; and the position of women has been taken into account in this bill.

The Rights of Women in the Revolution

To what extent have women in present-day revolutionary society benefitted from the rights which Islam has given them?

There is no question that women have not yet completely attained their legitimate Islamic rights in our present-day society. But one must search for and investigate the reasons for this. First, the legal problems of women and the family in general have still not been discussed in the Assembly. Second, some people are unfamiliar with the culture of the Islamic family and with questions of the divine and civil laws. In addition, the differences and difficulties are for the most part the result of undisciplined marriages, not observing the Islamic rights of the husband and wife and considering one another's responsibilities as unimportant. God willing, with the spread of Islamic culture and the total application of the statutes of the divine law, women and men, and as a result all members of society, will attain to their rights.

As a female representative to the Assembly, what role do you see for yourself?

I can say that a woman does not go to the Assembly only for establishing the rights of women. On the contrary, her goal is joint deliberation, presenting proposals and striving in composing the life-giving laws of Islam, and especially in revivifying the rights of the family and society.

I think that I will have mainly a legislative role, and I hope that with God's help I will be able to be a thread of connection between the people and their Assembly, that I will be able to accomplish this heavy responsibility and that until the last day of my life I will be able to serve society in the way of God.

9831

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VEILING IMPOSED ON IRAN AIR WOMEN ABROAD

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German No 36 Aug 81 p 122

[Text] Female employees of Iran Air are supposed to cover their heads in Europe as well. But they do not want to.

The audience was brief. Ayatollah Khomeyni squatted as usual on his patterned blanket, before him Alice Schwarzer and a group of European feminists. The bearded Islamic religious leader thanked the Western emancipationists for their "help against the dictatorship (of the Shah) and the oppression of the Iranian people."

But on that March day in 1979 Khomeyni remained silent to all the women's questions about chador and the fate of their Persian sisters. "We were interviewing a mute," said one disappointed Frenchwoman.

Now the misogynistic old man has given the Western women a belated answer: He tried to extend his power over women beyond the borders of the Islamic republic.

All female employees of Iran Air in the FRG, on orders from Teheran, must in future cover their hair, forehead and eyebrows under a 90 X 90 cm square cloth--greetings from the Ayatollah.

Mohammed Kaboli, the head of Iran Air in Frankfurt, wanted to carry out Khomeyni's order on German soil. Anyone refusing to wear the cloth, he ordered, would receive a warning every day. He threatened his female ground staff, seven Germans and one Iranian, openly: "Three letters, and you're fired!"

The Iran Air women went before the Frankfurt Labor Court in a body the week before last to fight the veiling order and won a temporary injunction.

If Iran Air continues to force its female workers to cover their heads, the company faces a fine of DM 1,000, or 6 months in prison for the manager. The judges in Frankfurt ruled that the Iranians were in violation of Article 87 of the works' constitutional law, which states that the dress code cannot be changed without the agreement of the work's council. A DAG [labor court] spokesman voiced his fears: "If we had tolerated the head scarf, we would soon have woolen stockings, the dark cowl and plain shoes."

This fear is not without justification, because there is some annoyance about Khomeyni's decree on clothing in other major European cities.

Kaboli, until recently the head of the Rome office, had already created an uproar in Italy. Italian employees at the Rome office in the Via Bissolati now have to greet their clientele modestly, with a head scarf pulled low over their foreheads.

English employees of the Iranian airline, on the other hand, have found a compromise with the mullah's fashion. They fix the dark scarf so loosely and provocatively in their hair that it is more like a fashionable accessory.

Athenian women can continue to go without a veil, in no small measure due to massive intervention by the Greek government in Teheran, but as a concession they must wear long stockings, even at temperatures of 40° Celsius in the hottest summer.

Their colleagues in the Champs Elysees, who have to sit behind bars for fear of attacks by Persians in exile, are still bare-headed. They too were commanded to wear dark scarves and long dresses. One Frenchwoman said: "We will never accept that."

The Iranian flight attendants have no choice. Many of them have lost their jobs and had to make room for men. The few female flight attendants who remain are now following Mohammed: They are to cast down their eyes, conceal their charms and "draw the veil across their bosoms" (Koran 24.31).

They know that in Iran today the will of Allah is receiving solid assistance: When two employees of the Tedcharat Bank in Teheran only partially concealed their curls under a scarf, the Islamic bank council wanted to have the two unchaste women flogged in the tellers' area. They just managed to escape. The council had the director beaten as the one responsible for the religious omission.

9581

CSO: 4620/14

BRIEFS

BRITISH WIN POWER CONTRACT--Ruston Diesels of the UK, a GEC subsidiary, has won a \$126m contract to supply Iraq with 70 small power stations. Under the contract, which was won against competition from West Germany, Scandinavia and Japan, each power station will generate no more than 2MW to supply local industries. It is believed that Iraq has chosen to generate electricity on a small scale for strategic reasons. Delivery of the first generators will start next month. They will be installed in prefabricated buildings to be shipped out by Ruston. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 p 44]

INDONESIAN BIDDING PARTICIPATION--Indonesian contractors are taking part in international tenders for various development projects in Iraq. One of the projects is the construction of a 28.5km road. Their participation was discussed in Jakarta on 18 August during a meeting between Hadjisaroso Purnomosidi, the minister for public works, and Hisham Fakhri Nafi Tabaqchali, the Iraqi ambassador to Indonesia. After the meeting, Purnomosidi told reporters that he thought Indonesian contractors were competitive because of a novel technique called the 'hen's claw' system, used in road construction, first developed and successfully applied in Indonesia. This technique, he said, would be suitable for application in Iraq since the soil over which the road is to be constructed is very soft. The 'hen's claw' system is being used in the construction of the new international airport of Jakarta. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 p 45]

CSO: 4400/5

PRESIDENT NAVON PROPOSED AS NEW ALIGNMENT LEADER

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Aug 81 pp 11, 12

[Article by Mati Golan: "The President's Dilemma"]

[Text] Since the elections, the Labor party has been going through a process of discovery, a low-keyed discovery at present. Some are still whispering, and some raise their voice discreetly in saying the name of the person who can save the party from its exile in the opposition: the president, Yitzhaq Navon.

The party apparatus has only recently started to consider Navon an electoral asset, and a worthy leader. For years, the party apparatus thought the opposite, or at least acted as if it thought the opposite. When Navon wanted to be Knesset speaker, it put Yisra'el Yesha'yahu against him, who defeated him with its help. When Navon presented himself as a candidate for president, they, at the last moment, presented Prof Efraim Katzir, as their candidate.

Even Navon's natural home, the Rafi party, did not support him. In the struggle over representation of this bloc in the government, its members prepared Gad Ya'aqovi, and the highest position that Navon ever got, was that of chairman of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee.

Begin had to rise to power for Navon to get what his own party refused to give him. The prime minister got it into his head that the position of president should be filled by somebody from the oriental community. He sent messengers all over the place to find a suitable man, and at last they found him in Paris. But when the "Cinderella," Prof Yitzhak Shave, was brought to the presidential mansion, it was discovered that the shoe was much too big for him. Only then did the party functionaries look towards Yitzhak Navon, and only then did he get to see all the members of his party voting for him as president.

Cheers Are Better Than Rotten Eggs

In all fairness, we have to say that the Labor party as far as Navon is concerned, is not what it used to be. The death of Golda Me'ir and Pinhas Sapir has brought an end to the hatred directed towards anyone who has ever been associated with the Rafi party. The fact that the Labor party today craves for a leader who is charismatic and popular, is tragic and understandable. It is a result of the trauma that this party underwent in the last election campaign. Even though the

Labor people feel contempt towards the style of Begin and his supporters, they still envy them, because cheers, even if they are vulgar, are better than fists and rotten eggs.

The biggest problem is that in Israel popularity has proved to be unstable. Begin was unpopular for 29 years, and today he is called "the king of Israel." In the first half of 1977, a public opinion poll was taken, regarding the preferred candidate for prime minister: Peres got 55 percent, Yitzhaq Rabin--22 percent, Begin was somewhere in the bottom tenth!

There is no doubt that Navon's popularity is not only based on his high position. There have been presidents before him, and he is among the most popular. His personality and his qualifications have a lot to do with his popularity. The presidency, by itself, is not a guarantee for popularity and an automatic jumping board to the prime minister's position. Everybody respected the former presidents of Israel, but most of them would not have been considered suitable for the position of prime minister.

Without a Protective Shield

Even so, the presidency has something to do with it: the person in this position is perceived as being beyond party differences and governmental wrongdoings. He deals only with favorable topics, he is spared criticism. Take this protective shield away, and he would be vulnerable. If he got into the political arena, nothing would protect him anymore. He would have to attack and be attacked, to criticize and be criticized. He would be judged by his ability to withstand all this and not by the fact that he was president.

Navon did not get to the presidency from the academic world, but from the world of real politics, so he probably understands the problem quite well, maybe better than his friends who ask him to seek the prime minister's position. Therefore, he is not as enthusiastic as they are. Before he makes a decision, he is bound to consider his steps very carefully, with the measure being what is possible and not what is desirable.

In any case, he will probably try to postpone a decision, until his present term as president expires in about 2 years. By then, it seems, the fate of the Begin government, and at the same time, the fate of Shimon Peres, will have become clearer. That will make the situation much easier for Navon. If there is one thing Navon wants to avoid, it is a struggle with his friend and political ally, Peres. At the moment it seems, that only a unanimous party decision to ask him to run, or a voluntary decision by Peres to step down, can make Navon decide to run for the position of prime minister.

Both situations are highly unlikely at present. The Labor party is still waiting. Peres thinks, and many others share his opinion, that the election results do not justify his stepping down. But this atmosphere will change if the new Begin government proves to be stable.

Everybody assumes that in a year or two, this problem will be clarified. But it is doubtful whether Navon and the Labor party will be given this much time to

consider their course of action. It is possible that the time for decision will arrive much earlier.

Passage of the Law--A Political Death For Navon

All depends on whether the Likud decides to revive its initiative regarding the passage of a law which would forbid the president to engage in political activity for 5 years after resigning or finishing his term as president. Such a law was already discussed during the last days of the ninth Knesset. If such a law is presented, and if it becomes clear that it has good chances for passage, Navon will have to make a difficult decision before final approval of this legislation. Staying on the job after the passage of this legislation will mean political death for him.

It is possible that Navon will decide to give up future political activity, thinking that it is more important for him to finish two terms as president. The most difficult problem probably is the fact that it is not clear whether the choice is his. There is a possibility, a certainty as far as the Likud is concerned, that Begin would like "to have his cake and eat it, too": He will try to get Navon out of the political arena and at the same time will replace him as president at the end of the present term. It is no secret that Begin is not happy with the fact that the president's roots were "among those wretched monopolists," and in the headcutting atmosphere which is prevalent now, it is doubtful whether he would like to bow his head before somebody who has always pursued "the right way."

There is no doubt that the Likud is afraid of Navon being the leader of the Labor party or even one of its leaders. This fear has a firm foundation in reality and it might make Begin cool down and try to prevent Navon from resigning now or at the end of his present term. It is possible that the Likud will not push for passage of the law in return for a commitment by Navon to continue for a second term, or that prior to submission of the law to the Knesset, the coalition will assure Navon that it will support him for another term as president. In any case, Navon is already a political topic. For the time being only in private conversations, but we can assume that not long after the formation of the new government, it will become an open political subject. A lot of people and a lot of parties will have to make hard decisions, but the hardest decision will be that of Navon himself.

9433

CSO: 4323/50

MILITARY GOVERNMENT TRIES TO NEUTRALIZE PLO

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 19 Jul 81 p 18, 26

[Article by Tawfiq Khuri: "Military Government Attempts to Pave the Way towards the Establishment of Autonomy"]

[Text] The Military Government for the Territories has changed its course in recent months. Most of its activity today is directed towards encouraging moderate local bodies which will be ready, in time, to accept the Autonomy Plan in the Camp David framework.

Following the brutal attack near Hadassah House in Hebron last May, the Military Government has charted a "heavy handed" policy which aims at restoring quiet and eliminating terror. As a consequence of this policy, two mayors from the Mr. Hebron region have been expelled, restrictions have been placed upon most members of the Guidance Committee in the Territories and a severe clamp down on demonstrating students has been instituted. Control over institutions of higher learning and professional organizations has been stepped up. These and other activities have brought a calm in whose shadow many new settlements have been founded during the past year.

Now, with the final pullback from the Sinai at the top of the agenda and the need for achieving Israeli-Egyptian agreement on autonomy growing, the Military Government must gear its policy in the Territories toward creating a comfortable political climate.

Several months ago the Military Government increased its control over transfers of funds to the Territories by the Joint Jordanian-PLO Committee. It was intended to weaken the relationship between residents of the Territories and the PLO and Jordan, both sworn opponents of the Autonomy Plan. City governments and institutions in the Territories protested the strict controls, which have resulted in budgetary short-falls that are impeding implementation of development plans. While the Military Government does aid the city governments and institutions, it cannot replace funding from the PLO and Arab countries.

Despite controls, the borders have not been hermetically sealed to Arab money from the PLO and Jordan. The Military Government allows funds to be brought in from Arab countries for development plans which it approves. Several mayors have, in recent years, conceived plans for building institutions of higher learning,

supporting national organizations and institutions in the Territories, aiding families of terrorists, defending individuals imprisoned on security charges, and building new neighborhoods in order to create facts and limit Israel's ability to confiscate lands for building new settlements. Such plans, of course, are not accepted by the Military Government for the Territories, primarily due to their character. Funds from Arab countries are, therefore, not permitted for such projects.

Lately, the Military Government has taken additional initiatives in order to weaken the link between residents of the Territories and the PLO. City leaders and public figures were summoned by the military governors and requested not to meet with PLO leaders in the course of their visits to Arab countries and to refrain from making statements favoring the PLO, in accordance with 1968 regulations explicitly forbidding residents of the Territories from meeting with PLO representatives. Until now, the Military Government has not enforced these regulations. Mayors and public figures who visited Arab countries since 1968 have met PLO leaders, including Yasir Arafat himself, with relative freedom. The Military Government would only summon these people on their return for information concerning these meetings. It was frequently claimed that these public figures from the Territories were meeting PLO leaders as emissaries of the Israeli Government.

The only explanation for the Military Government's latest move in resurrecting the 1968 regulations is that it is aimed at neutralizing extremist groups in the Territories which are receiving orders from the PLO to oppose the Autonomy Plan.

Concurrently, the Military Government continues to encourage the formation of new groups in the Territories which, when the time comes, will be a replacement for the present extremist leadership. Several years ago the Rural Union was formed in the Mt. Hebron region, led by Mustafa Dudin. Dudin declared at the outset that his group intended to work for the development of the villages in the Mt. Hebron region, and pull them out of decades of neglect. Gradually, Mustafa Dudin gained the support of the Military Government. He became involved in political issues and held meetings of farmers from the villages. Today, the Rural Union in the Mt. Hebron region is considered a powerful political organization.

A similar attempt at creating a rural union in the Shechem [Nablus] region failed, despite the Military Government's support. Recently, mukhtars [village heads] and notables in the Ramallah area succeeded in forming a similar organization. Mustafa Dudin and many Mt. Hebron notables participated in the opening ceremonies. A third union was formed about a week ago by village representatives in the Bethlehem region.

Leaders of city governments in all these regions are well aware of the fact that the sole aim of these unions is to present an alternative to their authority. The city leaders are seriously troubled by these organizations and are devoting most of their efforts to prevent their recognition by Jordan and the PLO and to discredit their leadership.

Mustafa Dudin, the head of the Mt. Hebron Rural Union, sounds as if he has declared a war of annihilation upon the city leaders. This week he stated that he would not rest until a similar union is formed in Samaria. Once these unions have spread throughout the West Bank, Mustafa Dudin hopes to be the decisive force in the politics of the Territories. He maintains that 70 percent of the Territories'

will now be sweeter still. Those in the Military Government and the Coordinating Office for the Territories who still believe that this will strengthen the position of those representatives which the Military Government would like to impose on the Territories, are sorely mistaken. The PLO will gain or lose strength as a result of the actions of its leaders in Beirut or Damascus. Restrictions imposed on the relations of the residents of the Territories with the PLO will only strengthen the PLO's influence.

Since Ezer Weizman's resignation as defense minister, Dani Mat, coordinator for the Territories, who is an officer with the rank of major general, has, in effect, been making Israel's policy for the Territories. He is assisted by regional commanders. There is no active participation by any authorized civilian body, merely tacit approval. The current policy is based more on "don'ts" than "dos". The Mt Hebron populace is allowed to support such leaders as Mustafa Dobin, the Israeli Government favorite, who is despised by the actual West Bank leadership.

The reign of Major General Dani Mat is characteristically black and white, with little room for grey. Consequently, during this period most of the West Bank leadership has been lumped on one side of the fence (the black side, in accordance with the government's interpretation) while precious few have been placed on the other (white) side. Grey has all but disappeared. Previously, there were many more subtle shades of color.

The population [of the territories] has often found itself caught between several hammers (the PLO, Jordan, Egypt, Arab countries, and others) and the Israeli anvil. Its leaders are forced to walk in the rain and try to stay as dry as possible: getting wet in this case means either ending up in an Israeli jail or being murdered in the courtyard of one's own home by a PLO or other hit-man. How many of them falsely call on the PLO and would be happy about that organization's demise, or at least, of its leadership? Others truly believe that only the PLO can bring salvation. Some wait, alternating trips between Amman and Beirut.

This is the reality which is difficult to change with an administrative order from the Military Government. The reality in Nablus, Hebron and Ramallah will not change because Dani Mat's office decided to change it with silly words. Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron reflect Beirut, Damascus and Amman. The West Bank towns are reflections of Arab capitals in miniature. Only positive or negative change in the latter will produce change here.

We may soon hear Palestinian leaders in Gaza, el-Bireh and Tulkarm referring to the PLO as "a band of murderers," "terrorists" and "the so-called PLO," but unlike Mr Begin, they will accompany these words with a wink and a broad smile.

8770

CSO: 4323/45

WEST BANK REGULATIONS AGAINST PLO CONTACTS CRITICIZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Jul 81 p 9

[Article by Yehuda Litani: "The Conqueror's Trap"]

[Text] Prime Minister Menahem Begin does not use the abbreviation PLO and, instead, refers to this organization as an "organization of murders," "the so-called PLO," etc. Mr Begin's terminology will soon be employed by an unexpected group: [Arab] residents of the Territories. The Coordinating Office for the Territories and the Military Government sought and found regulations dating from 1968 which forbid the Territories' residents from meeting with PLO leaders and outlaw calls for PLO support.

Personalities, mayors and East Jerusalem newspaper editors have been summoned by the Military Government and warned that during trips abroad they must not meet with PLO leaders and that at home in the West Bank and Gaza Strip they may not call upon the population to support the PLO in any manner. In this way, perhaps, the leaders of the security network believe that PLO support among the Territories; population will gradually cease.

Why have these old regulations been reactivated now, after so many years of free and open contact between West Bank and Gaza leaders and the PLO in Arab and world capitals? "Something had to be done once and for all," a security official told me this week. He stated that the situation has become unbearable. PLO leaders, through the joint PLO-Jordanian Committee which regularly meets in Amman, or directly from Beirut and Damascus, had been issuing instructions to supporters in the Territories via the local leaders with whom they met. This sparked constant agitation, the security official stated. He further stated that the newspapers and leaders calling for PLO support were, in fact, engaged in anti-Israeli provocation which Israeli authorities are now trying to halt.

We spoke with Nablus Mayor Bassam Shak'a prior to his latest trip abroad, the security official told me. He was warned not to meet with PLO leaders and functionaries and not to make public declarations of support for the PLO, which he is, in any case, doing. We approached other representatives and newspaper editors and hope they will comply with the regulations.

Members of the Military Government are satisfied. The letter of these regulations seems to be observed. However, their spirit is certainly not observed. Who can be

so naive as to believe that the PLO's supporters will stop listening to its leaders, even if Israel outlaws meetings? Instructions, advice and guidance can be disseminated in many other ways, such as radio broadcasts from numerous stations, directly or through secret messages, and via emissaries from among tens and hundreds of thousands of visitors from Arab countries who yearly visit the Territories from across the Jordan bridges.

If Bassam Shak'a doesn't meet in Amman or Beirut with Yasir Arafat, he can meet with Yasir Arafat's representative, who need not be a PLO member, someone who could pretend to be a supplier of pipe for the Nablus water company, for example. There are thousands of ways to connive and scheme. Meanwhile, having deluded ourselves in the late 1960s and early 1970s into thinking that we could be an enlightened conqueror, maintain a liberal military government, rule over a foreign population and still be nice guys, we are, with heavy bearlike steps, walking right into the classic trap of all conquerors.

The trap is the illusion that it is possible to rule over a foreign population through quislings. That the character of its leadership can be changed by reliance upon so-called moderates, to the detriment of those forces which the ruler considers extremist, agitating, and instigating. The trap is the delusion that if people are not permitted to say a specific word, it won't be on their lips anyway.

It reminds me of the children's story about a king in a far-off land who forbade his subjects certain human functions. It is a decree which the residents of the Territories cannot obey. Mayors can be forbidden to meet with each other and members of the National Guidance Committee, the supreme body of PLO supporters in the Territories, can be prohibited from leaving their city limits. Lands can be confiscated for settlements on the pretext of "security." More prohibitions, deportations, curfews and fines can be imposed, but people's thoughts cannot be governed.

If these personalities and mayors are prevented from publicly calling for PLO support, they will do so clandestinely. Those involved in propaganda know that frequently clandestine propaganda is most effective. This is particularly true in Palestinian society, which has grown accustomed to foreign rulers and to speaking about issues using indirect references, rumors and secret mutterings.

When a Palestinian in the Territories reads AL QUDS, AL FAJAR, or AL-SHA'B the three East Jerusalem dailies, he doesn't look for what is there, as we Israelis do, but for what is missing. Frequently, based on what does not appear, he learns much more about what is going on. The papers are subject to the strict supervision of military censorship, which deals with the East Jerusalem press in a completely different manner than the Israeli press. Most of the writing, from foreign reports about Arab countries to death notices, utilizes allusions and hidden messages well known to readers.

Technically speaking, [the new regulations] will make it difficult for representatives and mayors from the Territories to meet with PLO representatives at the Joint Committee in Amman, or in Beirut or Damascus. However, as indicated, in a short time new lines of communication will be established. This will result in the lifting of the present restrictions. Stolen water is sweet: The taste of conspiracy

population is rural and demands that their voice be heard on issues that will determine their future.

Now, one can only ask: Will the Military Government succeed in cutting the Territories' residents off from the PLO and fostering a rural leadership representing the majority of the Territories' population in a short period of time?

It would seem that only sworn optimists can entertain the idea that significant changes in public opinion in the Territories can occur and allow the establishment of autonomy according to the Camp David Accords.

8770

CSO. 4323/45

BRIEFS

NEW HAWKISH LABOR GROUP--A new hawkish group, called "A Lever for Zionist and Social Activism," was established in recent days. Several dozen Labor party activists from the city and from the agricultural communities have already joined the group. The group sees as its aim "preventing the subversion of the party's and the Alignment platform." The members of "Lever" are going to meet with Shimon Peres, the chairman of the party, to talk about the aim of the group, which will conduct ideological discussions open to all members of the party, and about an action plan for the group. Knesset members Shlomo Hillel, Yehuda Hasha'i, Amos Karmel, Me'ir Bar'eli, David Qoren, Prof Aryeh Har'el, Matilda Gez, 'Amos Hadar, 'Ada Golan, Naftali Ben-Yehuda, 'Ezra' Beles, David Petel, Yehuda Har'el, Shimon Shabes and others have already joined this hawkish group. This hawkish group rejects: "the attempts by a few MKs to disregard the platform of the Labor party, as they did after the declaration of the Saudi prince, Fahd." The spokesman for the group, 'Amos Karmel, said: "The platform of the Labor party is not 'Mao's Red Book,' but it is an obligation of the party to its electorate, and the party representatives are obliged to honor it, and whoever does not do so, must draw his own conclusions." [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Aug 81 p 3] 9433

CSO: 4323/50

PHOSPHATE PRODUCTION TO BE INCREASED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 pp 5-6

[Text]

Jordan accounted for 10 per cent of the world's phosphate exports in 1980, third behind Morocco with 41.6 per cent and the US with 33.2 per cent, it was reported from Amman last week. According to the Director-General of the Jordanian Phosphates Mining Company, Ali Nsour, the value of these exports last year was about Jordanian Dinars 47 million (\$142 million), constituting some 30 per cent of total Jordanian exports.

With 60 per cent of its soil rich in phosphates, from which fertilisers are produced, Jordan hopes to expand its production rapidly and narrow the gap with its two leading competitors, the US and Morocco. Output has already trebled in the last five years, to reach nearly 4 million tonnes in 1980, and Mr Nsour says his company plans to spend some JD 60 million (\$180 million) to expand mining operations and seek new markets in the Far East and Europe, and reach an export figure of JD 100 million (\$300 million) by 1985. By the end of the decade, Mr Nsour, told reporters recently, production will be at about 6.5 million tonnes.

By then, enormous new deposits at Shidiya in the South of the country are expected to be coming on stream, only slowly eating into Jordan's proven reserves of 1.5 billion tonnes.

So far, Jordan's main export markets have been in Asia, especially India, Eastern Europe and one or two Western countries.

In order to enhance its position as a major supplier, Jordan is seeking to develop its own processing and transport facilities so as to supply the finished product, rather than just a raw material. To this end, a \$400 million fertiliser complex is planned. It is to be built close to the Red Sea port of Aqaba, from which all phosphate exports leave the country. It is expected that by 1990, Jordan will be processing about 30 per cent of its total phosphates output into fertiliser.

In addition, Jordan has huge potash deposits, of around 2 billion tonnes — considered the largest deposits in the world — which will also greatly increase the country's ability to become a major producer of fertiliser. Already, the state is investing some JD 92 million (\$275 million) in a five-year potash industry scheme in the Dead Sea (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, February 9 and March 24, 1980).

According to scientists working in Jordan, some of the local phosphates deposits have an unusually high uranium content, which could be developed commercially following the American example. A West German consultant has been hired to study the feasibility of such a project and is due to report back within the next two years, when the price of yellow cake (raw uranium) should be even higher than today and therefore make such a project even more attractive.

EXPLOITATION OF COPPER, OIL SHALE PLANNED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 pp 38-39

[Article by Stephen Ross]

[Text]

JORDAN's Natural Resources Authority (NRA) is mounting large-scale operations to exploit geological wealth in two areas of the country: the southern Jordan Rift Valley for copper and central Jordan for oil shale.

Copper is found in many parts of the Wadi Araba — the section of the Rift Valley that stretches from the Dead Sea down to Aqaba — and has been exploited since ancient times. Relics of a copper-smelting industry have been discovered in the Iron Age ruins of the town of Etzion-Geber, near Aqaba.

The area on which the NRA is concentrating contains at least 60m tonnes of 1.36 per cent copper oxide ore, said NRA geological survey and mines director Mohammed Abu Ajamiyeh.

The NRA started geological mapping and test drills in the area in the 1960s. A study in conjunction with the French agency Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minérales was pessimistic about the project's feasibility, largely because of the instability of copper prices. The latest study, by UK firm Seltrust Engineering, was completed in October 1979. It concluded that exploitation of the mineral was feasible. The NRA has now floated tenders for the construction of a pilot plant to process the copper ore.

If after six months the pilot plant proves satisfactory, it will be upgraded into a 'cottage' plant, producing 3,000 tonnes a year of almost pure copper by electrowinning — dissolving the mineral and extracting the metal by electrolysis. If this is successful, Jordan will start commercial production.

The NRA is more optimistic about its plans to exploit Jordan's deposits of oil shale. On 4 August the NRA announced a programme, in cooperation with West Germany, to explore and evaluate shale reserves between Amman and Maan in the south. Germany will provide technical expertise and deutschmarks 1.6m (\$660,000) in finance.

Last year the NRA signed contracts with a Soviet agency and a West German consortium for studies on generating power from Jordan's oil shale. The Soviet agency Technopromexport will study the feasibility of direct combustion of the shale in a proposed 350-400MW power station to be built at Lejjoun in southern Jordan, where there are proven deposits of 1.3m tonnes of shale. The German consortium (Kloeckner and the Lurgi group) is in charge of the study on processing the shale.

ECONOMIC PROTOCOL SIGNED WITH ROMANIA

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 15 Sep 81 p 6

[Text]

BUCHAREST, Sept. 14 (KUNA): A protocol for economic cooperation between Kuwait and Romania was signed here during the two-day visit of H.H. the Amir to this friendly socialist republic.

The document calls for further development and diversification of trade exchange and economic cooperation between the two countries in various domains of activity.

The protocol was signed by the Minister of Trade and Industry Jassim Khalid Al Marzouk and the Romanian Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Trade Cornel Burtica.

This is the second protocol of cooperation signed which started September 8. The first protocol was signed with Bulgaria.

Kuwait and Romania today called for a just settlement to the Middle East problem, ending the armament race, realising the new world economic order and fostering their bilateral relations especially in the economic field.

In a joint communique issued here following a two-day visit to Romania by H.H. the Amir Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed on the third leg of his five-nation Balkan tour, the two sides noted with deep concern the increasing deterioration in the international situation and stressed the need for creating a suitable atmosphere for strengthening peace,

detente and international cooperation on the basis of equity, respect of national independence, sovereignty of all countries and non-interference in their internal affairs for the purpose of realising constructive and positive cooperation for the good and prosperity of the peoples of the world. They called for strengthening the role of the Non-aligned countries and the UN in world affairs.

Arms race

The communique said that the Romanian side showed special interest in realising security in Europe and the two sides emphasising that the European security and cooperation positively affects peace, security and cooperation in the world and eases tension in international relations.

The two sides expressed deep concern over the armament race which they viewed as a serious threat to world peace and security and they reaffirmed their support for quick disarmament measures especially in the nuclear field and ending the production of weapons of mass destruction.

The two sides also noted military competition in the international waters which threatens the coastal states and stressed the need for curtailing and ending this military competition and presence.

In this connection, Kuwait and Romania stressed significance of application of the UN declaration announcing the Indi-

an Ocean as a peace zone.

Special attention

When discussing the Middle East problem, the two sides gave special attention to the delicate situation resulting from the continuity of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories including Jerusalem and Israel's refusal to abide by the UN resolutions in this respect and to recognise the national legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and the continuing Israeli aggression against Arab countries.

On the Gulf situation, the two sides emphasised that safeguarding peace and security of this region was the responsibility of its countries without any foreign interference. They expressed deep concern over continuity of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict and called for ending it by peaceful means through negotiations.

When discussing the world economic situation, the Kuwaiti and Romanian sides stressed the importance of pushing forward the wheel of development in the under-developed countries and the establishment of a new world economic order on the basis of equality and justice for the purpose of advancement, ending world economic problems and development of world economy.

On the bilateral relations, the two sides noted with satisfaction the growth in fruitful cooperation between their two countries in various fields and stressed the need for further increasing these relations especially in the economic field. They also expressed the desire to strengthen this cooperation in the field of food industry, health, tourism, communications, infra-structure, as well as in the financial and commercial fields.

NUMBER OF CO-OP SOCIETIES TO INCREASE

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 15 Sep 81 p 7

[Text]

KUWAIT. Sept 14 (KUNA): Kuwait's consumer cooperatives will be developed so as to cope with the increasing population, a spokesman for the Ministry of Social Affairs said today.

The existing number of cooperative societies will be doubled within ten years to reach 49, at the rate of two societies a year.

In the meantime, the Ministry of Education is introducing a special syllabus at Kuwait Commercial Institute to cater for students studying cooperative movement philosophy.

A joint committee comprising representatives of the ministries of Social Affairs and Commerce in addition to delegates from Kuwait University, the Technical and Vocational Training Authority and the cooperatives sector will be formed to prepare that syllabus.

In addition to existing services, Kuwait's cooperative movement will be gradually directed to engage in production and agricultural output, the director of cooperatives at the Ministry of Social Affairs Abdullah Al Fawzan said.

Objectives

To achieve those objectives,

plans are ahead to prepare qualified national cadres to undertake the increasing activities of the movement, the director added.

In 1979, the number of cooperative societies reached 27 compared to three in 1963 which operated on a KD 76,000 capital and a total membership of 695 nationals.

In 1979, the membership shot to 100,000 while the capital increased to KD 3.25 million and the annual turn-over reached 70 25 million dinars.

In 1965 there was one cooperative society for every 156,000 persons and in 1970 there was one for every 50,000.

Planning on the basis of a forecast that Kuwait's population will reach 2.45 million by 1990, the Ministry is keen to maintain the present ratio of one society for every 50,000.

In 1979-1980, the twenty seven societies provided work opportunities for 3,469 employees including 148 Kuwaiti nationals of whom 50 are holding executive posts.

The relatively small number of Kuwaitis in both general and managerial capacities, indicates the need for preparing national cadres, the director said.

BRIEFS

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS DISCUSSED--Kuwait Real Estate Investment Consortium (Kreic) is the nation's real estate investment arms, providing sound and legitimate opportunities for individual investors, a report said. Jointly owned by the Ministry of Finance, the Public Institution for Social Security and a number of leading firms, the consortium engages in the coordination of Kuwait's real estate activities in Arab and foreign countries. The consortium's activities range across a broad spectrum of construction and investment in hotels, offices, apartments, residential housing, industrial commercial complexes, the report by Kreic directors said. To maximize return from these ventures, the consortium is involved in the construction or purchase of hotels, resort complexes, restaurants, motels, villas and a variety of other related activities. The consortium is engaged in projects in various parts of the world including Morocco's tourism sector where one of its companies, Maroco-Koweitien de Developpement is operating from Casablanca. A similar project is also run by the consortium in Tunisia, under Tunisio-Koweitien de Developpement. The consortium is active in Egypt where it has formed a partnership with Cairo governorate for the development of new sites. The Yemeni-Kuwait Real Estate Development Company follows the consortium's joint format, with investors also from Saudi Arabia. The consortium's success in the Arab world has led to new investment opportunities elsewhere including the United States, the report added. A number of opportunities were evaluated before the consortium entered its first US joint venture in the southern city of New Orleans. Arab projects will continue to have a higher priority and joint venture partnerships are active in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Bahrain, it concluded. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 633, 12 Sep 81 pp 13, 14]

INCREASED PORT ACTIVITY--According to a recent report published by the MIDDLE EAST MARKETS magazine, the cost of transiting goods through Kuwait ports has risen by eight percent due to congestion and the shortage of trucks and manpower. The report added that ships are calling by the hundreds at Kuwait ports due to the closure of ports in Iraq and Iran. Another factor attributed to the increase charges was that the local government has passed resolutions preventing goods from being stored for a long time in Kuwait ports. The magazine quoted authoritative sources as saying that goods to the tune of 10 million tons are likely to pass through Kuwait this year. According to the magazine, an average of 80 ships wait daily in Kuwait ports for a berth. Some must wait 60 days before getting a berth, the magazine added. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 634, 19 Sep 81 p 11]

TRUCK ASSEMBLY PROJECT--A spokesman for the Kuwaiti National Automotive Manufacturing and Trading Company disclosed recently that a local company will shortly engage in a truck assembling project with an annual capacity exceeding the one thousand count. The project, the first of its kind in the Gulf region, will assemble trucks for civil and military use in accordance with the latest international specifications. The foundation stone of the plant was laid earlier this month while the actual phase of construction is expected to be completed within three months. The company had already obtained concessions from a leading West German car manufacturing complex, to assemble seven types of trucks averaging between seven and 23 tons. West Germany was chosen for its advanced technological capacities and its vast experience in the Middle East car markets, said the company's managing director, Adil al-Atiqy. The assembling operations will begin at an annual rate of 150 trucks, and the factory will reach its maximum capacity of 1,000 trucks within four years. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 634, 19 Sep 81 p 11]

MAJOR RESHUFFLING OF ASSETS--Although the government of Kuwait has not announced any reshuffling of assets, bankers from Kuwait to New York are abuzz with reports that Morgan Stanley and Co. picked up about for billion dollars of the gargantuan investment account and that Chemical Bank is in line to manage the remainder. The loser, if the reports are correct, is Citibank. Bankers say the Kuwaitis were rankled by what they felt was a lukewarm investment performance at the bank. A series of leaks to the news media about the account also bothered the Kuwaitis, noted the bankers. None of the New York financial institutions involved in the reports will comment. But investment bankers in London and New York say Morgan Stanley scored a coup by capturing the hefty investment business of the Kuwaitis. Although a well-known as an underwriter and investment banker, Morgan Stanley's money management arm is dwarfed in size by the portfolio operations at the large New York banks and the biggest insurance companies. According to bankers in Kuwait, the transfer of the remainder assets, valued at some three billion dollars, to the Chemical Bank is not nailed down, and Citicorp is fighting a last-ditch battle to keep at least a portion of the massive account under its wings. Dissatisfaction was heard this summer in the New York financial community leading Citicorp's competitors to view the Kuwaiti funds as up for grabs. In July, Kuwaiti Parliament criticised what it called the "unimaginative kind of investment government is making of its surpluses." Several members of the parliament took exception to the fact that a US bank was managing the portfolio. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 634, 19 Sep 81 p 10]

BLACKLISTED FIRMS CITED--According to a report carried in the official gazette, KUWAIT AL-YOM, the government has approved with a long list of blacklisted companies and vessels accused with violating the Arab boycott of Israel rules. United States and West German companies topped the blacklist, which also included firms in Britain, Austria, France, Turkey, Japan and Liberia. A ban was imposed upon the US firm "Monsanto" and its West German subsidiary. A similar sanction was adopted against the British company "Van Leer" and its subsidiary "Parsons Brothers of Hull." The US company "General Refractories" and two of its subsidiaries "Rades International" (France) and "Osterreichisch Amerikanische Magnesit" (Austria) were blacklisted because of holding shares in the Israeli firm "Dead Sea Periclase Limited".... A ban including the non-calling on Kuwaiti ports for

loading, off-loading of supplies will be imposed on a number of vessels of which: the Turkish ship "Paboug Oglou," the British ship "Crown Prince" (both are accused for calling on Israeli ports); the Liberian tanker "Gale" came also under sanction while a ban was lifted from the German vessel "Burhavensand" after owners had presented documentary evidence to abide by current regulations. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 6]

TRANSIT COSTS INCREASE--Kuwait, Sept. 15--The cost of transiting goods through Kuwait has risen by eight per cent due to the congestion in ports and shortages of trucks and drivers, a recent report in the Middle East Markets magazine said. The report added that ships by the hundreds had flocked to the Kuwaiti ports due to the closure of several ports in Iraq and Iran. Another factor attributed to the increase in transit charges was that the Kuwaiti government has passed resolution recently preventing goods from being stored for a long time in Kuwaiti ports. The magazine quoted authoritative sources as saying that transit goods to the tune of 10 million tons are likely to pass through Kuwait this year. At present there are 80 ships waiting for a berth in the Kuwaiti ports. Ships have to wait for 60 days in Kuwaiti ports sometimes before getting a berth, the magazine reported. Kuwaiti authorities are charging a four per cent fee on all transit goods. Some malpractice has also come into play, the report said. Some businessmen are marking their goods to Kuwaiti markets, though they are meant for other destinations. Goods for the local market are given priority, and hence the malpractice. [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 16 Sep 81 p 6]

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS CLAMPDOWN--Kuwait, Sept. 9--The Dean of Student Affairs at Kuwait University has laid down special regulations for bulletins, wall stickers and other publications issued by students' organisations or societies at the university. The regulations said freedom of expression is guaranteed for students, but the chief editor would be responsible for all the published material with the writers also held responsible for their articles. The name of the publisher, chief editor and that of the press must be mentioned in all printed matter. The regulations banned publication of any article that could disturb Kuwait's relations with other countries or which harmed public behaviour. All printing matter will be censored by the dean. He ordered the formation of a committee to look into punishments or appeals. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 10 Sep 81 p 7]

CSO: 4400/7

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT REVIEWED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 9-15 Aug 81 pp 10-11

[Article by Sheikha Ibrahim]

[Text]

The Lebanese National Movement LNM brings together a wide range of forces with differing ideologies differing origins, age and organizational structure communists, socialists, nationalists, Nasserites and Baathists, on the basis of a minimum platform concerning the most pressing political issues in Lebanon and the region. Some of its component parts are native to Lebanon; others are affiliated with pan-Arab movements.

By bringing together such a broad spectrum of those forces opposed to imperialism, Zionism and reaction, the LNM has presented a positive example for the patriotic and progressive forces in the area as a whole. In Lebanon the very existence of the LNM attests to the falsity of the fascist forces' claims that the Lebanese are not part of the Arab world and that their aspirations lie with 'the West.'

The non-sectarian practice of the LNM counters attempts to paint the Lebanese conflict as a religious one. The majority of its organizations do not derive their following from a particular sect, but have gained popular support as a result of their political line. Thus, the LNM has thousands of Christians in its rank-and-file. On the other hand, reactionary Moslem leaders have opposed the LNM and keep channels open to the Lebanese rightists.

The Lebanese National Movement has evolved into a front composed of 12 organizations. While some of its component groups have a much longer history, and forms of cooperation which existed between them, the LNM's origin dates back to 1969 when a coalition of progressive and nationalist organisations was formed under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. These forces had a dual platform: democratic political and economic reform, and the defense of the Palestinian Revolution.

These goals still constitute the cornerstone for the movement's unity and have placed the patriotic forces on an inevitable collision course with the confessional system, and with rightist forces allied to Zionism. The radicalization of the movement climaxed in the 1975 - 6 civil war, when it systematically took up arms in order to reinforce and defend its political and social struggle.

In April 1972, the successes of an electoral coalition between communists, socialists, Baathists and Nasserites gave status to the movement as a country-wide political force. In the same year, Kamal Jumblatt was prominent in the formation of the Arab Front associated with the Palestinian Revolution on the regional level.

In 1973, the movement exerted an important influence on the popular level when it rallied to oppose the

regimes attempts to restrict political activities in Lebanon when in the spring of that year, the Lebanese Army attacked the Palestinian camps patriotic forces launched a political and military campaign to defend the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as well as their own political freedom. The Resistance's alliance with the LNM was its enemies what most wanted to avoid — an overall Arab mass struggle. Thus, the nationalist Lebanese became a prime target for rightist and Zionist attacks.

The two events most often designated as sparks to the 1975-76 civil war clearly illustrate the intertwining between the LNM's aims for Lebanon and Palestine. One was the fishermen's strike in Saida, February 1975, which addressed itself to economic and social injustice in the Lebanese system. This strike against Chamoun's fishing monopoly was supported by LNM forces and opposed by the state which sent in the Army. The other incidents was the Phalangists massacre against a busload of Palestinians in Ain al Rummaneh in April.

Initially the LNM raised the demand for banishing the rightist Phalange from any role in the institutions of Lebanese politics. By August, the movement had begun armed struggle to supplement its political reform of the political system (August 18, 1975) with the stated aim.

"to equip the growing popular movement with a phased program which defines their main demands in the various domains and constitutes a working guide for them at this stage of their long struggle for a progressive, democratic, Arab nationalist Lebanon."

In the introduction, the LNM explain its reason for concentrating on political reform.

"Political denominationalism, with the privileges it maintains, runs contrary to the real interests of the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese people. It is the main feature of our retrogressive political system and the source of the major aspects of confusion

characterizing this system. On the basis of inherited denominational privileges, the Lebanese political system discharges its function of protecting the prevalent economic, social and cultural privileges, concealing Lebanon's isolation from the rest of the Arab area, and giving predominance to a class of political feudalists who are incapable of providing effective solutions to the economic and social problems resulting from Lebanon's capitalist evolution. Moreover, rivalries created by the existing denominational system and the backward tribal political relations consecrated by it have prevented men of competence from asserting themselves and from assuming positions of responsibility, with the result that the state has fallen down to a level of incompetence that threatens the future of democracy itself..."

The program advocates electoral reform with the adoption of proportional representation, based on considering Lebanon as a single constituency. It calls for increased power to the legislative branch at the expense of presidential power, and that the army be entirely subject to the political authority. Moreover, "the Army's sole function will be to defend Lebanon's frontiers and national independence and to shoulder the national obligation towards the Palestinian cause and Arab causes. It should not be involved in governmental problems or internal matters." As well the program calls for the abolition of all political restrictions on the formation of political parties, trade unions, societies and clubs, and complete freedom of the press.

The LNM as a whole continues to adhere to this program as the only solution to the Lebanese crisis. While some of its forces tend to regard this program as an end in itself, other organizations view the enactment of such reform as the path for creating better conditions for a continuing struggle. The Marxist-Leninist organisations in the LNM emphasize the abolition of the Lebanese class struggle to assume its true and full dimensions. It is also important to note that this program is directed at the state,

whereas the LNM's program vis-a-vis the masses takes more varied forms, as can be seen in the organizations' political stands and practice.

The rightist attacks in 1975 confronted the LNM with the necessity of taking up arms despite the lack of systematic military preparation. It also faced the movement with innumerable political, social and economic responsibilities. From August through December 1975, the main battles were inter-Lebanon. Due to the support of the vast majority of the Lebanese people, the LNM in alliance with the Palestinian resistance, gained control of 80 per cent of the country. For more than a year, the LNM met the needs of the population in these areas, which swelled due to the influx of refugees from other areas. Temporary administration was set up, and schools and hospitals were staffed by LNM members when state employees failed to fill their posts.

Having pooled their resources during the war, the LNM crystallized its organizational structure in July 22, 1976, with the formation of the Central Political Council, headed by Kamal Jumblatt, seconded by four vice-presidents from the LCP, the SSNP, the Baath party and Murabitoun, and an executive general secretary (CAO). Also in 1976, coordination with the Palestinian resistance in the South was institutionalized with the formation of the Joint Forces.

After Jumblatt's assassination in March 1977, it was agreed to implement collective leadership. All organizations are represented in the Central Political Council and in the regional political councils, which are subject to the decisions of the central council. (The central council also includes 6 independent figures.) Local councils function throughout Lebanon, also in some areas under rightist military control. The 11-member Executive Committee, elected by the Central Political Council, includes representatives of the major trends within the movement. In addition, the LNM has established departments to deal with social services, infor-

mation, popular security, military affairs, Arab and international affairs, as well as planning and research. Its newspaper *Al Watan* (the Homeland) is the largest circulating daily in Lebanon.

With the cessation of the war, the LNM entered a stage of crises. The assassination of Kamal Jumblatt deprived the movement of a dynamic leader that had commanded respect on the Lebanese, Arab and international level. Moreover, the LNM had to face a difficult dilemma vis-a-vis the state authority. The LNM believes that it is the state that bears responsibility for meeting the population's needs. The majority of LNM organizations view their own administration as a temporary phenomenon designed to fill the state into assuming its gaps left by the state's incapacity and professional discrimination, and to pressure the state into assuming its full responsibility. This stand counters the rightist practice of setting up auto-defense and auto-administration, which in fact constitutes partition of the country. In contrast, the LNM has emphasized maintaining the unity of Lebanon — its territory, people and institutions.

However, the state's very structure and the increasing overt cooperation of the executive and the Army with the rightists precludes their functioning as neutral or unifying forces.

The dilemma vis-a-vis the state has been a recurring theme of the political developments since the war. On June 28, 1977, the LNM forwarded a new program. While declaring adherence to the principles of its 1975 program, the LNM now singled out certain basic, but less comprehensive demands, with the aim of creating a broader national front for the reunification of the country:

1. reunification of the state administration; dissolving the 'private entities' set up by the various parties; restoring state authority throughout the country; for full responsibility;

2. establishment of a balanced political system through democratic distribution

of power, entailing readjustments in the Army and Parliament

3. reaffirming the Arab identity of Lebanon and ending the 'good fence' policy vis-a-vis 'Israel'

At this time, the LNM pledged its support to President Sarkis' efforts to unify the country. However, renewed rightist provocations, and the president's negligence regarding this, brought the LNM into renewed conflict with the authority. In December 1978, the Communist Party demanded Sarkis' resignation. In 1980 the LNM launched a national accord initiative on a set of principles to which Sarkis paid lip service. The national accord was met by rightist resurgence in which the executive and the army cooperated. While some forces of the LNM may have banked on national accord as a real solution,

the revolutionary organizations, utilized this program as a tactical approach.

Since the civil war the LNM has escalated its military and mass activities in South Lebanon. The Israeli invasion of 1978, the occupation of the border strip by Saad Haddad's separatist militias and the relentless aggression against the masses in the South has graphically illustrated, say the LNM, that their task of defending the Palestinian resistance is synonymous with defending Lebanese sovereignty. As well as joining the Palestinian resistance in confronting the invasion, the LNM organized relief work, reaching approximately 30,000 families who were made homeless by the invasion. The Joint Forces have been created with steadily growing strength, witnessed by the 2 week long Katyusha attack on northern Israeli settlements last month.

CSO: 4400/6

AMBITIOUS DEVELOPMENT PLANS REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 pp 21-39

[Text]

Like all other oil states, Libya is intent on investing its wealth in industries that will lessen the national economy's dependence on oil in the medium term, and create a flourishing industrial and manufacturing base as a source of income and national wealth in the long term.

Libya is also capitalising on the particular advantages it enjoys over most other oil states, such as the presence of European markets across the Mediterranean, the ease of communications with Europe and the high quality of its 'sweet' crude.

Petrochemicals produced from this oil are pivotal to the country's future plans for expansion. The 1980-1985 Five Year Plan has a budget of Libyan dinars 18.5bn (\$62.5bn), of which light and heavy industrial development is assigned \$8.7bn. Petrochemicals takes a massive 25.3 per cent share (\$2.2bn) of this allocation, second only to metal production expenditure.

Among the petrochemical projects planned or already under way are the Methanol II plant at Marsa Brega (\$135m), Urea II, also at Marsa Brega (\$203m), a fertiliser plant at Sirte (\$338m), and the third stage of the petrochemical complex at Ras Lanuf which involves the production of aromatics, polyester and fibres (\$237m).

The Libyan planners are aiming at a 38.9 per cent growth in the coming five years. And at the heart of the country's chemical development is the Abu Kammash plant. Built by the West Germans, the project is complete but for some downstream product lines. It should be in full operation by the beginning of next year.

A Japanese company, 8 Days understands, has been awarded the contract for the third stage at Ras Lanuf. This is Japan's second large contract this year in Libya, coming on top of the one for the first stage

of the steel complex at Misrata. The building of the polyethylene plant at Ras Lanuf is already under way, and the contractors, the Anglo-US company Stone Webster, have also just won the contract to maintain it when completed.

Above even petrochemicals in the Plan, however, is metal production. By expending 31 per cent (\$2.7bn) of the Plan's industrial allocation on this, the Libyans intend to increase metal production by 60 per cent — a highly ambitious target. One of this scheme's key factories is the aluminium plant at Zuwarah, the building contract for which has just been awarded to a Yugoslav firm. The plant has a planned output of 100,000 tonnes of aluminium a year.

Existing plants for metal production include the scrap steel plant in Tripoli, the foundry and forge project at Sirte and the Misrata iron and steel complex. It is targeted that the value of Libyan metal output will increase from \$7.8m in 1980 to \$81m in 1985. The first stage of the complex at Misrata is scheduled to produce 1.26m tonnes of molten steel per year, using imported ore and locally produced gas.

Much of the metal produced will ultimately supply the manufacturing industries budgeted for in the 1980-1985 plan. By the Plan's end, work should be under way to build plant to produce aluminium cables, electricity and water meters, transformers, woodworking machinery and equipment, fluorescent lamps, trailers, metal frames for buildings and other structures, household appliances and car and truck exhaust systems.

The Libyan motor industry could also eventually become a major consumer of Libyan steel. At the moment Fiat is building a truck and bus assembly plant at Tajoura, 20km east of Tripoli. Massey Ferguson is to

build an assembly plant for 2,000 tractors a year for the Libyan Tractor Company.

The biggest deal, however, is the car plant that the Libyans want. At first this will simply be an assembly plant for parts manufactured elsewhere. But in time, like the Hindustan Company in India, Libya will be producing cars from scratch, using jigs and dies supplied by the manufacturers.

Earlier this year it looked as if Fiat was almost certain to get this plum contract. It is the obvious choice, since the Libyans already have a 15 per cent stake in the company. But in recent months Libyan planners have been making approaches to Japanese, British and German car builders. A diplomat at the British embassy confirmed to *8 Days* that British Leyland had been approached.

The first Five Year Plan taught the Libyans about over-optimistic projections. The planners have admitted that in the last plan (1976-1980), performance 'fell far short of target planned'. The aim for annual growth in the first plan was 15.8 per cent: at the end of the five years it emerged that growth had in fact run at 2.9 per cent annually.

It was also revealed that the allotted investment of \$4.1bn for the Plan had been increased by \$1.4bn. In the end only 86 per cent of all this money was spent and 70 per cent of the planned projects got under way. Therefore, one of the second Plan's top priorities is to catch up and finish uncompleted projects left over from the last one.

Industrial administration is divided into two secretariats, one each for light and heavy industry. The secretary for heavy industry, Omar Muntassa, is quite frank about the inefficiencies that caused the shortfalls in the first plan: one grave oversight was that many schemes were planned without proper preliminary studies.

Embodied in the draft of the second Plan is the firm intention for both the industry secretariats to establish a monitoring unit 'which should undertake periodical evaluation studies' and ensure that plant is being used to maximum capacity.

All public institutions have been instructed to procure maximum benefit from invested capital by playing their part in streamlining projects, and ensuring that they will fulfil their stated targets. From now on planners are enjoined to undertake 'more efficient preparation and evaluation of these studies, in order to avoid construction of new factories with built-in technological and/or economic deficiencies.'

The new Plan points to another very

important requirement that will affect industry and manufacturing. It stresses the need for the Libyan authorities to invest in human resources. While many young Libyans travel abroad for technical training of one sort or another, there are fears that there may not be sufficient qualified people. Libyanisation of projects is a reasonable enough desire. But if there are not enough trained managers, technicians and other experts, then important projects will have to remain in the hands of foreigners. While no one doubts the efficiency of these overseas personnel, the fact remains that they are doing the work for money, not out of any particular loyalty to Libya. It is admitted that, in the long run, this must be bad.

The current Plan has also admitted in as many words that Libyans are going to have to work harder. The final section of the draft plan includes the statement: 'According to the Green Book's dictum, "workers are partners, not wage-earners". It is necessary to find a more incentive-orientated system of remuneration in order to stimulate the workers' interests for higher productivity.'

How this is to be done remains to be seen. One diplomat felt that it was likely that the authorities would embark on a drive to encourage Libyan workers to be more conscious of the revolution's achievements and their partnership in it, and take a personal pride in working for new successes.

The plan also calls for the careful monitoring of all manufacturing. It points out that: 'At present there is no link between the targets of the national development plan and the operation of the basic economic units which are supposed to implement the planned targets and objectives.'

To tighten this up, the authorities are going to be calling for short- and medium-term plans from industrial enterprises as a 'prerequisite' for their success, and to make sure targets are stuck to. This means Libyan managers will have to give the secretariats to which they are responsible thorough analyses of what is happening with their plant and production lines. No one is talking about profit, which is almost an alien concept in Libya. But what the authorities do mean is that they want no more losses and no more waste.

One particular way in which they feel they can reduce this is to cut down the number of small manufacturing firms which employ less than 20 people. It is only 12 years since the Libyan revolution shot the country to prominence on the

world stage. Previously, it was the one Arab state which other Arabs dismissed. Now no assessment of the Middle East can be made without reference to Libya.

It is usually Libya's politics which hit world headlines. But there is another, equally newsworthy, side to Libya since the revolution: its rapid move towards development. Some \$62.5bn is to be spent on the second five-year plan, which began this year. Its keynote, in keeping with Colonel Qaddafi's Green Book of political philosophy, is self-sufficiency.

From this come the ambitious plans to set up local chemical and petrochemical industries — as well as a host of light industries — and to build a steel works and an aluminium smelter. Agriculture, too, is set to receive billions of dollars. The vision is quite simple: to transform what was a backward and barren land only 12 years ago, with nothing but oil to sustain it, into a thriving industrialised state capable of feeding itself without relying on imports.

Tripoli, not surprisingly, is now awash with people trying to sell what will convert these visions into reality.

Western and Far Eastern businessmen have the edge in winning Libyan contracts. There may be political difficulties with certain western governments, but Libya wants quality and will often refuse, for example, East European goods. Reflecting this, over 80 per cent of Libya's trade is with Italy, France, Japan, the UK and US, and West Germany.

There is no doubt that companies maintaining offices in Tripoli often land contracts simply because they are there on the ground. Libya is very conservative in its business dealings, and prefers to work with those it knows and trusts. There are, for instance, over 70 West German representative offices in the country which are constantly picking up new business.

In two recent examples of this, a West German turbine supplier was asked to build an Olympic-sized swimming pool and a Portuguese hydraulics firm requested to supply the structural steel for new agricultural storages. Both were firms of proven reliability who chanced to be in the right place at the right time.

The sheer scale of Libya's development plans has, of course, produced its problems. But the signs are that the new approaches are taking root in Libyan society: the public-sector supermarkets, for example, have improved remarkably.

Libya's electricity system is expanding rapidly to meet the growing demand for power. Before the revolution, Libya produced only 100MW of power. Now the country's power stations are putting out 1,200MW, and by the end of the second Five Year Plan in 1985, Libya will be generating 3,000 MW.

At the moment, the country is divided into three unlinked grids. That for Tripoli stretches from Tunisia to Bu Ghraïn, and south to the mountains. The Benghazi area runs up to the Egyptian border, and the Sabhah grid covers the south of the country.

By the end of the Five Year Plan, the three grids will have been linked into one national grid. The 3,000km of power lines needed for this are being put at the moment by the Yugoslav company energinvest, which is in equal partnership on the project with the Secretariat of Electricity. The project is costing Libyan dinars 141m (\$525m), which works out at \$175,000 per kilometre. The work is being done as quickly as possible, because upon Libya's flexibility in power generation depends the success of a great number of industrial projects that are themselves currently under construction.

The under-secretary for electricity Mohammed Agial, said: 'The rate of demand is always much higher than we plan for.'

Agial hopes that power cuts will soon become things of the past. The problem has always been balancing peak and minimum demands: Libya has no power storage facilities. At one time minimum usage used to be only 20 per cent of peak load. This consumption has now been improved to 50 per cent, but at times of lowest demand, normally between three and four in the morning, consumption is around 50 per cent.

Peak use normally comes between eight and nine at night, and it is interesting that the peak season is summer. Agial explained that this was not because of air conditioning units being switched on, but because of the extensive use of water pumps for irrigation.

As energy-guzzling heavy industrial units like the aluminium plant at Zuwarah come onstream, the new national grid will face great demands. The Zuwarah factory will need 240MW a day but since it is likely to be closed for the night, there could be a very serious waste of power, as obviously, power capacity is going to have to be increased to meet its daytime demands. The electricity Secretariat, accordingly, is trying to per-

suaide the Secretariat of Heavy Industry to work the aluminium plant with two shifts.

Among the power station, most of them oil-fired, to be built during this Five Year Plan is a 720MW plant at Zuwarah — the contracts for which are due to be awarded at the end of this year — and another 720MW unit at Zueitina, the specifications for which have not yet been issued. Prequalifications has now closed and letters of invitation to tender will be sent within the next six months.

At present the German contractor Deutsche Babcock is building four 120MW units at Homs, which will all be completed by 1985. One unit is already operating, but Agial says that the project is running behind schedule. The Homs plant, on the coast 150km east of Tripoli is, like other power stations to be built on the coast, scheduled to produce water as well as power — the unit will incorporate a desalination plant to produce 70,000 cubic metres of water a day. Eventually it is anticipated that Libya's entire domestic water supply will come from desalination, most of it produced as an ancillary process to power generation. The Tripoli West power station, with two 120MW units, one of which is already operating, will produce 450,000 cu m of desalinated water a day.

Other smaller inland power stations, like those at Tajoura and Zanzur, use gas turbines. Besides these conventional power stations, Libya is to get a nuclear power plant, although is not budgeted for in the current Five Year Plan. The 400MW nuclear station, which is to be built by the Soviet Union, comes under the Secretariat for Atomic Energy, although the power it produces will go the national grid. However, since it has not yet been decided where to site the nuclear reactor it is unlikely that this formidably complicated project will be completed before 1990 at the earliest.

One plan likely to be completed a lot sooner, within the next two years in fact, is the construction of a power line that will link Libya with Tunisia. Tunisia has its peak power use season in the winter. This means that each country will be able to exchange 150MW of power when they find their supplies are getting low. The project is budgeted at between \$55m-\$75m. The feasibility of supplying electricity to Chad is also being investigated.

While these larger plans are being considered and carried out, the electricity secretariat is concerning itself with a few smaller difficulties in Tripoli. The capital is get-

ting 3,000km of 220-volt line to update the system. Some of the city's houses are still running 120 volts.

The day the national grid comes into operation, sometime in 1985, the old national power station in Tripoli — the country's first and for a very long time its only power station — will turn off its generators, explained Agial. It will then be pulled down, because the municipality wants the site for development. Only one small portion of that plot will keep its link with electricity — for housing a small electricity substation.

Libya's future communications plans focus on decentralisation. The emphasis ever since the revolution has been to build up airports, roads and ports to meet the growing needs of the country, but even during the last plan, communications development was seen in terms of creating a basic infrastructure for those areas where the largest numbers of people were to be found. Tripoli and Benghazi consequently got more than their fair share of investment. The same applied in every other sector, except agriculture.

Under the new plan, not only is agricultural development to be intensified, but new industries are being deliberately set up in areas other than the two main cities, in the hope that by 1985 the trend of migration to the cities can be arrested, even reversed.

Even in small countries decentralisation, particularly of the means of production, needs a highly efficient communications system. In a country the size of Libya, where distances between areas of population have always been enormous, it is vital.

Before the 1969 revolution, the lack of a basic communications infrastructure was a prime factor in hampering national unity. As figures for 1970 — just a year the revolution — show, the situation was deplorable: there were just 3,000km of road. The 'international airport' at Tripoli consisted of a few old hangars, one of them serving as the terminal building. The few other airports were in a much worse state. Most population centres, no matter how isolated, had to make do with only occasional flights in, the planes being forced to land on sand strips.

Libya's maritime and air fleets were just as limited; the national carrier had three Caravelles and two Fokker Friendships, and managed to carry a grand total of 200,000 passengers a year. There were only two commercial cargo vessels of substantial

size, and three petroleum tankers.

All Libyan officials love to impress on foreigners the change in figures since the revolution and: Assistant Secretary of Communications Salim Mednini enthusiastically points out that, by 1980 ten years of massive investment had pushed up the figures to 11,000kms of roads, 240,000 telephone lines, a fleet of 30 planes for Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), including ten Boeing 727s, eight commercial vessels and 13 tankers.

For the future, with decentralisation the driving force, the goals are even more ambitious: the aim is to double these figures in the next four years. Already the contracts are going out, and the various departments implementing the projects planned by the secretariat of communications are awash with foreign businessmen eager for contracts.

Stars of the decentralisation show are a 1,300km railway network centred on the steel works being built at Misrata, and United African Airways (UAA), Libya's new second airline. Though intended primarily for cargo, the latter will probably outstrip LAA in size by the end of the plan period. Its budget over the next five years has been initially estimated at Libyan dinars 300m (\$1bn). But with plans for ten wide-bodied planes — Boeing 747s it is hoped — and talk of at least 30 other smaller planes such as 707s and either British Aerospace 146s or Fokker Fellowships, the budget could easily exceed LD500m (\$1.6bn). Equally impressive is UAA's plan to develop Sabhah airport into the largest aircraft maintenance centre in Africa.

To 'support effectively the planned growth in the economy,' as the planners put it, the development of ports is essential. Normally the harbour in Tripoli is constantly crammed with row upon row of containers full of machine tools, heavy goods vehicles, road making equipment, cement mixers, combine harvesters, cars and all equipment necessary for development.

In fact, Libya's ports have been developed systematically since the revolution, particularly Tripoli's. The problem — and it applies as much to every other sector as to the ports — is that, even before a project is complete, it is rendered inadequate because of ever-growing needs.

Crucial to any plans for decentralisation — though not as spectacular as a new railway or new ports and airports — is a comprehensive road network. Despite the enormous road building programme of the

1970s, including some impressive highways in and around Tripoli and Benghazi, officials and contractors alike regard the network as inadequate.

Contractors, for example, maintain that the lack of sufficient roads is causing costs to rocket. According to one company's estimate, it costs about \$1,000 to transport heavy equipment just 50km in areas poorly served by roads, which perhaps explains why Libya has become so single-minded about extending the network. One British consultant for example is currently involved in building 1,700km of roads.

This year alone, about half the communications secretariat's development budget of LD306m (\$1bn) will go on roads. Over 1,000km of rural roads are to be built, while a further 3,000km of existing country roads are to be improved. One stage up, the network of main roads outside the towns is to be increased by 2,000km.

Old road projects shelved some time ago are to be resurrected. One highway which runs almost to the centre of Tripoli but stops abruptly not far from the central hospital, is finally to be extended after years of delay.

The economy may be the prime moving force behind communications development, but there is no intention to forget the human factor. If people are to be encouraged to move out of Tripoli and Benghazi to the new agricultural settlement zones in the countryside or to the new towns such as Brega, Ras Lanuf, Misrata and Zintan, where the emerging industries are being located, there have to be adequate communications facilities.

Moreover, with people's expectations constantly on the rise, the facilities have to be comparable to those in Tripoli and Benghazi. Thus more local airports are planned at Sarir, Ghadames, Ras Lanuf and Brega, among others; there will be an expanded bus fleet, extended passenger services and over 35 passenger stations on the new railway network, and 390,000 more telephone lines.

Telecommunications development alone will cost LD349m (\$1.17bn) and will include a new international telephone exchange, telex facilities for Misrata, Derna and Sabhah, the upgrading of automatic exchanges and a general rehabilitation of the microwave system.

The communications planners are only too well aware that unless their efforts succeed, Libya's aim of a decentralised yet highly coordinated economy could well be jeopardised. However, all those involved

seem to proceed with the utmost confidence.

Libya's railway will undoubtedly be one of the stars of communications development over the next few years, even though proposed investment during the new plan period is only Libyan dinars 76m (\$256m).

That is a lot less than other transportation sectors are to get during the same period: airport development will receive LD135m (\$455m), while expansion of the main-road network will need a massive LD386m (\$1.3bn).

However, trains — even when pulled by today's mundane diesel engines — have a habit of catching the imagination, and Libya has not proved an exception to the rule. The director of railways and his staff happily admit they are hooked on trains.

Much of the interest shown, however, is because this is a totally new venture in transport and as such, LD76m is just the starting point. There used to be a small and colourful narrow gauge network serving Tripoli and the surrounding areas till the late 1950s, but that was ripped up by the old regime in the mistaken view that trains were a thing of the past.

The plan is for a new 1,300km standard gauge network in the western part of the country, centred round the new steel town and port of Misrata. From Misrata the line will run 210km westward to Tripoli, where High Speed Trains will carry passengers the 170km to Ras Jadir on the Tunisian border, and then up to Tunis and on to Algiers. East from Misrata the line will go to Bu Ghraïn and then south to Sabhah and the nearby iron ore mines.

The Misrata-Sabhah link, the most important section in economic terms as it will run from the steel works to the iron ore mines, will not be operational by the end of the current plan period and probably not until 1989, though contracts are expected to be awarded before the end 1983. However the other two lines, which officials estimate together will cost at least LD200m, (\$675m) should be partly operational by 1986 at the latest, but maybe even by 1985.

So far, however, planning has been split into three separate programmes: Ras Jadir-Tripoli-Misrata, and Misrata-Sabhah, each planned as if the others did not exist. Ras Jadir, according to the consultants — the Hungarian firm Tesco — will be run by 672 employees with 11 locomotives, eight maintenance and work engines, 13 passenger wagons and 550 freight wagons.

The Tripoli-Misrata line, designed by the Libyan Consulting Bureau, is officially to have 21 locomotives with another four for work and maintenance, 42 passenger wagons and 761 freight wagons. The preliminary estimates for the Misrata-Sabhah line are 2,160 employees, 18 locomotives, 11 maintenance and work (engineering) locomotives, 25 passenger and 622 freight wagons.

The railways department now feels that these figures may be too high, and so last month asked France's Sofrerail to produce a study for all three projects as a single network.

Because a rail link has been under discussion with Tunisia since the early 1970s, it will be the first of the projects to get under way; at least the 170km Libyan section will be. A line already exists from Tunis to Sfax, but it is narrow-gauge. The Tunisians plan a new standard-gauge line from the capital to the frontier, but the railway authorities in Tripoli do not expect it to be ready before the Libyan section. The contract for the latter — both for civil engineering and signalling and communications — should be awarded in the next few weeks, and work is planned to start before the end of the year.

The Indian Railway Construction Company, which submitted the lowest bid, has high hopes of getting the construction contract, and it is understood that their offer is being very seriously considered. West Germany's Philipp Holzmann, which does a massive amount of work throughout the country, is also a front-runner.

Like the rest of the planned network, the Ras Jadir-Tripoli line will initially be single track, operating with diesel engines and a design speed of 160 kph. Double tracking and overhead electrification, though preferable, are being left to the future, partly because of costs but also because of the time factor; the communications secretariat's promise is that the whole railway should be ready shortly after the Misrata steel works come on stream. The line will have 14 stations in all, including stops at Abu Kammash Zuwarah, Sabratah, Az Zawiyah and Zanzur.

As can be seen from the proposed figures on rolling stock, cargo transport is the main objective, and there will be branch lines to the new Abu Kammash chemical works, to the Az Zawiyah oil refinery and to the ports at Tripoli and Zuwarah. Preliminary forecasts for 1990 estimate cargo traffic at 3.6m tonnes annually. Not that passengers are being ignored: with 11 passenger trains running up and down the line each day, it is

estimated that 1.9m people will be using the line at the beginning of the 1990s.

The Tripoli-Misrata line is to have only ten stations, including a major one at Homs, and a branch to Misrata's port at Kasr Ahmed. There will also be a branch near the beginning of the desert line out of Misrata, for the limestone quarries at Sidadah. The main line, however, will go down about 900km to a junction at Brach, where the track then divides to Sabhah and to the iron ore loading terminal at Talut.

Although the network will be economically centred on Misrata (estimates for the year 2000 are that 12.6m tonnes of cargo — mostly iron ore for the steel works — will be moved into Misrata on the desert line alone), the main station together with the operational headquarters will be in Tripoli. A station complex is to be built 7.5km from the centre of Tripoli, and will include the operations base, a mosque, an hotel and shopping facilities. The project has already been designed by the Libyan Consulting Bureau and ten companies have been pre-qualified to bid for the contract. It is expected to be awarded before the end of the year. The administrative headquarters for the railways will be located elsewhere in Tripoli.

Nor is this the end of the story, or in this case, the line. All of eastern Libya still needs track, and it is hoped that — once Egypt returns to the Arab fold — the new Libyan network can be joined up to the Egyptian system, thereby creating a trans-north African railway. The only slight technical problem is that the Egyptian system is broad-gauge, which might involve some Egyptian rebuilding. According to the railways director, a consultancy contract will be awarded next year for feasibility studies to continue the line from Bu Ghraïn 1,300km to the Egyptian frontier, going via Benghazi.

More ambitious — should it come off it would change the political and economic face of the land-locked states of central Africa — is the proposal to continue the line from Sabhah down to Chad, to Niger and to the Central African Republic. Though still in the discussion stage, the current plan itself refers to either Misrata or Benghazi eventually becoming a 'major transshipment centre for Africa'.

Logically the choice would be Misrata — going on to Benghazi would only involve further distances — and indeed this now seems to be the official thinking.

Tripoli's Corniche has changed a lot in the last twelve years. The sea no longer laps against the walls of the old castle, which has

guarded the city since Carthaginian times: nowadays you look beyond the Italianate balustrades of the seafront out across hectares of reclaimed land to the capital's busy harbour.

At first sight all seems well. But Tripoli port is a victim of its own success. With its sister harbour at Benghazi and the brand new docks at Misrata (completed in 1978) it has been the channel through which millions of tonnes of goods have passed, much of them materials and equipment to help keep up the momentum of Libya's ambitious development plans.

The load has proved too great at times. This month Lloyd's of London has reported that queues of vessels are standing off Tripoli awaiting their turn to discharge their cargoes.

Libya's minor ports — Tobruk, Zuwarah, Derna and Brega — have been handling around 100,000 tonnes a year of general cargo each, and in 1975 all Libyan ports handled a total of 9.7m tonnes of goods. It was planned to increase port capacity to 15m tonnes by last year, but this has not happened, because of falling demand for the import of building materials.

In 1978 Misrata's 1,120 metres of quay came into operation, and the new port expansion at Tripoli added 4,100 metres of docks. Developments to other ports added 1,147 metres of docks. These schemes have brought the total cargo handling capacity of Libya's seaports to around 13.7m tonnes of dry cargo a year.

Further dock expansion has already begun: Tripoli is to get a second-stage development which will produce a third mole to encompass the two existing structures; Benghazi is being expanded to take 3.5m tonnes of cargo a year; Misrata, which at present can only handle 1m tonnes a year, is nearing the finish of a second stage which will add 3m tonnes capacity; the iron and steel works at Misrata is getting its own port, already under construction; and Tobruk, Zuwarah, Derna and Brega, although not yet earmarked for major development, are also being refurbished.

Libya is in the midst of an ambitious expansion of civil aviation, which planners hope will not only bring the country closer together but also establish it as a major transit and aircraft maintenance point on the routes into Africa.

The old tin hangar that once greeted arrivals at Tripoli airport is still standing, but nowadays passengers are passed through a modern, air-conditioned terminal built nearby. Before the 1969 revolution the

country had few main airfields. Libya's director of civil aviation, Marid Abu Zaqaq, told *8 Days* — at Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha. There were also a few wartime airstrips. Flight supervision for the whole of the country was run from Malta, that Libya could exercise no sovereignty over its airspace.

Four years after the revolution, Libya had trained enough personnel and installed sufficient equipment to take over its own air traffic control. On 1 December 1973 Libya assumed control of the airspace between latitudes 34 degrees 24 minutes and 22 degrees north.

Since then civil aviation has grown rapidly. The airport at Sebha has been brought up to international standard and can now accommodate jumbo jets. A new airport has just been completed at Ghat on Libya's southwestern border and the first phase of an airport has been built at Sarir on the oil fields. Jaghbul in eastern Libya has an airport and another is under construction at the oasis town of Ghadames on Libya's western border with Algeria.

Benghazi is to have a major new international airport including a new terminal, runway, aprons and taxi ways, all separate from the existing facilities. *8 Days* understands that the designs for this development have already been made by the Basle firm of Gesellschaft Fur Wirtschaftlichesbauen (GWB). Approaches to build the project have been made to companies in Germany, Sweden, Japan, Korea and Italy. GWB planned for the work to be done in five stages, but the Libyan civil aviation authorities obviously attach a great deal of importance to the development and are pressing for the work to be rescheduled so that it can be accomplished rather more quickly in just three stages.

A second stage development at Tripoli airport is expected to start soon. The apron is to be extended in two stages at a cost of Libyan dinars 16m (\$54m) for the first part and LD 11m (\$37m) for the second. *8 Days* has learnt that there are also plans to build a second terminal at Tripoli, the design of which is being undertaken by the British architects Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, who were responsible for the first terminal. The civil aviation authorities will use the old terminal for domestic flights and the new one, estimated to cost between LD 80m – LD 100m (\$270m – \$290m) for international passengers.

The secretariat of housing has plans to complement the development with an air-

port hotel. A hotel is also planned for the new Benghazi airport. There is also a scheme, which though not approved seems certain to go ahead, to build a second runway at Tripoli, north of the present terminal building.

At present Tripoli airport can handle 2.5m passengers a year, coping with 1,450 passenger arrivals and departures an hour at peak times. The plan is to boost capacity to 5m a year. In Benghazi the new airport will be able to cope with 1,650 people an hour during busy periods and 3.5m people in a year.

The development at Sebha is part of the plan to make Libya the gateway to Africa. There are two huge new hangars capable of accommodating some of the wider-bodied planes. These are the start of planned repair and maintenance facilities which the Libyans hope will make Sebha the major African aircraft service point.

To back up this massive expansion of facilities, Libya has an efficient air traffic control system (ATC). It is customary for pilots to criticise the failings of Greek and Moroccan air traffic control in particular, but one pilot of a Hercules transport used in Libya to lift oil rig equipment told *8 Days*: 'The Libyans are very good indeed. Traffic density isn't as high as in some of the ATC horror spots like the Adriatic but you get a great feeling of confidence with the guys they've got out here.'

ATC is backed up by flight information centres in Benghazi and Tripoli and by a network of over one hundred navigational aids, or non-directional beacons. These are being replaced by the highly sophisticated VORs (Variable Omnidirectional Range beacons). When this process is completed, says civil aviation director Marid Abu Zaqaq, 'there will be no need for us to raise the number. The feeling is that Libya will be sufficiently covered by navigational aids and facilities.'

The whole navigation system is also being linked to computer. A new ATC training institute is being built at Gebha 17km south of Tripoli, where Libyans will be taught to operate the new equipment. The institute will be able to take between 250 and 300 students.

There will be plenty of work for these people when they graduate. Ultimately the civil aviation authorities intend to build paved runways wherever they think there is a need. Some, like that at Hun in the Kufra area have already been constructed. There is also an airstrip and passenger facilities at

Bani Walid, 200km to the south of Tripoli, and at Nalut and Ubari, west of Sebha. Design contracts have been signed with the British company Scott Wilson for new airports at Ras Lanuf and Brega. Within a few years, with all this development air travel is going to be the rule not the exception in Libya.

To move passengers around this network of airports, Libyan Arab Airlines is to be joined by a new Libyan carrier, United African Airlines (UAA). At present Libyan Arab Airlines operates ten Boeing 727s, seven turboprop Fokker Friendship F27s and a single Boeing 707 cargo variant which wears the all-white livery of a subsidiary, Libyan Arab Cargo. Eight more Fokker Friendships are to be delivered in 1982 and the company also has ten European Airbuses on order. Libyan Arab had also bought and paid for three Boeing 747s but Washington vetoed their supply, claiming that they could be used for military purposes. The airline was forced to sell the jumbos to South America.

The Airbuses, two of which will be all cargo, are to be powered by General Electric CF 26 engines built in France under licence from the US. This avoids Washington's ban on Pratt and Whitney engines which are the most common power plant for the Airbus. Libyan Arab are also considering the purchase of the new British-built, highly fuel efficient short haul jet the BAE 146. Airline officials already have models of the plane decked out in Libyan Arab livery.

United African Airlines will complement Libyan Arab's operations. Its operational base will be Tripoli, but its maintenance home will be Sebha where it will also undertake work on planes from Libyan Arab and other international airlines. It is understood that UAA intends to fly a large fleet of Boeings. UAA planes will run a 70 per cent cargo service and ultimately the company could have a fleet of over 40 aircraft.

The need for air cargo capacity in Libya is now great. British Caledonian, which operates five passenger flights a week between Tripoli and London, is also authorised to make five cargo runs a week as well. However, so great has been the demand for air cargo space that in recent months, 8 Days understands that the Scottish airline has been making an average of a flight a day. A company spokesman admitted that the Libyan trips for both passengers and freight were one of the airline's most profitable routes.

Expansion of air travel is central to plans to decentralise the economy. In the early days of oil in the 1960s there was considerable movement of people away from the countryside into the cities. Because jobs and wealth seemed to be concentrated in towns, agriculture and the whole structure of rural life suffered as people sought better work away from the land. The new air network with its small feeder airports will help Libyan efforts to reverse this trend.

Housing construction in Libya has slowed down markedly in the last year, simply because the goal to give everyone a roof over their head set in 1969 has been largely met.

In the days of King Idris, 40 per cent of the population lived in tents or shanty towns. Now there is a roof for everyone. But work continues to improve the housing stock and iron out anomalies in the housing system. One problem has been that housing was allocated only to married couples. It was assumed that young people would live with their families until they married. The wrinkle in this concept showed up as young men were sent to work in jobs away from their home towns. There was no temporary housing for them and many have had to live in hotels. The authorities' solution is to embark upon a building programme of studio flats to house these people.

The Libyans are also increasing their housing stock by 30,000 homes a year to add 150,000 units by 1985. Libya, with a population of just 3m, has one of the highest growth rates in the world and planners believe that the number of citizens will reach 4m in four years' time. The hope is that as the number of people increases, Libya will be able to spread its population throughout its huge territory. Therefore seven new cities and 15 villages are planned. The cities will be at Zintan, near Gharyan, south of Tripoli, Medina al Wasit, in the middle of Libya, Sarir by the oilfields in East Libya, Brega, Ras Lanuf and Misrata.

Eighty per cent of housing in Libya is built by co-operatives and individuals. The co-ops register with a central office, draw up plans for their homes, normally flats, get the plans approved and then go to the housing bank for interest-free loans. The local municipal housing committee then awards the building contracts.

The Libyans are also taking a greater interest in the quality of architecture. By and large no one regrets the passing of such ornate architectural creations as the Grand

and Mehari hotels, which are seen as the symbols of the Italian occupation. But there is a growing awareness of the value of indigenous architecture. Housing Secretariat officials such as the under-secretary, Abdurrahman Tir, point to a new trend to encourage traditional styles of building, adapted to modern standards.

One manifestation of this new architectural consciousness is the scheme, still under discussion, to rehabilitate Tripoli old town. 'We are trying to keep it as it is,' said Tir, 'but it will need time.'

However, although house building has slowed down compared with the frenzied activity of the past decade, there still remains much construction work to be done, most of which will be done by foreign firms. There are 52 national building companies working on various projects, but these are heavily outnumbered by the 300 foreign construction companies that are registered in Libya. Another 200 foreign firms are waiting to be registered.

The hotels are full of foreign consultants. At the moment the lion's share, around 70 per cent, of all consultancy work goes to British firms. The actual building work goes to West German, Italian, Korean and Turkish companies in particular. Within the past few days the West German company, Philip Holzman, which built Tripoli's water system, has been awarded a contract to build a conference centre and village for the 250 OAU delegates who will hold their annual conference in Tripoli next July. Libya will hold the presidency of the OAU during 1982.

Contracts are awarded in Libya in one of three different ways — traditional open competition, closed competition among invited companies and finally direct approach, normally to the Libyan office of a registered foreign firm. This last method is quite frequent for relatively simple works. A company that has done one job well is generally rewarded with more work.

Once a contract has been signed, foreign contractors still face a number of particular problems in Libya. For a start they share with Libyan firms the problem of labour. 'There isn't any,' said one contractor. A senior planning official in the Secretariat of Housing confirmed this. 'Labour is our biggest problem,' he said. There is no unemployment in Libya, so the construction industry has large numbers of foreign labourers. Much of the work is undertaken away from the towns, often in the desert. This poses great logistical problems for construction

companies, whether Libyan or foreign.

One construction man told *8 Days*: 'Most of the work is where people are not.' Building a desert road to an airport site highlights the problems. The planned route was extremely difficult. The construction crews had to transport their equipment and the buildings in which they were to live 600km south of Tripoli. While the work was in progress the firm had to take in supplies daily as well as bring crews out for rest periods and take new men in. 'It costs a lot to keep men in the desert,' said the construction man. The road needed 100 tonnes of bitumen every day. Libya does not yet produce its own bitumen so the tar had to come in through Brega.

But despite such logistical problems, foreign companies are still queuing up for work. In February this year Libya had \$13bn in foreign currency and gold reserves. Although this has probably fallen with the demand for Libya's high-priced oil, officials are confident that the country is well able to meet its existing commitments and take on more projects without any trouble, even if the present oil glut continues for another year.

One way that the Libyan authorities have sought to avoid paying out too much foreign currency is to offer companies contracts in which they would be paid for their work with oil. This barter arrangement is available for contracts worth as little as LD12m (\$40m). One German subsidiary of Krupps is understood to have agreed such a contract with the Secretariat of Electricity last month. Apparently Krupp is taking a drop in profits of around three per cent. *8 Days* understands that other barter deals are being negotiated.

At the moment, Libyan companies take 25 per cent of the contracting work in their country. This capacity is going to increase as more local companies, referred to in Libya as 'establishments', are created each year. Libya is also seeking to become as independent as possible in building materials. The second Five Year Plan makes the point that the country has abundant supplies of raw materials such as dolomite, limestone, silica and gypsum. Cement production has increased from 700,000 tonnes in 1976 to 2.1m tonnes last year. The Homs II cement factory, with a production capacity of 2.5m tonnes a year is to make Libya completely self-sufficient in cement. There are plans to expand cement works to produce special prefabricated cement products, as well as plants to produce lime, glassware, bricks

and sanitary ware.

Libya has a long way to go before it can entirely replace foreign construction expertise with its own people, but the basis for the takeover is there.

With export earnings dropping this year back to their 1979 level while imports rose by 22 per cent, Libya is studying carefully its financial options to guarantee the full implementation of its \$62.5bn five year plan.

At a time of increased administrative responsibilities in Chad, the squeeze may toughen through 1982 with prospects of continued sluggish world oil demand and mounting pressure from fellow Opec members in Africa, such as Nigeria, desperate to recoup their share of the market at almost any price.

By slashing petrodollar income by around 50 per cent during the second half of 1981, the glut may easily cost \$7bn to \$8bn in lost income to the Jahamiriya. Total earnings are not expected to exceed \$15bn, against administrative and development outlays of the same magnitude in the civilian sector.

Contingency plans are already being drawn up. Rajeb Missellati, governor of the Central Bank, outlined what he sees as the main options open to Libya to cushion the effects of the oil glut:

- Dip into government reserves, which are now more than \$14bn. The law provides that each year, the Secretariat of Treasury must set aside 30 per cent of its oil income in a specially-designed reserve fund held in a Libyan Dinar account at the Central Bank. Those accumulated funds are now running at well over half of the country's total reserves perhaps about \$10bn. With a total import bill of \$10bn expected this year and civilian and military expenditures that will easily outpace petrodollar earnings, the secretariat will hardly be able to meet the 30 per cent target in 1981. So far, however, there has been no withdrawal. But during the two previous gluts in 1975 and 1978, in addition to shaving its prices, Libya was forced to slice 36 per cent and 20 per cent respectively off its total reserves. 'Of course, if we are facing a temporary cash flow problem, we will resort to our reserves. Isn't that what reserves are for?'

- It may also choose to tap the domestic capital market, first because the outstanding public debt is minimal — less than 10 per cent of the national budget this year — and secondly because the domestic banking system's liquidity remains very high after drastic measures since last year to cut down

money supply by a third to LD800m (\$2.7bn). Idle funds are now estimated to be about 50 per cent of total liabilities among the five commercial banks, a staggering figure which includes the non interest-bearing 15 per cent reserves deposited at the Central Bank. Libyan sources indicate that such a pool would amount to LD3bn or just over \$10bn.

- The Treasury could also turn to the international capital markets. 'Sure enough, instead of doing barter agreements, I would much prefer going on the international markets. I don't say we will but if needed, we'll do it. We have never been to that market before and we think we can get a lot of money there,' says Missellati. Indeed, Libya would certainly rate among the best credit risks in the world with total liabilities vis-a-vis commercial banks of the top 14 industrialised countries amounting to \$686m last year.

- 'We can also improve our tax collection,' says Missellati, who admits it is 'not very strict'. By Opec standards, Libya's is among the highest income tax rates for both companies and individuals. For any registered venture, foreign or domestic, a 60 per cent flat rate is slapped on earnings exceeding LD150,000 (\$500,000) with an additional 4 per cent special 'Palestinian tax'. Moreover, since June the authorities have tightened social security tax collection which, in terms of contributions, can easily reach 8.75 per cent on an LD100,000 (\$337,000) monthly payroll.

The sharp appreciation of the dollar, at a rate of 29 per cent on an arithmetical basis from July 1980 to June 1981 against nine currencies originally included in Opec's long term pricing strategy has obviously been a great comfort for the Central Bank. Since the dinar is pegged to the dollar, Libya's purchasing power has increased by 16 per cent against IMF Special Drawing Rights.

Missellati estimates that for goods and services, this enhanced buying power has grown by more than by 29 per cent. The Italian lira dropped by more than 40 per cent against the dollar — and therefore against the dinar, especially fortunate for Libya as Italy is its main trading partner.

Libya is to invest \$9.1bn in agricultural development during the next four years. This will be the largest single amount that any sector is getting under the 1981-1985 development plan, and Libya hopes that this time agricultural output will rise substantially. At the moment, about 50 per

cent of food consumed is imported, a situation the authorities find both economically unnecessary and politically insecure. The goal — one close to Qaddafi's heart — is self-sufficiency. Not for nothing is the revolution called 'green'.

Agricultural output is intended to rise by an annual 8.5 per cent. Assistant Planning Secretary Bashir Salama has every confidence that it will do so, and that there will be no repetition of the last plan's disappointments. The planned agricultural growth per year for that was nearly 16 per cent, but in the event, it was around three per cent. This was, according to Salama, partly because of adverse weather, and partly because land development projects got behind schedule. These have now been completed so, with less ambitious targets, there is, he believes, no reason why they should not be achieved.

The face of Libyan agriculture has changed beyond all recognition in the past 10 years. The coastal strip around Tripoli, and the Jebel Akhdar (Green Mountain) area behind Benghazi, are still highly important in terms of production, though they are now being completely reorganised and extended. However, they are no longer the only areas of major production: equally important now are the Gefara Plain and the Solul al Khadra zones, respectively southwest and southeast of Tripoli, the Sarir and Kufra areas in the west and a string of projects in the Fezzan.

So important are these new projects that around \$3m is being invested in them during the current plan. That is \$400m more than during the last plan, and accounts for nearly a third of all agricultural spending in the next four years.

The change is the result of a comprehensive strategy for land use worked out in the 1970s by the agricultural planners and based on two factors: first and foremost water resources — from which can be assessed the most suitable crops to grow — and secondly, the proposed land tenure — public establishments or individual farmers. So far the only rule of thumb is that, because of the massive area required, cereals should be in the public sector.

As in all arid countries, water in Libya is too precious a commodity to waste. Not unnaturally, therefore, it influences all agricultural planning.

The availability and quantities of water have been systematically worked out so as to use it to best effect. For example, areas with over 200mm of rainfall are to be reserved for dry farming — usually cereals

and olive plantations — while those with rainfall from 200mm to 15mm will be used for irrigated farming — vegetables, animal fodder, fruit trees — and below that for grazing, pastures and forests.

The Secretariat of Agriculture has been able to work out from this basis what Libya's total cultivable land resources are, at least in terms of dry farming, pasture and forestry. According to Ahmed Gartaa, who is in charge of planning, it gives Libya a total of 600,000 hectares for cereal use on dry farms, and 13m hectares for grazing, pasture and forestry.

Irrigated land, however, is more difficult to work out. The yardstick of 15mm to 200mm does not take into account those areas of minimal rainfall that can be irrigated either by using local sources of underground water, or water piped in from elsewhere. Altogether, it is intended to raise the figure of irrigated land from the current 180,000ha to at least 220,000ha by 1985.

The planners' next step is to decide who is going to do the farming: public establishments or individual farmers. Development schemes are planned either as production or settlement projects; the former for large state farms usually producing cereals, though it could just as well be sheep or cattle rearing, and the latter for division into small units on which to settle individual farmers and their families. These come free, though the size is dictated by the type of farming involved. If all irrigated, then the smallholding may well be only six hectares. A dry farm, on the other hand, could be 15ha or even 30ha. The yardstick is that each family should have an income of at least Libyan dinars 3,000 (\$10,000) a year.

Further to the west is the Maqnusa production project, with its vast and apparently endless green circles of cereals looking as if they have just dropped onto the desert. Installed and managed by the General Food Corporation of Seattle, each is 80ha in size and irrigated by a giant revolving sprinkler system. The system has so impressed the Libyans that it is now accepted as the basic means of irrigation for future production projects, and there is a plan in hand to open a factory in the country to produce the equipment.

Such equipment is vital to agricultural development. Just as there is cooperation with the Secretariat of Electricity to desalinate water, the Secretariat of Light Industry is moving to set up the necessary factories.

The Libyan Tractor Company already assembles 2,000 Massey Ferguson tractors

a year, and it has just been agreed that the Libyan company can start manufacturing certain parts for the two models it assembles, eventually with a view to producing Massey Fergusons under licence.

Another series of measures to conserve water in the Tripoli belt are being considered, such as the possible use of greenhouses for growing vegetables, controlling the supply of water to the plants. At present only 40ha are under glass, but contracts have been signed recently to increase this by 100ha.

There is also a feeling in the Agricultural Secretariat that the water problem should diminish substantially by 1985, at least for the area surrounding Tripoli, when the two desalination plants planned for Tajoura, east of Tripoli, and Zanzur, to the west, come on stream. Altogether they should produce 450,000 cu m of water a day, which should take care of the area's domestic and industrial demands. There are also plans to recycle waste water for agricultural use, and some such projects are already in operation, like the Hadba al Khadra pilot scheme on the outskirts of Tripoli. As yet, however, the system of reusing waste water is still in its infancy.

It is more simple just to take the water from where it is abundant — the south — and pipe it to where it is needed, which is what the planners have decided to do. There will be two pipelines from the south-east, each capable of carrying 1m cu m of water a day, up to the coast.

The first will run from Tazerbo near Kufra, where there is plenty of water, north to near the Sarir oil fields, where the second line will start, and from there both will go up to the coast south of Benghazi. There the lines will divide, one going to provide water for the Benghazi region, and the other to supply the region between Agedabia and Sirte.

Even the number of water wells to be sunk seems massive: 270, 150 of them in Sarir, the rest in Tazerbo. When complete, it should be possible to irrigate an extra 40,000ha in the Benghazi region and some 15,000ha west of Agedabia. At least one of the pipes should be operating by 1985, putting water into Benghazi, and allowing the development of at least 10,000ha in the area.

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH SINCE REVOLUTION DETAILED

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 1 Sep 81 pp 16, 17

[Text]

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT has been accorded the highest priority by the Libyan Jamahiriyah's planners ever since the Revolution of September 1, 1969. The strategy was clearly spelled out by the Secretariat of Planning last year: 'The fundamental task of manufacturing industries consists in responding to the ever increasing extent of growing domestic demand for different kinds of industrial products, and through import substitution and export expansion, in supplementing and eventually replacing oil as a predominant export commodity and earner of foreign exchange.'

BUT IMPORT substitution and export expansion are not the only aims of our industrial development. Revolutionary thinking in the Libyan Jamahiriyah, has always stressed that political independence is unattainable without a parallel independence in the economy. Any country relying heavily on the outside world for essential manufactured products is open to a variety of blackmail operations that slowly erode political independence as well. As a socialist country, the Revolution's drive for industrialisation also shows its commitment to the well-being of our citizens in every field, and the provision of adequate employment opportunities is seen as a central tenet of policy.

Industrial development in Libya can be divided into two main categories: light industry and heavy industry. The former aims at achieving the goal of import substitution by the creation of factories producing foodstuffs, electrical goods, machinery and the like, while heavy industry, essentially involved with petrochemicals, iron and steel, seeks to produce the new exports. Since the Revolution, heavy industry has formed the back-bone of the Libyan Jamahiriyah's industrial development programme. Both oil and non-oil sectors have a major role to play and with the strategy that crude oil should be used as an industrial raw material rather than as a straight export, the

development of petroleum products and petrochemical industries has so far received a major slice of investment allocations.

Traditionally, oil was sold cheaply to the northern industrialised countries, who then transformed it and sold the various end products of the industry back to the southern countries at exorbitant prices. The development of a local petrochemical industry cuts out that spurious

middle-man, producing excellent and cheap goods for the home market. Beyond supplying the needs of the country, the industry also aims at eventually selling 80 per cent of its petrochemical and petroleum production abroad. Hence the factories established since the Revolution often have output capacities well in excess of what would be required to meet only the needs of our domestic market. Western comments, often snide, at what they call 'over-extension' or overambition, usually coupled with allegations of 'throwing petrodollars out of the window' are far off the mark, and not only show a biased Eurocentric view of things, but also analytical shortcomings as they do not take into account the Libyan Jamahiriya's long-term planning.

Heavy Industry

In the heavy industry sector, just as in agriculture, much attention has been devoted to a number of key projects, whose realisation also provides the basis for new industrial cities. In June, 1980 the foundation stone was laid for town housing, initially for 40,000, as Ras Lanuf on the Gulf of Sirte, where a refinery and methanol and urea plants are being built. Other petrochemical plants are to follow later including a complex producing aromatics and fibres such as polyester. New generation polypropylene technology is to be used at the 68,000 tonnes per annum capacity new plant, acquired by Azzawiya Refinery Company under licence.

Other schemes at the Ras Lanuf complex, include a 220,000 barrel a day oil refinery currently under construction; a project to supply 52,000 tonnes per year monoethylene glycol plant, whose products will be used by a 60,000 tonnes per

annum low density polyethylene plant and a high density plant of similar capacity. With such industries, Ras Lanuf will undoubtedly become our country's petrochemical city.

Further to the West, about 170 kilometres on the road to Tripoli, another new industrial city is planned around the town of Misurata. By the end of the century Misurata could well have a population of a quarter of a million, easily making it our third city. Misurata's development is centred around a project that is easily the Revolution's most ambitious in the heavy industry sector, the construction of an iron and steel works. When the first stage is completed in 1987, output is planned to exceed a million tonnes a year, and this stage alone will cost Libyan Dinars 1 billion. The plant is to supply steel for our future industries as well as, hopefully, for export. Initially the iron ore will have to be imported, but even there self-sufficiency is the order of the day, and once mines in the south of the country are developed and a railway built, Libya will use its own ore.

To the West of Tripoli, the towns of Zawia and Zuara are already in the process of expanding because of new industries, primarily the oil refinery at Zawia and the Abu Kammash chemical plant near Zuara. Just as the Misurata steel works will dominate the industrial development scene until 1985, Abu Kamash was the star between 1976-1980. The plant is one of the most modern in the world, and certainly the most sophisticated in Africa. Earlier this year two major contracts for petrochemical projects at Marsa Brega, on the Gulf of Sirte were announced, assuring the town's future as one of the three foci of the Libyan Jamahiriya's rapidly growing petrochemical sector. One of the

new plants will produce 1,750 tonnes of urea a day, and should be completed within 34 months. The other contract was for a 1,000 tonnes a day methanol plant to be completed in late 1983.

There already are two urea plants at Marsa Brega, with a combined capacity of 2,000 tonnes per day. The port town also has a methanol plant of 1,000 tonnes per day and an ammonia plant of identical capacity. A second ammonia plant is currently under construction. The petrochemicals complex draws its raw materials from the Hatabai gas field deep in the Sahara. At Zuara a 170,000 tonnes per annum petroleum coke plant will be built. The plant includes a distillation plant, a catalytic cracking unit, a liquefied petroleum gas recovery unit and associate utilities. Its output of calcinated coke will be used in 100,000 tonnes per year aluminium smelter to be built at Zuara. Power for the smelter will come from fuel gas from the coke plant, whose by-products will include gasoline and fuel blend stocks.

Light Industry

But this emphasis on heavy industry in no way means that light industry has been forgotten, on the contrary: it is a prerequisite for a flourishing industrial sector, independent of foreign imports. In May this year a statement by the General People's Committee for Planning revealed that 44 new factories were to be set up shortly. Of these, 14 will be for chemicals and petrochemicals; ten will be for food processing, four for timber and paper, four for building materials and five for textiles and leather goods.

With the evergrowing need for new houses, let alone offices, hospitals, radio stations, ports,

New projects listed in the 1981-85 plan

CHEMICALS

Soap (Zanzour)
 Soap (Banghazi)
 School bags (Tripoli)
 Travel bags (under study)
 Plastic slippers (under study)
 Polyvinyl sheets (Abu Khammash)
 Magnesia (Abu Khammash)
 Vinyl Tiles (Abu Khammash)
 Chemical complex (Marada, under study)
 Phosphate fertilisers (under study)

BUILDING MATERIALS

Cement factory (Sebha)
 Cement factory (Western Jamahiriya)
 Export cement factory
 Lime factory
 Light bricks plant (Souk el Khamis)

Sand bricks plant (Souk el Khamis)
 Red bricks plant (Sebha)
 Refractory bricks plant
 Eternite sheets (Zanzour)
 Sanitary ware (Gharian, new)
 Sanitary ware (Gharian, extension)
 Wall tiles (Gharian, extension)
 Chalk production (Tripoli)

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

Refinery (Ras Lanuf, 2nd stage)
 Refinery (Misurata)
 Refinery (Mursuk)

PETROCHEMICALS

Methanol II (Marsa Brega)
 Urea II (Marsa Brega)
 Fertiliser (Sirta)
 Petrochemical complex (Ras Lanuf, 3rd stage, aromatics, polyester, fibres)

METALLURGY

Aluminium complex (Zuara, under study)

METALWORK, ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

Metal cans (Sabaa)
 Metal structures
 Metal containers
 Different aluminium products
 Aluminium cables (Zuara)
 Metal houses
 Dry batteries (Tajoura)
 Electrical transformers assembly
 Water pumps
 Household appliances (under study)
 Car assembly (under study)

Source: Draft Plan,
 Secretariat of Planning, Tripoli

factories and a host of other buildings necessary to the well functioning of a modern industrialised society, there has naturally been a high demand for cement and other building materials. In 1980 a new cement works was inaugurated at Khoms, on the coast east of Tripoli, which will have a production capacity of one million tonnes per annum. Established at a cost of LD 60 million, the Khoms works employs 300 producers and its estimated revenue is 13 million dinars per annum.

Feverish activity

The foundation stone of a LD 52.5m cement factory was laid at Zitan also in 1980. This too will have a capacity of one million tonnes per annum. At the same time another cement works was inaugurated at the Zawia oil refinery. This is a smaller project with a production capacity of 100,000 tonnes a year. Given this feverish activity, it is not surprising that in 1979 cement production had surpassed the previous year's level by 23 per cent, having increased from 1.3 to 1.6 million tonnes. This figure was nearly equalled during the first nine months of 1980, and it is by now

clear that self-sufficiency in cement will be achieved before the proposed date of 1985.

But cement is only one example among many to show the success of the Libyan Jamahiriya's industrial sector. Our healthy oil revenues, and the fact that the industrial sector was so poorly developed at the time of the Revolution, have meant that it has been possible to establish the most modern plants in a wide range of light industrial sectors. Between 1969 and the beginning of 1979 58 factories were established, making products ranging from food to textiles, from leather to glass and metal goods. Between 1975 and 1978 an average of ten new light industrial plants opened each year.

The new Cargi cigarette factory in Tripoli, opened in late 1979, typifies the high technical standards of these establishments in our country. The factory, which has 1,000 producers was designed and constructed within a three-year period. The complex includes not only the plant itself but a small hospital, an ultra modern mosque, sports club, supermarket and guest house. All the buildings are set in parklands

of lawns and fountains. The plant itself has a capacity to produce between 15 and 20 million cigarettes an hour, which will more than satisfy demand within Libya itself. Export markets, especially in Africa, are being sought for the new Libyan cigarettes. The plant was described as 'the best plant in the world', by a western broker who pointed to the mix of the best equipment from a range of countries — the UK, Germany and Italy, and the use of tobacco from an equally wide range of sources — Brazil, Greece, the United States, and home grown.

Ultra modern

Similarly ultra-modern light industrial complexes are currently under construction elsewhere in Libya. Among these is a textile complex at Beni Walid with a production capacity of 620,000 square metres of non-woven, and 250,000 square metres of woven carpets and 400,000 rugs annually. Food-processing industries are also witnessing rapid development. In Khoms a major project is under construction involving a fully automated

plant for the production of industrial and medical alcohol, vinegar and dry bakery yeast. In September 1980 a flour mill complex opened near Tobruk, including five grain silos with a total storage capacity of 10,000 cubic metres and an hourly production of 18,500 kilos of flour. Flour, the basis of bread, couscous and pasta, will be produced at a self-sufficiency level by 1985.

Other commodities which should reach near sufficiency by 1985 include animal feeds (70 per cent sufficiency), cotton textiles (82 per cent), leather (76 per cent) and lime (94 per cent). Though such heights may not be reached in other commodities, their planned effect on the import bill in 1985 is just as startling. By then, for example, our country will be producing 56 per cent of the tractors used, 23 per cent of buses, and 12 per cent of trucks. Nearly all the factories producing these goods were planned or started between 1979-1980. However, one of the best examples of how our light industry has developed in the past few years, given that it started almost from scratch, is the enormous textile factory at Zawia. Not only has it given jobs to hundreds of people from the area, but its products — printed cottons of varying qualities — can be seen in our shops throughout the country, replacing imported materials.

The growing significance the Revolution places on light industry was highlighted by the production figures for the first half of 1980. The value of production had risen to LD 57 million while in most enterprises output was up by 120-216 per cent in real terms over the corresponding period in the two previous years. The detailed sectoral production figures reveal the breadth of the Libyan Jamahiriya's light industrial base: milk production, 19 million litres; flour, 110,000 tonnes; feedstuffs, 130,000 tonnes; aluminium piping, 14,000 ton-

nes; plastic piping, 5,200 tonnes; bricks, 40,000 tonnes; shoes, over 2 million pairs; skins, 1,960,000 square feet; shoe leather, 845,000 tonnes; ready to wear men's suits, 152,000; macaroni 55,300 tonnes; spun wool yarn, 360,000 tonnes; tinned foods, 18,420 tonnes; and furniture, both school and domestic, 65,250 items.

Side by side with the expansion of the industrial sector in the Libyan Jamahiriya has gone a parallel increase in the availability of facilities for the acquisition of industrial skills. By 1978 there were six industrial education institutes, capable of giving information to over 3,000 students a year. In 1969, prior to the Revolution, only 423 students received industrial training. In addition to the six institutes, there were two centres for industrial training, offering instruction at a higher level. On top of this the Revolution enables our citizens to avail themselves of any required training overseas, at public expense.

The various developments that have taken place in the industrial sector in the Libyan Jamahiriya indicate that a real industrial revolution has been achieved. But this achievement did not happen in the more or less chaotic and exploitative fashion it happened in the northern countries last century: the precepts of the Libyan Revolution ensured that these developments followed a socialist line. The motto underlying the need for industrial self-sufficiency is stated in *The Green Book*: 'The liberty of man is not complete if his needs are controlled by others. Need inhibits freedom.'

A central proposition of the Third Universal Theory relates to the status of the worker, and is thus extremely relevant to the industrial sector. This proposition shows how wage-labour is essentially a form of exploitation,

as a factory owner employing workers will do everything in his power to keep labour costs low so as to maximise profits. In Libya therefore the revolutionary slogan defining the working environment is 'Partners not wage-earners'. This is central to light industry, as those establishments range from large complexes to small family units employing four or five people.

The General People's Committee for Light Industry has therefore worked out a series of rules which govern the setting up and the running of light industrial establishments. These rules ensure that ownership of the industrial establishment is equally divided between the producers who work in the said establishment, and the income from production is distributed between the producers, each according to his contribution in the production process. This means, in effect, that the traditional exploitative structure still dominant in most industrialised countries has been abolished and that the workers are in the true sense of the word 'partners'.

Thirty years ago Libya was officially described by the United Nations as one of the poorest countries in the world, a description that was all too apparent to those who visited the country at the time. Today, the Libyan Jamahiriya is on the way to becoming an industrial nation, which can look forward to a bright, revolutionary future.

SPECULATION ON ITALIAN IMPORT PAYMENTS IN LIRA

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 233, 8 Aug 81 pp 41-42

[Article by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil: "Libya's Initiative, Between Italian Friendship and American Impossibility"]

[Text] At the end of June, an official in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's embassy in Rome quoted some information, indicating that the Jamahiriya had proposed to Italy that it pay for its Libyan oil imports in Italian lira, instead of dollars.

A few days after this information was reported through some of the media, which did not give it its due, in terms of exceptional, or even ordinary, interest, it became apparent that that information was derived from a statement by Mr Musbah al-Safrfali, secretary of the Federation of Banks and Insurance Companies in the Jamahiriya. It later became evident that al-Safrfali's statement, about selling Libyan oil to Italy an Italian lira instead of dollars, might not express an official position of the Libyan authorities. It might be merely an idea, a proposal or a wish. Doubt regarding reaching a decisive position in this regard, became mixed with the attention, which this information had produced among the Italian authorities, to such a degree that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested its embassy in Libya to officially ask the Libyan government whether it was in fact prepared to consider accepting Italy's payment for its imports of Libyan oil in lira instead of dollars.

So far, neither the Libyan authorities nor the Italian authorities have issued any action or information or any indication that the matter is true, or that the two countries intend to pursue this plan, or that they are engaged in studying its formula, advantages or its provisions with respect to them both. The subject might be looked at from two angles:

The first angle concerns both Libya and Italy, and their mutual relations.

Libya is considered the main, primary source of Italian crude oil imports. Italian imports of Libyan oil, in 1980, amounted to about 11 million tons, totalling about \$3 billion. In consideration of 1981's rise in the dollar's exchange rate to the Italian lira, and toward other currencies, this would mean Italy bearing a heavier burden and additional pressure on its currency, which would have a negative reflection on many of the pertinent economic indicators. If Libya accepted or approved of reducing the value of its crude oil exports to Italy, this would mean Libya's

sharing in lessening the burden on Italy, and a positive role by Libya in improving the Italian cash flow, in a way that would reflect on the entire Italian economy.

Naturally, Libya's acceptance of that would require mutual understanding about the details of a specific monetary formula, by which the price of crude oil exported to Italy could be determined in lira, so that the positive agreement with respect to Italy would not reflect negatively on Libya. However, agreement on that could be a means or channel for increased expansion in the economic and technological relations between Italy and Libya, and consequently, a larger role for Italian firms in the development of technological and production capabilities of the Libyan economy. This, at least, could be the price that Libya would require, and which for Italy could lead to satisfaction and contentment.

Of course, arriving at such a formula as this for Libya and Italy could only upset the U.S., as a leader in the international monetary system, and as the home of the dollar, which is considered the principal and overwhelming currency in terms of reserves and in international commercial intercourse, and as one of the United States' tools to maintain its economic (and political-military) dominance over the non-Communist world, or rather even over the Communist world many times.

The United States' distress at this action--if it should come about--would not be only with Italy and Libya's rebellion alone, against the principle of pricing and paying for oil in dollars. On the contrary, there would also be the possibility that this Italian-Libyan rebellion, against "American dominance" in the field of international finance, could be the start of a rebellion by other nations from the oil-producing "camp" and from the importing "camp," as well as the start of a rebellion by other nations from the "camps" of the developing nations, which export raw materials, along with other nations who import these raw materials. The Italian-Libyan rebellion, at that time, would be the start of a serious and effective rebellion of the entire world against the monetary (and non-monetary) dominance of the United States over the world.

This is the second angle, from which this subject could be viewed, and which is of concern not only to Italy and Libya, but also concerns every nation of the Third World, and every nation of the Second (Communist) World, including the nations of Western, Northern and Central Europe that complain, albeit timidly, about their subservience to the First World (the United States), except that the Second and Third Worlds share a common interest with it, in terms of the dollar and the owner of the dollar.

If the United States were to endeavor on all levels to prevent the conversion of any idea, such as this one between Italy and Libya, into reality (if it began to be converted, or there was an intent to do so), and if the United States, in order to prevent that, were to use everything it has, in terms of economic, diplomatic and military "weapons", starting with its NATO relations with Italy, since its Sixth Fleet is permanently based in Naples, and ending with using Sadat's Egypt and its threats against Libya, then the question is, why has it not yet begun? Why doesn't a movement toward some kind of rebellion begin now against American monetary dominance, by those who suffer from it, by the whole world that complains about direct or indirect American dominance?

Is the Third World waiting for something more unjust than what America bestowed upon it at independence, a constant superiority that does not impart any short or long-term justice? If the Communist World is bound in all this to Moscow's position, which sets their positions and policies, in accordance with its capability to polarize and divide through conciliation and controversy with the United States, then why does Western Europe, suffering under "the dollar's policies," expect more than the negative answers, which it heard from Reagan's mouth, before, during and after the recent summit conference of the seven major industrial powers in Ottawa?

Is the whole world unable to get rid of this dominance and despotism, which the United States practises, except that, by means of them, it is able to neither rule the world justly, nor to control the world, which complains about the excesses and abuses of power?

7005

CSO: 4504/65

LIBYA

BRIEFS

INDIAN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT--New Delhi, September 14--The state-owned Indian company National Buildings Construction Corporation (NBCC) has secured another 222 million U.S. dollars' contract in Libya for the construction of roads, public buildings and houses, the ECONOMIC TIMES daily said today. Current Corporation projects in Libya include New Ghat airport project, Brak airport, planning and designing of 2,000 houses, construction of 500 houses at Al-Orban, a 120-bed hospital at Ghat and school building at Ghat and Beniwalid. [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2828, 15 Sep 81 p 13]

CSO: 4500/6

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CIVIL DEFENSE DECREE

Nouakchott JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE DE MAURITANIE in French
No 542-543, 25 Feb 81 pp 119-225

[Ministry of Interior Decree No 80-087 of 2 May 1980, concerning the general regulation of civil defense]

[Text] Section I. Central Organization

Article 1. The provisions of this decree are aimed at applying the rules established by Law No 71-059 of 25 February 1971 concerning the organization of civil defense.

Article 2. The minister of interior heads, coordinates and oversees the drafting and implementation of the civil defense measures throughout the national territory.

To that effect, it has the Civil Defense Directorate and is seconded by a National Civil Defense Commission, which has an advisory capacity.

Article 3. The National Civil Defense Commission is made up as follows: the minister in charge of the permanence of the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) or his representative; the minister in charge of equipment and transport or his representative; the minister in charge of finance or his representative; the minister in charge of national defense or his representative; the minister in charge of the Merchant Marine or his representative; and the minister in charge of health, labor and social affairs or his representative.

This commission is headed by the minister of interior or his representative. It meets at least once a year, when called by its chairman.

The Civil Defense Directorate provides the secretaryship of the commission.

Article 4. Within the commission, as provided in Article 3, the following committees will have the individual tasks enumerated in Article 4 of Law No 71-059.

a) Civil Defense Committee: Headed by the minister of national defense or his representative, the Civil Defense Committee includes: the director of civil defense; the national chief of staff or his representative; the inspector of the National Guard; the general director of National Security; a representative of the

minister in charge of the permanence of the Military Committee for National Salvation; a representative of the minister of equipment and transport; a representative of the minister in charge of the Merchant Marine; and the commander of the National Guard or his representative.

b) Supply Committee: Headed by the minister of transport, it is made up of the following members: a representative of the minister of finance; a representative of the minister in charge of the permanence of the CMSN; a representative of the minister of interior; and a representative of the minister of commerce.

c) Rescue and Aid Committee: Headed by the minister of public health, it includes: a representative of the Ministry of Youth, Sports, Handicrafts and Tourism; a representative of the Ministry of Interior; the representative of the minister in charge of the permanence of the CMSN; the representative of the minister in charge of national defense; the representative of the minister of finance; and a representative of the Mauritanian Red Cross.

These committees meet when called together by their chairman or at the request of the minister of interior.

Article 5. The members of the National Civil Defense Advisory Commission can call in the assistance of experts from their respective ministries.

Article 6. If need be, the minister of interior can decide to set up one or more special committees, which can be either temporary or permanent.

Article 7. The work of the National Civil Defense Advisory Commission and its committees provided for in Article 4 is summarized in a report which is to be approved by the chairman and filed with the Civil Defense Directorate.

Section II. Role of Other Ministers

Article 8. Contingent upon the provisions contained in existing law, every minister will study, within the framework of the directives of the minister of interior, the drafting of civil defense measures in establishments under his authority or placed under his supervision. He submits these measures for the approval of the minister of interior and is in charge of their implementation in keeping with the terms defined by this regulation.

Close coordination between the civil defense measures and active defense is always ensured by the ministers in question.

Section III. Territorial Organization

Article 9. The organization of civil defense is obligatory throughout the national territory.

The terms of this organization, which will vary depending on the relative size and particular situation of the districts, will be the subject of instructions from the minister of interior.

In practice, if one excludes the general defense measures applicable in all regions, whatever their size, the other special measures concern only the regions, departments, districts, areas, and so on, specifically designated by orders from the minister of interior.

These orders, which specify the provisions for each individual region, department, district, area, and so on, are not published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE DE MAURITANIE. Copies are sent to all ministers, governors and prefects individually.

Article 10. The governor coordinates the drafting and implementation of civil defense measures in his region. With the aid of the prefects and district heads, he assumes responsibility for the direction, planning and execution of civil defense measures.

He draws up the general plan of organization for his region from the standpoint of civil defense and every year, summarizes the preparations made.

This report is sent to the minister of interior.

For this purpose, the governor has a regional civil defense department and is aided by a regional civil defense advisory commission which he heads.

Article 11. The makeup of the civil defense advisory commission, provided for in Article 10 above, is established by an order from the minister of interior, on the governor's report.

In principle, this commission has the following composition:

a) titular members: the president of the regional deliberative assembly; the deputy inspector of the National Guard; the police commissioner of the regional capital or, in his place, an appointed police commissioner; an officer from the Gendarmerie or the head of the regional capital brigade; the prefects; the representative of the Mauritanian Red Cross; and the heads of the regional departments.

b) other future members: a representative of every establishment compelled to have self-protection; and officials chosen by the governor and particularly representatives of trade unions or associations that might contribute to civil defense measures.

This commission handles civil defense problems under the central ministries at whose levels there will not be any ministerial civil defense commissions.

Article 12. The titular members of this commission are spread out over the committees provided for in Article 4.

Nevertheless, the governor can, with the approval of the minister of interior, set up other committees.

Article 13. At the departmental level, the departmental civil defense advisory commission is set up by an order from the governor upon the proposal of the prefect.

This commission, headed by the prefect, includes:

- a) titular members: heads of districts, the police commissioner, if required, the Gendarmerie detachment head, heads of departmental departments and the representative of the Mauritanian Red Cross;
- b) other members: a representative of establishments that may be required to have self-defense, and officials chosen by the prefect, particularly representatives of the trade unions and associations that may be able to contribute to civil defense measures.

Article 14. Local civil defense committees may be set up at the district level by an order of the prefect, upon the proposal of district heads presiding over them.

These committees will include: local administrative officials; and any other officials chosen by the chairman of the local civil defense committee.

Article 15. Either because of their individual situations or exceptional circumstances, permanent offices may be set up at the prompting of the governor in certain departments or districts.

Article 16. Decrees establishing the makeup of the departmental advisory commissions and local advisory committees will specify the operating rules of the organs.

Section IV. Special Security Measures

Article 17. All establishments, enterprises and companies, whatever their legal nature, may be designated to ensure their own defense as soon as they present national or public interest.

This national or public interest must be evaluated in terms of one of the following characteristics:

- a) the importance of their activity to the national defense or life of the country; or
- b) the number of persons who may be assembled there, for whatever purpose.

This designation is made by an order of the minister of the interior upon the proposal of the governor, based on the opinion of the minister in question.

The establishments, enterprises and companies directly under the minister of national defense and laboratories, enterprises, companies or establishments which, through an interministerial understanding, when struck in peacetime come under the authority of the minister of national defense during special periods, are automatically declared to be free of such strikes by virtue of a special order. Their list is sent to the governors and prefects involved as soon as peace is restored.

The orders containing the designations provided for in the preceding paragraph are not published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL. They are sent to the parties involved by the proper administrative authorities.

Article 18. The defense of the establishments, enterprises and companies named is planned and ensured under the authority of the governor of the region, in keeping with the instructions of the minister of interior, to be completed, if need be, by the technical specifications drawn up by the minister in question.

The defense of the establishments, enterprises and companies automatically designated by virtue of Article 17 is planned and ensured under the authority of the regional governor in keeping with the instructions of the minister of national defense, with the approval of the minister of interior.

Article 19. Every minister studies the measures and work necessary for the defense of central departments within the framework of existing laws and the terms of application drawn up by the minister of interior. Subject to the latter's approval, he ensures their execution under the conditions set forth by existing legislation.

Article 20. In accordance with the minister of interior, every minister draws up a list of his departments or domestic facilities whose defense is ensured under his direct authority, within the framework of the instructions of the minister of interior.

If defense of departments or domestic facilities is not on that list, it is provided under the double supervision of the minister of interior and the minister in question, by the governor of the region with the aid of the department heads in question.

Article 21. Every minister appoints from under the officials under his authority the chief of civil defense in charge of ensuring liaison with the Civil Defense Directorate of the Ministry of Interior.

Section V. Plans and Programs

Article 22. The planning of civil defense requires the drafting of plans and programs.

Plans objectively set the goal to be attained. They indicate needs and their order of priority. They are drawn up in terms of technical possibilities with the greatest concern for economy, but disregarding budgetary limitations. They are accompanied by estimates.

They are drawn up within the framework of the provisions of this section and in keeping with the technical structuration of the minister of interior, later to be completed by those of the other ministers involved.

They are drawn up by the minister of interior in keeping with the credits granted to him and following the opinion of the ministers involved when it is a question of programs to be carried out under their direct responsibility.

Article 23. The planning of the organization of civil defense means the drafting of an overall plan which is the synthesis of the individual plans named below:

- 1) Special civil defense equipment plans aimed at ensuring: general and local security (alert, blackouts, and so on); defense through removal (scattering, evacuation, and so on); on-the-spot protection, individual or collective; rescue means (firefighting, pollution, emergency clearing and excavation, the rescue of persons and property, and so on); and sanitary protection;
- 2) Plans concerning the organization of liaison (transmission, transport);
- 3) Recruiting plan;
- 4) Plan of instruction aimed at the training of cadres and the population; and
- 5) Plan of psychological action to facilitate the implementation of the preceding plans.

Article 24. In order to set up these various plans, it is first of all necessary to: determine needs, survey resources and provide for the creation of new additional resources indispensable to meet needs.

The creation of new resources is the subject, in each special equipment plan, of supplemental plans: requisitioning, studies, experiments, works, purchases of materials or products, storage, and so on.

Article 25. Technical instructions from the minister of interior, to be completed by special directives from the ministers involved, will be sent to the administrative authorities in charge of the planning and execution of plans provided for in Article 23.

Instructions concerning the drafting of plans relating to establishments required to have self-defense programs are sent to them by the proper administrative authorities.

Article 26. Following the drafting of special equipment plans, the minister of interior draws up the country's overall equipment plan for civil defense.

This plan supplies a total evaluation of needs based on the goal to attain and the country's economic and budgetary possibilities.

Article 27. The minister of interior plans the various equipment programs to be carried out in several annual installments.

These programs, drawn up in terms of the objectives set, establish the order of priorities for projects, considering both industrial and financial possibilities.

They serve as a basis for the evaluation of budgetary estimates. Their execution is pursued in terms of credits available.

Article 28. Measures to be taken in case of international tension are the subject of a special two-part study: One concerns the works, requisitions, purchases, changes and so on that cannot be done in advance. The other spells out the part of the programs to be executed. It requires repeated updates to keep up with programs.

Section VI. Execution of Programs

Article 29. When the overall equipment plan and programs for execution have been drawn up, if need be, the minister of interior notifies either the ministers or regional governors of modifications that must be made in the special civil defense equipment plans.

Execution of programs requires: technical studies and experiments; purchases of consumable materials and equipment; furnishings; the storage of consumable materials and equipment, their maintenance and the maintenance of property.

Article 30. It is the task of the Civil Defense Directorate to ensure, on the national level, the uniformity of the equipment policy and the standardization of materials. It is in charge of technical studies and experiments concerning civil defense.

For that purpose, it exchanges all information and documents helpful in the accomplishment of its mission with the technical organs of the various ministries; and

It calls all meetings of technical commissions in charge of studying the different types of materials, products or facilities that might be used by civil defense.

In connection with the Ministry of Interior, the departments of the Ministry of Public Health make the technical studies and do the experiments concerning sanitary protection.

Article 31. In the field of research, the Ministry of Interior can call upon the proper national organizations.

It can also procure the aid of specialists and private organizations that might contribute to the completion of studies and technical experiments that it could not conduct under the conditions provided for in the previous paragraph. Payment of expenditures resulting from such work is made in keeping with the existing public accounting rules.

Article 32. In order to obtain supplies of consumable equipment and materials, the ministry of interior, who knows the country's needs, can, with the approval of the National Marketing Commission:

- 1) on the national level, do the buying itself or request a specially qualified government department to do the buying and deliver the necessary quantities to the parties involved; or
- 2) on the regional level, entrust the governors or departments involved to buy the necessary quantities of materials and products themselves.

In all cases, the Civil Defense Directorate will: choose the type of material or indicate the quality of the product to be purchased; indicate the maximum unit prices; and oversee the execution of the purchases or work.

Article 33. All action concerning construction or property, carried out within the framework of the plan to provide shelter for the population, is required and is the responsibility of: the government when it is in the public interest; the establishments required to ensure their own self-defense if the work to be done fits into the protection system of the establishments; and of the owner when the work planned concerns only the protection of his own property or that of renters.

Article 34. Civil defense work and arrangements can be done by: government agencies and departments; regional organizations; establishments required to have their own defense system; and private parties. Such undertakings are permitted when done in a building belonging to them, when the work is required for the protection of the persons involved or when done in the general or local interest.

If the work is not done in the time required by the property owners mentioned above, then the minister of interior automatically has the work done.

Article 35. The ministers concerned receive notification of the program phases concerning: work planned under private plans; and work that is subsequently to be completed by the different departments in their buildings as civil defense measures of general or local interest.

The ministers therefore ask the minister of interior for the credits needed to carry out these programs. For this purpose, they plan the corresponding technical projects and the specifications defining the nature and size of the work.

Article 36. Upon notification from the National Civil Defense Advisory Commission, the minister of interior determines the risks against which buildings must be protected and, in agreement with the minister of equipment, draws up a typical regulation establishing modes of construction and the materials to be used in order to reduce their vulnerability in peacetime.

Using this typical regulation as a model, each minister issues orders, countersigned by the minister of interior, for the public departments, public administrative establishments and industrial and commercial establishments placed under his authority or supervision.

Under these same conditions, the regional governor, following notification by the regional civil defense advisory commission, issues an order determining the obligations imposed for the construction of buildings in his region.

This order must be approved by the minister of interior.

Article 37. The minister of interior also has the power to prescribe, through an order countersigned by the ministers involved, the measures to which certain industrial and commercial establishments can be subjected and whose nature demands special protection techniques.

This order must be approved by the minister of interior.

Article 38. The application of the different measures set forth in Articles 36 and 37 is ensured on the occasion of the delivery of the building permit, instituted

in Nouakchott by Decree No 64-081 of 12 May 1964 (city planning regulation) and subsequent regulations.

Article 39. For this purpose, the permit required for new construction and major remodeling is not delivered by the proper authority until that authority has observed that the project respects the special civil defense provisions.

However, if, upon the examination of a dossier, a difficulty arises or if a waiver appears necessary, the subdivisionary of public works must go to the government (regional civil defense department).

The latter may request the opinion of the special civil defense committee, which gives its decision within 2 months.

Article 40. Before the building permit may be issued by the minister of equipment or the regional governor, the minister of interior is directly consulted.

Article 41. If such construction is exempted from the building permit because of a dispensation granted by an order, the inspection covered by the preceding articles is made directly by the proper ministry, with the approval of the minister of interior.

Article 42. In the case of new construction or major building remodeling in his region, the governor may envisage the establishment of additional civil defense premises or facilities.

On the other hand, for major works intended for shelter purposes, the government sends the dossier to the minister of interior, including in particular the opinion of the regional civil defense commission and the report of a specialist on the value of technical provisions envisaged and on the financial estimates for the operation.

At the same time, he informs the owner of the additional obligations that might be imposed on him.

The minister of interior must reveal his decision in principle on the proposals put before him so that the building permit may be issued within the time prescribed. Notification is sent to the owner along with delivery of the document.

Article 43. Civil defense work of local or private interest may be done by the organizations and private owners involved.

Article 44. Supervision of public shelters is the responsibility of administrative authorities, who may entrust their management to other organizations.

Article 45. Plans and specifications relating to works which are normally the responsibility, for the protection of their personnel, of regional or departmental departments and private enterprises required to provide their own protection, are sent to the governor, who submits them to the regional civil defense commission or one of these committees for an opinion. Only then are these projects forwarded to the minister of interior.

Article 46. For certain projects or facilities, only public departments are used for construction and maintenance. These departments are chosen by the minister of interior in agreement with the minister involved.

The regulation of public transactions is applicable to these works and projects.

Article 47. Facilities and supplies involved in the various civil defense undertakings of the government must respond to equipment needs, either on the national, regional or departmental level.

Storage and maintenance expenditures are to be borne by the government. But when materials are assigned to a region, the expenditures then belong to the region and become obligatory in keeping with the provisions of Article 33 of Section VII.

Article 48. The storage and maintenance of materials destined to meet national needs are ensured by the minister of interior (Civil Defense Directorate).

Article 49. Materials permanently assigned to the special protection of a region are maintained and used by permanent personnel holding certain diplomas issued under conditions set by the minister of interior (Civil Defense Directorate), or by specialists approved by the ministry, upon the proposal of the governor, which personnel perform maintenance and use on contract.

The same is true of the maintenance and use of materials and equipment of the public departments and private establishments.

Article 50. Property and buildings are maintained at the expense of the government or of the organizations or establishments required to have their own protection.

The minister or regional governor issues the instructions needed to set the conditions for this maintenance and inspections.

Article 51. Private establishments required to have their own protection undergo inspection visits under the same conditions.

Section VII. Financial Provisions

Article 52. The financing of civil defense planning and equipment is to be borne by the government.

Operating expenditures are the responsibility of the regions.

Nevertheless, the government may make certain officials or cadres available to organizations, paid out of the state budget.

Article 53. Facilities and supplies of civil defense equipment and materials from the government, for the special protection of an organization or public department, become the respective property of that organization or department, which will have sole charge of maintenance and conservation under government supervision and, if need be, must organize the services needed to perform this function.

Maintenance and operating expenses are the obligation of these organizations in public services.

Article 54. Establishments designated in keeping with this regulation to provide their own protection must bear all expenses for installation, supplies, maintenance and conservation.

Nevertheless, the government may contribute to the defraying of these expenses under the conditions set forth in Article 59.

Article 55. Estimated civil defense expenditures concerning the Ministry of National Defense are included in the budget of that ministry.

Article 56. Anticipated civil defense expenditures concerning the sanitary protection plan and whose responsibility belongs to the minister of public health are included in the budget of that ministry.

Article 57. Estimated civil defense expenditures concerning ministries other than those named in Articles 55 and 56 are included in the budget of the Ministry of Interior.

The credits needed are made available by the minister of interior to the ministers involved, in keeping with existing public accounting rules.

In addition, certain materials can be issued in kind to the ministry in question by the minister of interior or, when it is a question of sanitary equipment and products, by the minister of public health.

Credits are granted and materials delivered in accordance with the provisions of Article 29.

Article 58. Credits needed for the civil defense of regional and prefectural departments are allocated to the governors in keeping with the provisions of Articles 29, 33, 42, 45, 49, 52 and 53.

On the other hand, expenditures for establishments, enterprises or companies or those organizations required to provide their own protection are borne either by: the budget of those establishments, enterprises or companies, if it is distinct from that of the organization; or by the budget of the organization, subject, in both cases, to the possible participation of the government, in keeping with the provisions of Article 59 below.

Article 59. The establishments, enterprises or companies so designated bear the expenses needed to plan their protection.

The government can furnish aid, either in the form of a loan made at the rate of advances from the Central Bank plus one point and repayable by annuities within a maximum period of 10 years.

Such loans are made only if the enterprise can demonstrate that it cannot meet, within the time allotted, all or part of the initial outlay required of it for

civil defense protection. Such loans cannot exceed two-thirds of the expenditures provided for by equipment plans.

Article 60. Public or private individuals who undertake new construction or major remodeling of existing constructions must bear the defense expenditures resulting from such work.

The additional expenditures resulting from the future construction of premises or facilities for civil defense in the general interest are to be borne by the government.

Article 61. The minister of interior has, for civil defense: allocations provided for in the state budget; and 2) the funds provided by Decree No 71-157 of 10 June 1971.

Article 62. The minister of interior can make available to the ministers those credits needed to carry out civil defense projects, in keeping with the provisions of Article 29.

The ministers must include a budgetary line in their respective budgets.

Article 63. Violations of the provisions of this decree are punishable by the penalties set forth in Articles 12 and 13 of Law No 71-059 of 25 February 1971, concerning the organization of civil defense.

Article 64. All provisions contrary to those of this decree are hereby abrogated.

Article 65. The minister of interior, the minister of national defense and the minister of health and public affairs are individually entrusted with the execution of this decree, which will be published following the priority procedure.

Decree No 2 of 26 January 1981 Concerning the Establishment of Regional Groups

11,464

CSO: 4519/58

FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY DECLINES; SOLUTIONS SUGGESTED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 21 Aug 81, pp 1, 6

[Text] At its general assembly, the Federation of Food Processing Industries of Morocco (FICOPAM) heard its president, Hadj Hamid Lahlou, present a report on the past year. He underlined the fact that the processing of food from the past harvest took place under somber and very delicate circumstances, characterized by a difficult international economic situation and unfavorable weather conditions which affected the principal agricultural products needed for food processing. He also noted that there had been substantial price increases affecting all the factors of production.

The president said that this situation had the following immediate consequences:

- the fact that our products were non-competitive on the international market, compared with those of our principal competitors;
- a slowdown in activity in all sectors.

Following are the principal points made in President Lahlou's speech: although the harvest season of 1978-79 recorded very satisfactory results, with exports of 125,153 tons and a value of 423.8 million dirham, the most recent harvest season unfortunately reflected a noticeable decrease. The export tonnage for the period from 1 October 1979 to 30 September 1980 was only 93,930 tons, for a value of 369.7 million dirham.

On a sector by sector basis the decline was general, with the exception of the processed olives industry, which more or less maintained its position by comparison with 1978-79.

Olives

Some 40,000 tons of olives were exported in 1978-79, for a value of 138.4 million dirham, while in 1979-80 only 39,304 tons were exported, for a value of 136.6 million dirham.

Fruits and Preserves

This sector recorded the largest decline in production, or 53 percent by comparison with the previous year. Only 15,899 tons were produced in 1979-80, compared to 33,690 tons produced in 1978-79, for a value of 47 million dirham, compared to 71.7 million dirham in the previous year.

This situation had the following principal causes: a very bad agricultural harvest, a price level fixed by Morocco which was clearly higher than that of competitive countries, and strong competition from Greece, in addition to the problem caused by the replacement of apricots by other fruits (peaches and pears subsidized by the EEC).

Fruit Juice

Compared to 1978-79, when production totaled 17,049 tons for a value of 47.3 million dirham, this sector, due to a decline in the tonnage of crushed citrus fruit, recorded a substantial decline in 1979-80 in the order of 33 percent in tonnage exported and 24 percent in terms of receipts (11,430 tons exported, for a value of 36.1 million dirham).

Normal supply of fruit to fruit juice factories was hampered by the increase in exports of fresh fruit and by demand on the local market, which made it possible for citrus fruit growers to obtain better prices than those paid by the preserving industry.

Vegetables

Going from exports of 18,202 tons down to 14,177 tons, with a value declining from 78.6 million dirham to 74.7 million dirham, this sector also recorded a decline amounting to 22 percent in terms of tonnage and 5 percent in terms of value.

Gherkins

Despite a decline of 18 percent in tonnage, with 9,530 tons exported in 1979-80 instead of 11,531 tons exported in 1978-79 and with the value of gherkins exported declining by 11.5 percent (31 million dirham instead of 35 million dirham), this sector continues to reflect a certain dynamism. Results achieved remain higher than those of previous years. As the 1978-79 harvest season was characterized by very favorable conditions, it can be considered an exceptional year.

Capers

This sector was no exception and also declined, with 23 percent less produced in terms of tonnage (3,500 tons produced in 1979-80 compared to 4,674 tons in 1978-79) and a decline of 16 percent in value (44 million dirham compared to 52 million dirham).

Sales

The dependence of this sector on the EEC, as the following figures show, remains a constant element in our sales structure.

PERCENTAGE OF SALES TO THE EEC BY ITEM

Gherkins	99.6
Fruit Juice	98.7
Fruit	97.14
Vegetables	93.7
Olives	83.2
Capers	74.2

The only case of diversification recorded in our markets is to the credit of our olives and capers, which have begun to be sold in eastern markets.

However, although for the export of olives this market diversification has been noted from year to year, the shipment of capers to the eastern markets has amounted to the reactivation of these markets which had been inactive for a long time, and which must be maintained and developed.

Thus, this situation of a "traditional market" continues to concern our Federation by reason of the evolution on the EEC.

This evolution no doubt will be reflected by the strengthening of EEC restrictive and protectionist measures against our products, measures which have already led to the disappearance of exports of tomato concentrates.

Diversification of outlets for our industries is therefore an imperative need, which our industries fully appreciate. However, to ensure the kind of success hoped for, such diversification should take place in a progressive, realistic way, responding to objectives and guidelines previously defined.

This sales effort concerning our products and the change in the present structure of our production necessarily and specifically imply abandoning different factors of production which were long considered logistical means for the promotion of our exports. They also imply the definition and application of new departures in our sales program in order to establish ourselves in new markets and develop with them. For example, this means more suppleness and adaptation to this new system of our administrative measures, as well as speed in decision-making.

This listing of conditions necessary for such a change is in no sense based on ill-considered demands. Rather, it reflects what is required to face up to competition which has become widespread and pitiless.

Action by the FICOPAM

In accordance with the continuing policy of our Federation, following the submission of our White Paper to the government, we have carried on a dialogue with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Ocean Fishing, the Directorate of Foreign Commerce, and the responsible officials of the OCE [Marketing and Export Office]. Specific committees were established to work with the OCE to go more deeply into various questions.

The Federation, for its part, in timely fashion had prepared and submitted documents dealing with the major problems facing us. Certain of these problems, like adjusting the advance export payment, payment for OCE services, and regionalization, have met with satisfactory solutions. More complicated problems, such as transit questions, call for more detailed study.

In terms of relations between our industries and the OCE and on the occasion of the holding of the SIAL [International Food Products Salon] exhibition in Paris in 1980 the FICOPAM participated for the first time in that event in the Moroccan pavillion, alongside the OCE.

This action by the Federation, which was favorably received, led to other, fruitful contacts and to satisfying requests for information on the different sectors of food processing in Morocco.

Taking advantage of this important economic event, our Federation organized a round table with Morocco's European customers for processed fruit. This meeting made it possible to undertake with our trading partners an objective analysis of the present situation in the apricot market and to identify the steps needed to be taken to avoid having the same thing happen to another sector of our industry.

It is appropriate to be pleased with this cooperation between our industry and the OCE, a kind of cooperation whose field of activity should be further enlarged.

Agricultural Problems

Specific aspects of the activities of our industry and difficulties encountered in the past have made the Federation and its various sectors very sensitive to agricultural problems.

Certainly, various private initiatives have involved making very valuable efforts, often under difficult conditions, to maintain the good name of our quality agricultural products. Contracts for developing new varieties of fruit have been entered into with farmers, whose success has made possible the introduction and spread of such new varieties in many areas of the country.

Well aware of this basic question, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform now intends to make its contribution to the resolution of these problems.

Contacts are presently underway between the Office of Agricultural Adjustment of Doukkalas and FICOPAM, under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture, with a view to producing everything required for agricultural development in the best way possible and in the mutual interest of the partners. Most recently, the King has presided over the Agricultural Economy Festival in Marrakech. Our Federation was represented there by the president, who took part in its activities and was a member of the sponsoring committee.

The committee made the following recommendations regarding canned vegetables:

- 1) the early establishment of a contractual system between agricultural producers and food processing industries, in order to guarantee minimum prices for

agricultural products and the supply of agricultural products to the factories on a regular basis, in both qualitative and quantitative terms;

- 2) reserving a portion of state lands to provide agro-industrial establishments with agricultural products;
- 3) creating a permanent agro-industry commission, including representatives of the government, specialized organizations, and industries concerned, in order to consider the problems of this sector and take timely action as appropriate;
- 4) encouraging the establishment of agro-industry in production regions and to do what is necessary for this purpose in terms of the revision of the Code of Industrial Investment;
- 5) encouraging exports by means of a special export premium like that available in competing countries;
- 6) reviewing the operation and organization of the ports and rearranging them to facilitate the task of exporters;
- 7) diversifying agricultural production and redirecting it, particularly in irrigated areas, toward products which can be canned or otherwise preserved;
- 8) reviewing provisions relative to export insurance to make such insurance more effective;
- 9) employing engineers specialized in agro-industry and food technology in order to improve the quality of agro-industrial products.

The establishment of the bodies recommended above and the application of the suggested measures will tend to resolve a considerable part of the difficulties with which the food processing industry is faced and will tend to encourage and promote exports.

Regrettable Division

The overall situation which the past harvest reflected demonstrated how closing our ranks and tightening our cohesion were essential in similar circumstances. At present the dynamic elements of our industry are divided into two associations, and this is profoundly regrettable. This situation, as many people engaged in the food processing industry feel, damages the interests of our industry. Today more than ever, our industry needs to move past personal and marginal problems.

Faced with an uncertain future, our industry has every interest in tightening our ranks to face up to our problems and to provide a better structure for our working equipment in order to respond to the needs of our members.

My wish is to see this appeal take concrete shape. Bringing together the efforts of all responsible members will end, I believe, in the result we all seek.

Our Federation has gone through a difficult year which has had an impact on the normal functioning of its internal activities. The participation of our members and the commitment of our sector must not be subject to any restriction or circumstance--quite the contrary. The audience we reach and the effectiveness of our Federation will depend directly on the participation and commitment of our members.

5170

CSO: 4519/51

OMAN

BRIEFS

OIL PIPELINE CONTRACT AWARDED--A 20.5 million dollar contract for laying oil and gas pipelines has been awarded to the Oman Construction Company (TOCO) by the Omani Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals. A 325 km gas pipeline will connect the Saih Nihayda gas field in the central part of Oman with the Marmul pipeline. It will help to provide gas to power stations in the south. The terms also include laying of gas and oil pipelines connecting the Rima oilfields with the main Marmul line. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 633, 12 Sep 81 p 14]

CSO: 440/3

QATAR

BRIEFS

JAPANESE WIN DESALINATION CONTRACT--Sumitomo Heavy Industries of Japan has won a contract worth \$123m to build the final extension to the Ras Abu Fontas desalination plant in Qatar. The deputy director of the Water Department at the Ministry of Electricity, William Lee, said the extension was due to be completed by 1983. The contract covers the supply of four waste-heat boilers and desalination units. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 p 44]

CSO: 4400/5

GROWTH OF SAUDI INTERNATIONAL BANK EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 pp 42-43

[Article by Lionel Peters]

[Text]

SMILING members of the board of directors adorn the first two pages of the Saudi International Bank's 1980 report. Their pleasure is understandable — SIB, unlike many Arab consortium banks formed after the oil price rises of the 1970s, has gone from strength to strength.

In addition, SIB's interim statement for this year (as at 30 June) reflects continuing progress, particularly in SIB's emphasis on asset growth and global lending. The total balance sheet has nearly doubled, in sterling krms, from £852m at 30 June 1980 to £1.6bn for the same period this year. The depreciation of sterling against the two currencies in which the bank operates, the US dollar and the Saudi Arabian riyal, had a major effect on the figures. If measured in dollar terms, the rise over the year would have been 60 per cent. Loans and other commercial banking assets showed a substantial rise, accounting for 40 per cent of total assets. In line with expected growth in business worldwide, a representative office was opened this May in New York.

Western bankers are partly responsible for the rapid growth in the bank's business since its inception in 1976. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York has 20 per cent of the bank's equity, and plays a major role in the everyday running of the bank — it has been so successful that its contract has been extended to 1984.

Other western bank shareholders include Bank of Tokyo, Banque Nationale de Paris, Deutsche Bank AG, National Westminster and Union Bank of Switzerland, which each have 5 per cent. There are three Saudi shareholders — Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) with 50 per cent, National Commercial Bank (Saudi Arabia's largest commercial bank) with 2½ per cent, and Riyad Bank which also has 2½ per cent.

The board of directors' members work closely together and include Lord O'Brien, former governor of the Bank of England, the Saudi minister of finance, Sheikh Mohammed Abalkhail, who is the chairman, and Andreas Prindl, formerly with Morgan Guaranty in the Far East, as chief executive.

Despite the influence of western banks, there is strict adherence to Arab tradition and the bank pays attention to the Arab blacklist of firms trading with Israel. Before accepting a participation in a syndicated loan, the bank has been known to ask the lead manager for the names of other participating banks.

Loan syndication has become one of the main growth areas and the bank lends worldwide, not just to Arab borrowers. The bank made its first appearance in the syndicated loan market in 1978, as a manager in the \$667m credit to Sonatrach

of Algeria. During the same year, SIB was a manager in the SR169m syndicated guarantee facility to Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of the Philippines and a manager in the \$100m credit to Chrysler Financial Overseas Capital NV.

Activity increased in 1979 with the bank managing or co-managing ten loans, for a combined total of more than \$1bn, to Algeria, Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria and Spain. It also played its first co-lead manager role, in the SR165m to Saudi Hotels and Resort Areas Company, co-leading with Gulf International Bank and Al Bank al Saudi al Fransi.

But Saudi International Bank really began to make the market aware of its presence in 1980 — it was a lead manager

on 15 occasions, including some prestige loans lead-managed, only \$53m was to an Denmark. Of the total \$2.1bn worth of loans lead — managed, only \$53m was to an Arab country, which underscores the bank's global outlook. It was also a manager 14 times, for loans totalling \$3bn.

This year could prove to be a record one for euromarket lending. In the first half, the bank was a lead manager in 11 loans totalling \$2.2bn and a manager on 17 occasions for \$2.3bn. Again, most of the lead managements have been to non-Arab countries. It was a co-lead manager in the \$600m credit to the Kingdom of Denmark and the \$1.2bn — credit — partly in SDRs — to the Kingdom of Sweden.

CSO: 4400/4

BRIEFS

LIBYAN PLOT ALLEGED--Khartoum, September 14--Libya is responsible for the scarcity and rising prices of consumer goods in Sudan, the daily paper AL AYYAM charged on Sunday. It said the Tripoli Government was financing a plot to exert economic pressure. While it might not affect the state, it would certainly affect day-to-day consumer needs and create popular discontent, AL AYYAM said. People were being recruited to monopolise essential commodities and to demand the highest possible prices, the paper said, without being more specific about the methods used. It said part of the plot was to dump perishable goods such as vegetables in the River Nile to ensure a scarcity. AL AYYAM said refugees were another cause of the high cost of living here in the capital, and in other urban centres. Eritrean, Chadian and Ugandan refugees in many cases made straight for Khartoum or for other big towns after crossing into the country and became a heavy burden on food supplies, public transport and health and other services, it argued. There was also a security threat because some of the refugees smuggled arms and ammunition into the towns, the newspaper said. AL AYYAM said the refugees should be confirmed to camps away from the townships. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2828, 15 Sep 81 p 12]

ARMS SMUGGLING INCIDENT--Khartoum, September 13--A truckload of arms said to be destined for sale in West Sudan was seized by police here last week, the Sudanese News Agency reported today. Five Sudanese nationals were arrested, according to a Security Forces statement quoted by the agency. The arms were found hidden inside sacks of onions. The five, who had confessed their guilt, said they brought the arms from Eastern Sudan and were planning to take them to Mujlad in the west of the country for sale there, the agency reported. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2828, 15 Sep 81 p 12]

CSO: 4500/6

COOPERATION BETWEEN SYRIA, USSR UNDERSCORED

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 10 Sep 81 pp 1, 2

[Article by Yu. Borisov and V. Chemodin: "Fruitful Cooperation"]

[Text] The people of Syria are living in the hard conditions created by the unceasing Israeli aggression, the continued occupation of some sovereign Syrian land by Tel Aviv soldiery, and the overall drastic rise of tension in the region caused by the intensified scheming of US imperialist elements. The nation has to combine its construction effort with that of defence, having to spend a large proportion of its national income for defence purposes.

Equal and mutually advantageous cooperation between the two friendly countries--the USSR and Syria--has been quite fruitful. The Euphrates Hydroengineering Complex, the key project in Soviet-Syrian economic co-operation, has become a unit of national importance, a major factor behind the Republic's economic growth. It has generated 12,500 million kwh of electricity since it was started up. On the other hand, the high dam across the Euphrates, which required as much earth-work as eighteen Cheops pyramids would have, has put an end to flood danger. The Al-Asad reservoir, thus formed, has made possible the irrigation of 640,000 hectares of land and an enlargement of the area under cotton, cereals, and other farm crops so essential to Syria.

Open-work towers of high-voltage power transmission lines have sprung up all across the land from the town of As-Saura, the home of this complex, over a distance of 1,670 km.

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Syria in oil industry development has been going on for almost twenty years. Soviet-assisted geological surveying and prospecting has served to discover some oil-bearing fields and estimate the overall geological oil reserves in North-East Syria, which meant laying the groundwork for full-scale commercial petroleum production. At present Syria is not only meeting her domestic demand in full, but exporting some of her oil.

Steady headway is being made in Soviet-Syrian cooperation in the development of transport services. The Soviet Union has been assisting Syria in designing, reconstructing and building 1,400 kilometres of rail track. The railway lines from Kamechliye to Lattaquie (760 km long) and Tartus-Akkari-Homs-Mhin and further on to the phosphate mines of Palmyra (300 km long) built with Soviet assistance,

are of great importance for Syria. The exploitation of these lines will yield a great economic effect.

The USSR is offering Syria technical assistance in enlarging the seaport of Lattaquie to handle up to 7 million tons of cargo a year, which is a matter of great importance for the development of Syria's external economic relations, as well as in building four bridges across the Euphrates, two of which are already open to traffic.

In the process of joint work at these projects, Soviet specialists are generously passing on their wealth of know-how to their Syrian friends. More than 32,000 Syrian skilled workers, engineers, and technicians have been trained during the years of cooperation at their places of work, training centres, established with Soviet assistance, as well as at higher and secondary educational institutions. Many Syrian specialists have had on-the-job training in the Soviet Union; Soviet organisations are providing assistance in building a railway training centre at Aleppo and a number of secondary vocational schools.

All this is certainly contributing towards consolidating the country's public sector which is fundamental to the process of national industrialisation and the creation of a diversified modern economy. These guidelines of Syria's economic development have been reaffirmed in the latest, Fifth Five-Year Plan, recently approved by the Syrian leadership, committed, as before, to creating a self-determined economy.

Damascus

(Sotcialisticheskaya Industriya, September 10.
Abridged.)

CSO: 4400/6

CABINET APPROVES SCHOOL, HEALTH, OTHER PROJECTS

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 22 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

THE UAE Cabinet at its weekly meeting in Abu Dhabi yesterday approved a proposal for the setting up of temporary schools in some rural areas of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.

The meeting, which was presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister, Shaikh Hamdan bin Mohammed, decided to earmark 16 million dirhams for the project. These temporary schools will be set up in industrial townships of Mussafah, Jarn Yafoor and Bani Yas. According to informed sources the schools will later be turned into permanent institutions.

The cabinet also approved a recommendation from the permanent projects committee for increasing the budget for the construction of clinics in industrial townships of Abu Dhabi. The sum earmarked for the clinic to be set up at Jaran Yafoor was increased to 1,870,000 dirhams, and that for the clinic at Mussafah to 1,960,000 dirhams.

The cabinet increased the allocation for the extension work in progress at Abu Dhabi radio station to Dh 386,000.

The Cabinet also approved a memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources for the execution of the third phase of the minerals survey

programme at a cost of six million dirhams.

A memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the payment of UAE's share in the budget of the UN forces stationed at the Golan Heights and the budget for the Unicef's regional office in Abu Dhabi, was also approved.

The cabinet reviewed a report, prepared by the audit department, on the closing accounts of the Emirates Telecommunications Corporation for the year 1978.

WAM adds: Education Minister Saeed Sulman told after the meeting that the Cabinet had approved a proposals put forward by the Ministry of Education and Youth concerning the requirement of teachers for the academic year 1981-82.

The Cabinet approved 1418 posts for new appointments from Arab countries, he said.

The minister said that the Cabinet also discussed a proposal for providing accommodation to teachers in Abu Dhabi and Al Ain. The proposal would be discussed again at the Cabinet meeting next week.

Mr Saeed Salman said that the Cabinet approved the formation of the board of directors of Emirbus transport company. The company, he said, would also be responsible for providing transport facilities to schools.

LOCAL FIRM WINS WATER CONTRACT

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 16 Sep 81 p 15

[Text]

AN agreement was signed yesterday in Dubai between the UAE Ministry of Water and Electricity and the Galadari Engineering Works (GEW) to modernise and regulate activities in the Dhaid water-field. The contract is worth Dh 5.4 million.

Mr Humaid Nasser Al Oweis, Minister of Water and Electricity, and Mr M.S. Khan, director of GEW, signed the agreement under which GEW will supply, install and maintain submersible pumps and also an observation and control system at Dhaid.

A ministry spokesman said the contract, first of its kind to be awarded to a national company, involves supply and installation of highly sophisticated

instrumentation for quality check of water.

The project, to be ready in ten months, will automate most of the operations in the field.

Waterflow from each well, main-tank water level, pressure, total dissolved salts level, PH measurement, temperature and quality of water all could then be read in the control room.

At present pumps are operated separately till the main tank overflows. There is also no facility for recording the level and quantity of water pumped from each well.

The new project will also have a workshop for repair of pumps and engines from Dhaid, Dibba and Fujairah.

The Ministry is planning similar projects for Dibba and Fujairah water fields, the spokesman said.

CSO: 4400/7

BRIEFS

FOREIGN LABOR PROJECTIONS--There will be more than half a million foreign workers in the UAE sometime in 1982 if present trends continue. A report from Abu Dhabi last week said the size of the labour force in the UAE was increasing at an annual rate of 13.6 percent and that Planning Ministry figures showed there were 422,548 foreign workers in the Emirates at the end of last year. Construction employs about 145,000 workers, representing 34 percent of the work force. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 6]

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE FIRM--The final work on implementing a project to set up a pan-Arab aircraft maintenance company will be complete by the end of September and the \$32.5 million company will then be launched, according to reports from Abu Dhabi last week. The new firm is to be called the Gulf Company for Aircraft Maintenance and it aims to be able to handle all the maintenance of Arab-owned aircraft within the next four years. The Director General of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED), Nasser al-Noueyssi, who is also a member of the Board of Directors of the new firm, said that in the first stage of its operations the company would provide maintenance services for Gulf Air, which is jointly owned by several small Arab states. Later, Mr Noueyssi added, the firm would handle about 10 percent of the maintenance work required by other airlines flying to the area. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 11]

BRITISH WIN POWER CONTRACT--The British engineering firm, John Brown of Clydebank has won a £30 million (\$55.5 million) contract to supply a turnkey power station to Abu Dhabi, involving the company's first sale of a new fuel-efficient "Frame 6" gas turbine. The order is for the manufacture, installation and commissioning of a power project of over 100 Megawatts at Bani Yas town power station for the water and electricity department. The Frame 6 gas turbine is no bigger than previous models producing 25 Megawatts but has a capacity of 35 Megawatts, thus saving fuel in electricity generation. An official of the British firm said last week that the order was won by John Brown Engineering against severe competition from Westinghouse of the US, Brown Boveri of Switzerland, and the British General Electric Company. No details were given on the project's completion target. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 12]

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTIONS--According to the latest amendments to the five-year plan, submitted to the Cabinet, production of vegetables and fruits in the UAE would rise to 333,000 tons in 1985 from 194,000 tons in 1980. This represents a growth rate of 11.3 per cent. The plan expects meat production to rise to 53,000 tons and eggs production to 200 million eggs from 80 million in 1980. Fish production target is 106,000 tons against 68,300 tons in 1980. The agricultural sector's investments will amount to about Dh 3.7 billion against Dh 1.7 billion in the last five years. The value of agricultural production in 1985 will be about Dh 1,363 million against Dh 817 million in 1980. At its last meeting, the Cabinet had ordered the ministries to study their plans and to amend them in the light of the latest developments. [Text] [Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 19 Sep 81 p 3]

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